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A1gad.-Watercourse.
Badmash.-A blaclrgnarcl.
Badraga.-Safe-concluct ; tribal eucort.
l3cckir.-A trading caravan.
Band.-A clam.
Bnram2n.-A forcil3le seizure, by way of reprisal.
Barani.--Cultivatecl land dependent on rain. Also called lalmi.
Bht6sa.-Choppecl straw or chaff. Waziri Pushtu-Pir or PTW.
Cha1weshii.-Tribal " Whippcrs in."-"
Specin1 Constableq."
C'l~igi~n.--A
pursuit party.
B
China.-A spring ; fouatain.
C?bitlai (chrctlai).-Course matting, usnally made of cllvarf palm (mnzmi) Waxirrr.
call it Beza.
Daman.-Plain co~lntryon thc slrirts of the hills.
Dara.-A pass.
Gccs?~l.-A patrol.
Qhar.-A lnountain pealr.
Ghazi.-A Mussalmaq who devotes his life to killing a n inficlel, or fighting Kafiru.
The title is no longer used officially, and its assumption b y fanatical niurde~ers
is disapproved b y respectable Mussalmans.
C4kndai.-8 lrnolL
Jihad.--A ?vIuhammaclan religious war ;equivalent to a crusade.
Jirga.-An assembly of t~sibberepresentatives or elders (maliks).
Kach.-An alluvial flat on the bank of a stream.
Kafi1c.-A caravan ; trading convoy.
Karez.-An irrigation-channel, frequently borecl t h o u g h hillsiclee.
Kals.-See Xach.
KRarif.-The autumn crop.
Khassar1ur.-An Afgllan militiaman or levy.
Kiwi.-An encampment of nomails.
KRzoar.-(Khwara, khor).-A ravine.
KO!-.A
wallecl village.
LasREar.-A tribal gathering of over 2M) fighting inen ; used as a n exaggorrttiou
of the numbers of a raiding gang.
Mu1ilz.-hlaster ; elder ; tribal representative.
Mzi1lah.-One learnttcl (or reputed to be so) in the M~thammadanscriptures,
Narai.-A cot or koial ; a pass.
Nakhlar (A7as7~lar).--Bluepine (pin?@excelsa).
0ba.-Water.
pa1osi.-Babul ; acacia tree.
Pir.-A saint.
powindab.-A nomad.
~ z c n ~ . - - U p l a nglacle,
d
or patch of grazing ground.
Ragha (Rogha).-A plateau on the edge of a valley.
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Sungar.-Stone breast-work.
.Sar.-Head, peak.
Sur.-- (fern. Sm).-Red.
Shariat.-The i\luhammadan lam as set forth in the Quran.
Shin -(fern. Sltna).-Green.
Spin.-White.
11a7tgi.-A defile ; gorge.
Toi.-A stream.
Tor.-Black.
Tserai.-Holly oak.
Turnan.-The common people, as opposed-to the t~ialiks.
IVam (worn).-Waziri term of kals (q.v.).
IVarsak.-A spur of a hill.
Wuclt (Uch).-Dry.
IV?r,ta.-8 tree.
.Binral.-A ahrine.

I.

H. E. SIR CHARLES C. MUNRO, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.C.,
C.-IN-C. IN INDIA.
2. MAJOR GENERAL S. H. CLIMO, C.B., D.S.O., COMMANDING
WAZlRlSTAN FORCE.

INTRODUCTORY.
%Taziristan.lieson the western border of the Indian Enlpire,
and forins the coniiecting link ail tlie Afghan
Geogrsphicd.
iroiltier between the districts of I<nrram
and Zhob. For political and adnzinistra,tive purposes it is
di;rided in t o North ern aitd Southern T3Taziristapn, its shape
~eseinblisga rough paral.]elogram, 5,000 square miles in
extent, practically the whole of which is a i;aagl'ed mass of:
mountains a i d hiils of every size, shape, arid braring. At
first sight the nionntains appear to run irregularly in all directions, but a study of the map will show t h a t t h e ~ eare well
defined ranges protect.ing the interior of the couultry and
niakjng penetration into it a matter of extreme difficulty.
The general trend of the main vater-courses is from west
rises by a series of parallel
to east, and the country
ranges froin the Derajat plain to the matershecl which divides
tlie basin of the Indns from that of the Helnland. l'lie streams
s7ary greatly in width and are generally flhnlcccl throughoul;
-their length by high hills, but occasionally thess narrow valleys
ope11 out and cnItivation. takes the place of roclrs and stones.
Here and there, by cutting through ranges of hills a t right
angles to their courses, they have formed gorges wliich are
locally known as ' taiigis ' and these are usually held by the
tribesmen to oppose an enemy's advance. Tlie beds of the
watercourses are thickly strewn with stones and boulders.
In dry weather a stream of water usually trickles do1v11 them,
and has to be crossed and.recrossed frequently ; but after
rain they fill very rapidly, and become dallgerous torrents.
The two chief l~ighwaysof Waziristan are the Tochi and
t.he Gomal Valleys, the fornler giving access from tlie Bannu
dist?rictto the Afghan district of Birmal, and the latter connecting the two British districts of Derajat and Zhob, and
forming the principal route used by Powinclah caravans in

their annual migration from Afghariistan to India. There
ace no well-clefinecl lateral communications between the Tochi
and Goilla.1 Valleys, but the following routes are possible
a.1ignments for inetallecl roads :(a) Datta I<hel to Wana, vid Shatval-Dhana.
(b) Datta IChel to T;Vana or Jandola, vid Tot NaraiRazani-Razmalr, Malrin and thence either, (i) wid
I<aniguram-Lare Lar to Wana : or (ii) v i e Tanlr
Zaln t o Jsndola and thence vitl Shahur Tangi and
Sarwraka to Wana.
(c) (Coutinuatioa of Thal-Idalr road) Idalr to Wana or
Jandola, vitl Star Sarobi-Upper Khaisora Valley
t o Razani a i d thence as in (b).
(d) Wana, vici Spin to Rhajurj I h c h and thence down
Gomal t o Murtaza.
Waziristan is essentially a barren country, and the poorness
of the soil has hitherto proved an insuperInhabitants.
able obstacle to a large increase in the,
pop~~lation.The chief inhabitants are the Darwesh Khel
Wazirs, the Mahsuds, the Daurs, and the Bkittannis. The
two last named tribes can be dismissed in a few words. The
I3a~u.sinhabit the banks of the Tochi River froin Ghazlamai
village t o IChajuri Post, and are reputed to be morally the
lotvest of the Afghan races. Nevertheless they are diligent,
hardworking, and patient cultivators, and, though unwarlikeby n a t u e , have often resisted successfully attempts by their
neighbours to oust them from their rich lands.
The Bhittannis are a tribe inhabiting the borders of the
Dera Isnlail Khan and Bannn districts and who dwell partly
in independent territory. The independent Bliittannis though
heredit,ary enemies of the Mahsuds have more than once
foregone their time-honoured feud, and combined with their
more warlike and rapacious neighbours in attacks and raids
in British territory. Now, however, they have practically
identified themselves with British interests and for eonle
years have not given serious trouble.
Tradition, the truth of which is very doubtful, assigns a.
common origin to the Darwesh Khel Wazirs and Mahsuds,
bnt the name Wazir is applied exclusively to the former branch.
The original home of the Wazirs and Mahsuds is said t o
have been in the Afgha,n border district of Birmal and t h a t
these races began to move eastward at the close of t h e 14th

ceiltury, first occ~lpyillgthe area north of the Tochi river a i d
then spreading southward to the Gonlal.
*The TVazirs are largely a i~oinadicrace and have comparatively few perillaneilt villages or settlements. They are
divided into two main classes, the Utmanzaif- and the Ahmadmi.:[ The former occupy the Tochi Valley and areas acljoilliilg
it, inoving up to the higher hills in the auillnler and returning
in the winter to t11e footl~illsand valleys. The majority of
the Ahmadzai migrate every aut,unin with their flocks t o t1;e
grazing lancls on the western borders of the B a n n ~District,
~
returning in the spring to their suminer settlements in the
Wana ancl Shal<sbiplains.
The three main branches of t'he Mahsuds are the Alizai,
Xhalllall Ichel, and Bahlolzai, each of which is nub-divided
into nuinerous sections and sub-sections. The settlements
of these sections are so greatly intermixed that i t ia impossible
t o define clearly the localities occupied by the main b~anches
of the tribe. As a result of this internlingling, sectional feuds
a1 e allllost unknown and therefore in dealing with the Alnhsuds,
t h e possibility of a conibinatjoll of all the sections against a
common foe must always be considered.
Relying on the inaccessibility of their country, the Waziristan tribes have for centuries defied the
CharactOristios
Of
power of the ruler8 of India and Afghanistan,
Mahsuds and Wazirs.
and on more thar, one occasion in the uast
they engaged and defeated the invading arrniea of the ~ o ~ g u l a .
Their character, organization and instincts have made them
independent and strongly democratic, so much so that even
their own nlaliks (or elders) have little real control over the
unruly spirits. Any man nlay rise by courage and misdoln to
t h e position of illaZik, but many ~ v h o have attenlpted an
undue assumption of authority have been assassinated. True
sons of Esau, the Waziristnn tribesmen carq7 their lives i n
their hands and finding that the natural resources of their
country do not favour them enough, they eke out their existence bg plundering their more peaceful neighbouts. This
mode of life has
in their men a fine physique and
a free and independent mamer, and in their women a reinarliable power of resisting fatigue and of nurturing their children
under t.he most adverse conditions and circumstances.
' For main sub-divi~ionsof

Mahsnds and Wazirs soe Appfndiv

t Known as t.ho Toahi Wazirs.

$ Known es the Wane W e z i r ~

" L.'

Both Wazirs and Mah~udsare notorious for tllelr raiding
propeasities, and for the rapidity v i t h which they remove
their plunder to the security of the irlner hills of their country.
The Wsziristan tribes do not in theory carry out a blooclfeud to the bitter end as do other frontier
Biood feuds.
Pathans, for the death of the offender
generally extinguishes tho Send ; but if the offender escapes
the life of a relation may be talcen insteaci, and as this may
in t~zrnbe avenged, the feud tends t o become interminable
as is the case among the Afridis. On the other hancl, zl murder
may be cornpounded on payment of a sum which usually
vcl,ries between Rs. 700 and Rs. 1,000. Professional assassins
are somet;mes employed to deal with a murderer, the ice
being from Rs. 60 to Rs. 150.
Mahpuds and Wazirs are not as a r ~ d every much under
the influence of their Mullahs a-nd are
Fsnatioism.
consequently less fanatical than many tribes
on the frontier. On the other hand there have been manv
instances of ~ n ~ ~ r dofe rBritish
s
officers or officials by indivjciual
fanatics or " ghazis," who mere in some cases trusted and
apparently devoted employees of the officer they murderecl.
The chief weakness of the Wnziristan tribes lies in their.
.
lack of ~ ~ n i t yThe
M a h s ~ ~ dand
s Wazirs
unitybetween
have
lcng
been
a
t
feud,
and
a
whole-hearted
Mallsuds and Wnzirs.
combination of the two is therefore uznnsual.
On the other hand, the democratic character of the tribes,.
especially of the Mahsucls, has the disadvantage from our
point of view that their jirgccs, or assembly of tribal leaders,.
have little restraining influence over the more lawless elements,
and are therefore not truly representative of tribal opinion ,;
in other words, a jirgu can produce no reliable gnarantee that
the terms they have accepted will be carried out. This was
well illustrated during the 1919-20 campaign, and placed u s
a t a consiclerable disadvantage in our negotiations with the
Mabsuds. It is important to remember, however, t h a t a wave
of fanaticism or the rise to power of some commanding personality may a t any time cause Mahsuds and IVazirs to sink
their differences and effect n formidable combination against
us. It must not be forgotten also that when the Government
of India undertake operations against an offending tribe,
n~ighbouringsections are often placed in an unenviable position ; if they decide to stand aloof, they run the risk of losing
their pro pert,^ or lives unless strong enough to defend them,

1

I

if

'

while if they agree to help their cc>-~:eligjonjst~,
they will prob-ably become the objective a t some later date of another.puni-tive expedition. They generally elect to brave the remoter
retribution, and for this reason it is impossible to foresee the
exact limits to which a' tribal rising may extend.
The fighting strength of the Waxiristan tribes has been
appreciably reduced by the campaign of
Fighting
strength
1 0 19-20 but i t is as yet too early to calculate
and armaments.
accuiately the extent of their loss. Moreover, the fighting sti:eagth of a frontier tribe is to be measured.
not so illr~clzby heads as by rifles, ancl there can be no d o ~ ~ b t ,
as will be explained in a later. chapter, t h a t the Mahsuds and
Wazirs are still well supplied with arms, in spite of the severe
casualties they have suffered and the large number of rifles.
they hsve been forced to surrender. At the present time
th.e Wazirs can probably still arm effectively about 10,000,
out of a total streligth of 23,000 fighting men, ancl the Mahsuds.
about 12,000 out of a total fighting strength of 16,000 ; and
this takes no account, of smooth- bore^ and other obsolete.
weaponB, of which there are s~~fficient
to arm the remainder
of the tribe.
itloreover, the IVazirs and Ma,hsucls operating in their own
country, call be classecl among the finest.
Tactics of tribesmen.
fighters in the world, and a t the present;
molxellt they include in their numbers upwards of three.
thousand men who have served in our regular army or militia
and who have an intimate knowledge of our habits and
tnctics. The tribesnle~i have been described a s the best.
umpire: in the world, lor they seldcm allo~va tactic,al error.
to go ~ulpunished. History furnishes numerous examples of' .
the price ivhich has to be paid when fighting against them for.
the neglect of ordinary precautions, such, for mstance, as a
failurp, to piquet heights, the daily adherence to a fixed.
method of carrying out protective measures, a loss of touch
with detached parties, or the miscalculatiiin of time ancl space.
The tribal system of intelligence is also very good. All
inovemel~tsof troops are closely watchecl, and a t the first..
threat of an advance into their coulltry the implicated sections
hasten to bury their grain and skrid their women, cllildren
and catt.le icto the. fastllesses of the 'upper hills, or to the
settlement's of secticns with whom we h&veno quarrel.
Owing to his activity on the hillside ancl general watchfulness! it is exc,esdingly dlikioult to ontflanlc t21.e t,ribesmes or*

6

--to cut ofi his retreat, while if vigorously pursued and uuslsle
to get clear away, he will hide his rifle and appear as a peaceful
villager, H e is an expert a t attaclriiig small parties and
.couvoys, and when the troops begin t o svithclraw i t is astonishing hov large lluinbers of the enemy will appear in places
which had seeined to be deserted, and with ~vllatdeterillinatioil
the rear-guard will be harriecl. I11 the past the Mahsuds have
been couspicuously successful in capturing small, isolated
posts, their usual procedure being t o fielid an emissary to
iilduce thc commander to detach a large part of the garrisoil
in p u r s ~ iof
t an imaginary raiding gaug. One of their grcatest
t~aiumphswas the seizure of I<aslinlir I c a ~Post in 1901 which
was largely due to one of their number having spent several
we~Bsdisguised as a shepherd learning the habits of the ga1.l.i-

1
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This auccess was eclipsed by the capture of Tut Narai Posi;
in t'he Upper Tochi on 31st May 1917 by a gang of Abdnllai
Illahsuds who eillployed the ruse of sellciillg two of their
nlen~bersclisguised as woillen to attract the attentioil of the
ruilitia garrison. The gang decalllped with 59 rifles
. al3out 12,000 rounds of ammunitioa.

I
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CIHAPTER 11.

POLITICAL.
From the time of our earliest dealings with the Wazira
and Mahsuds these tribes haqve presented a most difficult
problem and one which still awaits a satisfactory solution.
The political history of Waziristan especially i n its earlier
stages has always been closely interwoven
'Afghan
claims t o
wsziristm,1884-1892. with, and to some extent overshadowed by,
that of Afghanistan. Since the middle of
t h e nineteenth century the British Government has from .
time to time been involved in military operations with the
Waziristan tribes, but the first event of purely political importance with which we are concerned occurred in 1884,
when the Amir of Afghanistan made an attempt to establish
his supremacy over the Wazirs, and, though it met with little
or no support from the tribesmen, our policy mith regard t o
Waziristan had not reached a sufficiently advanced atage
to enable us to dispose of the question finally. Pour years
later the Amir was informed that it mas not our intention
to occupy Wana. This somewhat vague intimation led him
to suppose that the Afghans were free fo go there, and they
accordingly did so. Previous to this the Amir had on more
than one occasion asserted that Waziristan belonged to him,
b ~ his-claim
~ t
was not definitely repudiated until 1892, when
he was informed that, although he would not be called upon
immecliately to evacuate Wana, me did not admit his. right
to occupy it, and he was forbidden to advance further into
Waziristan pending a aettlement. At the same time he mas
reminded that we had always insisted on the independence
of the Wazirs and upon our right to deal directly with them,
t h a t we should continue to do so and that he must not attempt
to bring them under his authority. This pronouncement
was naturally unpalatable to the Amir, who objected to our
having any dealings mith the Wazirs and claimed the whole
of Waziristan in his dominions. It was of course, impossible
to admit such a claim, which had no foundation in fact, for
it would have allowed this large track of country, in which we
were becoming more and more interested, to pass entirely out
of our control.*
* It is interesting to note that the present Alnir (Amnnulla) ha8 by no means nbandoned tho hope of one day regaining his suzerainty over the Wwxiristan tribes and his
delegates brought out this point strongly in tho Muesoorie Ooderenoo in 1020.
( 7 )
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The position of Waeiristali mas thus clearly defined to
the Amir as being one of complete inderolioy of *""'"\endence,
qualified by our right to hold
Government, 1892.
direct relations with its inhabitants. About
this time a proposal was made that me should hand over the
suzerainty t o the Amir, allow the-tribesmen to pay him tribute,
and a t the same time exercise some sort of control over them,
ourselves and bind the Amir to abstain from all actual interferellce with the tribes. Lord Lansdowne, however, dislilced
the idea af this arrangement which would have given both
our,~elvesand the Amir concurrent rights in the same country,
. and i t was rejected. Nor did the Government of India view
with more approval a suggested solution of the question involvillg a partition of the Wazir tribes between clurselves and
the Amir. This scheme, by which the whole of the Darwesh
IChel would have been transferred to Afghanistan, was conaidere-1 as presenti.1: insuperable difficulties and was also
dropped.
It had alway~been the policy of the British Government
t o abstain as far as possible from interference with the internal
.affairs iof the independent tribes ljving beyond our Indian
border, but the decision t o exclude the Arnir from Waziristan
logically involved the protection ol that region as well as of
i t s inhabitants from unprovoked acts of aggression on his
part. All that Government wanted, however, was that the
Wazirs should look to us and t o no one else. Obviously the
advantage of gaining the confidence of the tribes was allimpor'tant.
When the Gomal route was first opcned in 1890 a system
of tribal allowances was inaugurated, the
Opening of
Route, 1890.
main considerations on which they were
Tribal allowance?.
granted being as follows : (1) general good
behaviour ; (2) the prevention of raids and other offeuces
across the border of British Indis ; (3) the surrender for trial
and pullisl~mentof tribesmen for offences against us ; (4) the
furnishing of tribal escorts to officer; visiting any pavt of
their country under orders of Governmeilt ; (5) the rendering
of services, for which they received allowances, in any part
of t'heir country most convenient t o Government. The subdidizing of the tribesmel~formed part of a policy t o supplement the scanty resolrrces of the Wazirs and Mahsuds and
to assist in providing thein with an honest means of livelihood.
f t was in the compleinent of this policy, namely in the employ-

illelit of the tribesmen and enlarging the scope of their energies.
t h a t the Government hoped to find the real remedy.
I n 1893 the negotiations of the previous year reached a
final settlement and by the Duralid AgreeDuralld Agreement,
ment, signed in Kabul in November, the
i893.
Amir definitely renounced all clajl~l to
TVaziristau (the Birmal tract escepted) and agreed to the
~ e q n e s tof the British Govirnment that the boundary line
between India and Afghanistan should be delimitated.* A
dlommissioll was accordingly appointed in October of the
following year to d.emarcate the Western boundary of Wazisis;tan from Domandi, on the Qomal, northwards.
It was considered that this was a suitable opportunity
t o accept the invitation of the Waziss of
Occupation of Wana,
1893.
Wana, givei two years previously, to
occupy their country, thereby preventing
future aggression on the part of either the Afghan authorities
'or the Povindahs and securing the Gomal route against the
(depredations oE the Mahsuds. To do this i t was decided to
,establish a military post in Wana with outposts along the
Jjne of tlze Gomal Valley. No sooner was Wana occupied
than a PIahsud attack on the camp occurred and the thirdDIahsud expedition of 1894-95 was the immediate result.
This attack was organised by a fanatical priest of the
Shabi IChel, Alizai, section of the Mahsuds,
The Mullah Powinknown as the Mullah Poivindah, who had
~dah.
already achieved notoriety as the leader
of the faction, hostile to the maliks, which may be termed the
" Young Mahsud " party. From this date the Mullah steadily
increased his influence with the tribe and up t o his death in
1913 was a constant thora in the side of the Indian Governn1ent.t He was as bitterly opposed to the British as he was
-to t h e control of the tribe by their malilcs, and all efforts to
uphold the authority of the latter against his faction failed.
Efforts to drive him irom the country proved of no avail
and Government, making a virtue of necessity tried a policy
of conciliation. In 1900 his official status was recognised
and he was granted a monthly allowance of ICs. 100 and in
1906 a grant of land was sanctioned for hiin in British territory.
Both these privileges were cancelled in 1907 as a result 01 his
aontinued hostility, and henceforward Government adopted
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the policy, which had better results than any previous efforts.
to lower his prestige, of ignoring his existence in all official
dealings with the Mahsuds. On his death his son, Mullah
Fazl Din, was nominated. as his successor by the tribe, and,
although he never achieved anything approaching his father's
iduence, he was prominent as a leader of the opposition
both in the 1917 and 1919-20 expeditions.
The signing of the ~ u r a n dAgreement necessitated a
neconsideration
of ~econside~ation
of our policy regarding the
Policy aftor signing of Wazirs am1 Mahsuds, and it was recogDurand Agreement.
nised that in course of time the whole of
their country up to the Afghan border must come more and
more under our control. On the conclusion of the Mahsud
operations in 1894 it was deemed advisable, for the greater
security of that part of the fronkier, to take advantage of the
repeated offers of the Daurs of the Tochi
Ocoupation~
Of
the
and to occupy their country. Posts were
Tochi Valley, 1894.
therefore established along the valley of
the Tochi as far as Sheranni and occupied by troops and local
levies. The districts thus occupied in Wana and Tochi were
termed " Protected Areas " and were administered by political
officers,while a loose form of political control based .on tribal
allowances was exercised over the TVazirs and Mahsuds outside
these areas.
With the object oi' relieving regular units ol the Indian
army of the task of garrisoning outlying
Formation of
posts, and of purely police duties on the
frontier, and in view of the fact that
neither the Tochj nor the Gomal routes were regarded as
being suitable as main lines of advance into Afghanistan, i t
was decided in 1899 to call on the inhabitants of the various

The policy in 1899, then, was briefly as follows :-On the
North and South of Mahsud country, the
Policy in 1899.
" Protected Areas," long narrow strips of
country under the direct control of our political officere,
stretched out towards the Afghan border. I n these areas
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were various posts garrisoned by tribal militias, led by British
.officers but directly under the Civil administration, and -with
backing of regular troops in Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The
~aisoad'gtre of these militias was to prevent incursions by
kribesmen from the interior into the Banliu and Derajat areas,
and definitely to obtain the loyalty of a number of their
,young men by providing congeliial eniployment for them. Over
the remainder of the country a loose form of political control
was exercised, which consisted mainly in affording moYal
sulpport to the rnaliks, and, by the payment of tribal allcwances
for good behaviour, t o ensure that the tribesmen could support
themselves without increasing their income by raiding ill
British territory. . '
There is no doubt that this policy was open to scrious
objections both from a Political snd Military point of view,
and a ~ t u d yof the next chapter will shew that on maiy occasions ~nilitilry operations were necessary t o enforce it. It
was, however, considered a t the time the best solution of an
extremely difficult probleni and in spite of many suggestions
for it's revision* it mas adhered to with slight modifications
for the next twenty years.
The complete brealcdown of this policy during the Afghan
Brealrdo3m of Policy War in 1919, however, shewed that it
during Afghall War, would have to be abandoned and its place
1019.
talcell by one 01 military occupation and
road makilig, even though the tribesmen would see in it the
filial blow to thek iizdepenclence.
During this cainpaign the loyalty of the Militias, which
had successf~~lly
stood the test of the great mar, was pnt to a
severe strain by our withdrawal from the Upper Tochi and
from TVana. This, combined with the call ol: Islam, proved
too much for them and the defection of large portions of their
transfrontier elements not only reduced the value of these
corps but provecl a potential source of danger to us. Mahsud
and Wazir raiding parties swept over the border tracts of the
Derajat and Zhob, and even penetrated into the Punjab,
rrobbing and murdering peaceful villagers, especially Hindus,
and their activities increased rather than diminished after
.the signing of peace with Afghanistan.

* One of the m o s t discussed suggestions w m the occupation of Waziristan up to
&heDurand Line.

This continued and gratuitous provocation could no longer
be tolerated and our presBnt policy demands.
Present Polioy.
that our forces shall remaiu in occupation
of central Waziristan and that mechanical transport roads.
shall be constructed especially to join up the Toclii with the
Gomal line. The occupation of the country must eventually
lead t o the inauguration of a loose type 01administration, and:
consequently a partial if not complete disarmament of t h e
tribesmen.
- The security that is sought for is not security only from
raiders in Waziristan. There is no doubt that any weakness
i n our administration of our frontier tribes constitutes one
of the chief dangers in our relations with Afghanistan. If
once y e strengthen our hold on our hitherto unadlninistered
tribes, one of the chief temptations and opportunities of Afghan
intrigue will be removed. '
It is to be hoped that in the peace which our domination
of Waziristan will eventually secure, rapine and violence wilZ
give place t o security and contentment ; and that the tribesmen
will find, both in the material improvement and development.
of their country, and in the civilizing intercourse with India,
a more stable prosperity than their traditional profession of
robbers and marauders has ever been able to afforcl them.

CHAPTER 111.
B

OPE^^ ATIONS

WAZIRISTANTRIBES

P ~ ~ E V I OsU TO
1914.
The great majority of the disturbances in IVaziristan have
been caused by the Mahsuds, against whom the six principal
series of operations have been mainly directed. Sections of
the Darwesh Khel Wazirs have on occasion given trouble, but
have generally proved leas .obstinate. This can he accounted
for partly by the fact that inany of them hold land in the
plains, and as their hill settlements are inore acceesible than
those of the Mahsuds they have to be more circumspect than
the latter in their dealings with us.
The first important expedition occurred in 1860, the
immediate cause being a Mahsud attack on
Operations against
the
town of Tank, which was completely
Mallsuds, 1860.
crushed by the slrill and energy of an
Indian Officer. ColoneI Paget's description of this brilliant *
little cavalry affair is as follows : " Emboldened by years of
immunity, and believing that they could successfully oppose
any attempt t o penetrate their mountains, the Mahsuds had
on March 13th' 1860, without provocation or pretext of any
kind, come out into the plains to the number of some 3,000,
headed by their ~rincipalmen with the intention of sacking
the town of Tank, which stands on the plains some five miles
2 roni the foot of the hills. The Nawab's agent, having obtained
previous intimation of their gathering, on the 12th infornied
Saadat Khan, the Indian officer in command of the tro'op of
the 5th Punjab Cavalry? (now tlie 25th Cavalry, Frontier
Force) then holding Tank. This Indian officer a t once summoned the sowars from the neighbouring regular outposts,
besides collecting twenty of the Nawab's horsemen and some
irregular horse ; so that the force a t his disposal ~ r a sone
hundred and fifty eight sabres of the 25th Cavalry and
thirty seven mounted levies. On the morning of the 13th
the whole party moved out towards the mouth of the Tank
* " Record of Expeditions against the North-West Brontior Tribea " by Paget and

AGAINST THE

Mbson. See also " C a m p a i ~ son the North-West Frontier," by Ctlphin,H. I;. Nevill,
D.B.O., R.P.A.
t When e unit still exists, its prosent designations will be givon : this arrangement
will, it is thought, edd interest to the narrative, the old designations being praotioally
unlmown bo tho present goneration of readera.
( 13 1
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Zam, on arriving near the entrance of which they found
the Mahsuds drawn up about half a mile on the plain side of
tlze defile. The Mahsuds immediately opened fire on the
cavalry, on which Rissaldar Saadat Khan ordered his detachment to retire with the intention of drawing the enemy further
into the plain. The stratagem mas successful and tlie enemy
followed with shouts of derision ; but when they had come
nearly a mile the cavalry turned and having first cut off their
retreat to the hills, charged in the most dashing manner.
The Mahsuds, personally brave and invariably of vigorous,
muscular frames, wanted the power of combination to resist
effectually 6he charge of our cavalry. Cut down and ridden
over, thef fled in confusion, the men in front forcing back
the men behind till all became a helpless r;lbble, struggling, striving, straining to regain the safety of the mountain
defile. The result was that about three hundred Mahsuds
weqe killed, including six leading maliks, and many inore
wounded. Our loss was one Jemadar of levies killed, two
non-co~nmissionedofficers, and eleven sowars of the 25th
Cavalry, and three of the levies wounded." The principal
clzief of the whole Mahsud tribe was killed in this encounter.
The unl~rovokednature of this' attack led to the desgatch
of an expedition, and Brigadier-General W. B. Chamberlain
was accordingly ordered to assemble a force to enter the
Mahsud hills and there exact satisfaction for the past alldl
security for the futnre. The force, which numbered about
five thousand of all ranks, included detachments from the
following units :21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th Mountain Batteries (Frontier
B'orce), whose guns were at this time carried on elephants ;
Guide8 Cavalry, 23rd Cavalry (Frontier Force) and 15th
Lancers ; 1st Sappers and Miners : Guides Infantry ; 20th
Infantry and 21st Punjabis ; 32nd Pioneers ; 54th Sikhs ;
55th) 56th and 57th Rifles (Frontier B'orce) and 5th Gurkha
Rifles (Brontier Torce). Before advancing, a proclamation
was addressed to the Mahsud Chiefs announcing the objects
for which the force was about to enter their 31ills ; to tell them
that, within a fixed period, they were free to attend the camp
and hear the demands of the British Government ; and that,
on their failing to appear or comply with the demands, they
would be treated as enenlies and punished accordingly. No
reply having been received to the proclamation, General
Chamberlain moved forward on the 17th April wit% the mhole
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(of his force, a,ugnlented by sixteen llundred levies, to the
~ n o u t h01 the Tank Zanl aud camped on the present site of
Khirgi post. On arrival at Jaadola, a portion of the force
was sent up the difficult defile kilown as the Shahur Tailgi to
operate against certain host,ile sections of the tribe in the
neighbourhood of lhidari Kach and Barwand. No opposition
was encountered and an important fort was destroyed ; but
during the absence of this column, the remainder of the force
had been seriouslj~attacked in its camp a t Palosina near
Attack on camp at; "~anclola. On the nigkt of the 22nd/23rd
7Palosina,
22ndi23rd April, a body of 3,800 Mahsuds iliaking a
April 1860.
sudden rush, overpowered and nearly destroyed the camp piquets immediately in their'line of attack ;
here the majority of them stopped, bu.t 500 of the bravest
,of them clashecl into the camn sword in hand, and nenetmted
illto the areas occupied by tl; Guides and the mouited levies.
For a time the confusioi~mas general, but eventually a counter.attack by the 25th Punjabis, 54th Sikhs and the Guides was
organised, the camp clearecl and the enemy pursued for fully
three miles over the hills. Niaety two Mahsud corpses were
found in and aronnd the camp and forty more in a naln oil
their line of reteat ; our ovrn casualties, many ol which occurred
aniong unarmed followers, amounted to 37 killed ancl 132
wounded.
Three days later, thc coluinn froin IIaidari Kach rejoined
the force headquarters, and a move up the
Actioil of Bareri
.Tan& 2nd May 1800. Tank Zam was begun. Some negotiitions
took dace with a 13artv 01 Mahsud nzalilcs
before the Ahnai Tangi \as reached, butdthey led to nothing
and the force nlovecl for~varcltowards the Barari Ta~igion
the 2nd Mag. The Barari Tangi is a narrow cleft cut by the
TBdc Zam through a range of mountaiils crossing its course
a%right angles, both banks of which are perpendicular clifls
eighty to one hundred feet in heishi. A strong obstacle in
the shape of large roclcs and felled trees had been placed in
position by the Mahsuds: coinpletely closing the river bed.
The enemy's position was one of great strength. A double
row of sufigurs, admirably sited for flaidcing fire, had been
constructed on either side of the defile, and qbove these again
were numbers of sharpshooters whose fire would also tell
ton a body advancing by the only line of approach to the main
position. A p~ecipitousridge also afforded the enemy. a safe
line of retreat,-always an important consideration in Blahsud
tactics-enabling him to inflict injury on a n attacking force
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up t o the last rnolneilt and the11 to get away without fear of
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Disheartened by the loss of their left, the Mahsuds offered
only B, feeble resistance t,o the advance of our other column
which advanced steadily from ridge to ridge with the loss,
of only two men. I11 the centre, as soon as the barricade a t
the mouth of the gorge had been removed, the 20th I n f a n t ~ y
aild 5th Gurkha Rifles moved forward and completed the
capture of the whole position. No fGt11er opposition wasoffered and camp was pitched on the Bangiwala 'Icach, three.
miles b.eyond the defile. Our loss in this affair was thirtykilled and eighty-six wounded, tvhile the enemy left thirty.
five dead bodies on the ground.
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result in the subinissio1l of the Mahsuds, its success was considerable. The loss inflicted on them was estimated a t over
a lakh of rupees ; their chief town Icaniguram, had been occupied, and spared only on payment of a fine ; Makin, their next
most important town had been completely destroyed ; their
hitherto unknow~lcountry had been surveyed and mapped ;
and whenever they had met our troops, they had been signally
defeated.
The next twenty years was a period of almost continual
unrest on the Wnziristan border, and
'lockado9 several minor expeditions had t o be under1879.
taken. I n 1879, a body of Mahsuds,.
estimated a t between 2,000 and 3,000 men, raided the town
of Tank, plundered and burnt the bazaar, and carried off a
large quantity of private property. This event was the signal
for general disorder, and for some time predatory bands of
marauders continued to raid, plunder, and destroy along theborder, enjoying a considerable measure of immunity as t h e
result of our preoccupation in Afghanistan. All we were
in a position to do a t the time was to institnte a blockade,
a form of reprisal which is very difficult to enforce and which
must in any case be a slow process.
On the termination of the Second Afghan w a r , however,
Government was able to take the matter
Operations againat
Mahsuda, 1881.
ia hand. I n 1.881 a proclamation was.
published and widely cii:culatedj which,.
after reciting the ehgagernents under wliich the Mahsuds had
bound themselves to abstain from aggression in British territory, offered to them a final opportunity for peaceable submission and invited them to depute delegates to arrange for
the terms of settlement. Meauwhile orders were issued for
the concentration of a force a t Tank undej the command of
Brigadier-General T. G. Iielmedy, G.B., and of n reserve
brigade a t Bannu under the con~maildof Brigadier-General
J. J. H. Gordon, C.B. The former consisted ol 12 guns, 270'
sabres and 3,660 bayonets, end included detachments from
the following units : 22nd, 23rd and 24th Mountain Batteries
(F. I?) 21st Cavalry (3'. I?.) ; 51st and 54th Sikhs (F. P.) ;
55th, 56th and 57th Rifles (F. I?.) ; 20th Infantry and 21st'
Punjabis ; and 32nd Pioneers. The Bannu Column numbered
8 guns, 330 sabres and 3,380 bayonets, and included a battery
of Royal E'ield Artillery, the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade,
the first time British troops had been employed in Waziristan,

.
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ldetachmeuts from the 21st Mountain Battery (P. I?.), 18th
Lancers, 14th Sikhs, 20th Infailtry,. the 21st and 30th Punjabis,
sad the 58th Rifles (P. l?.).
Neither column was seriously engaged, and the total battle
lcasuslties incurred during the expedition aniounted t o ody
32. The Tank Colun~nmarchecl. t o Ranipram, vid Jandola,
Barwand, and I<undiwam, the only action of importance
beihg a t Shah Alam, between Kundiwanl and Kzlniguram,
where t,l~eenemy lisd t o be ejected from a strong position on
.a derisely wooded hillside. 'When the troops had deployed
for attack and were halted while a reconnaissance of the
position tvns being made, the Mahsuds suddenly charged the
Blst Sikhs, but the attack broke down before the fire of this
Isattalion, and suffered considerably; The Bannu Column
marched, vi8 the Rhaisora Valley and Razani t o Razniak,
where commu~cationwas establis11.ed wit11 the Tank colunin
at Kaniguram ; and then, after a. short stay in the heart of
kite Mahsud country, each column returned to its base. During
t,he r e t ~ ~ rmarch
n
the Bannu Column paid a visit to the Shaktu .
Valley, the inhabitants of which liad hitherto held aloof from
.all negotiations, thinking themselves secure on account of the
difficulty of penetrating t o their settlements and becaJuse
they werer,left unulolested in the campaign of 1860. They
.now submitted without a struggle, and t11.e presence of their
nzabiks in t11.e British camp reassured the people, most of
-whomliad never before seen a European.
Although the expeditioii liad been successh~lup to a, point
allti. the boldest of the Mahsuds had been taught that no
nature1 difficulties of their country could protect them fro111
punishment, yet the demands of the Qovernnient had not
heen fully complied with, and the blockade was therefore cont i n ~ ~ e dEven
.
before the troops had left the Mnhsud hills,.
.some leading spirits aniong the ahti-peace party sought the
intercession of Afghan-istan, sld the appearance of the Amir'e
agent st Kaniguraln tended conr;idera.hlyt o thwart the efforts
,of the party who favoured a settlement with the British Govcznn~ent. However, such was .the pressure of the bloclcade
that tlie welcome accorded to the Arnir's emissary was but a,
cold one and Be departed suddenly for Ichost and thence to
ICab~d,accompanied by a few leading Mahsuds. The absence
of ,these letter and the reaction consequent on the hopes raised
b y interference from Kabul retarded final settlement with
the tribe. Ere long, llowever, ' t h e Mnhsuds discovered that
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p8pers had been received by the Ainir purportiug to offer.
him the sovereignty of their country and freedom to enlist
troops from their hills. This djscovery alarmed and irritated
a people both prond and jealous of their independence, and
the feeling that their freedom was involved produced a reaction in favour of concluding peace, direct wit-11 the British
Goverument. The surreader of six prescribed rjng-leaders
had been laic1 down as an earnest ol: their submission, and
these were now brought in. The Mahsuds having t h ~ l acceptecl.
s
a humiliation as great as a Pathaa clau can suffer thereby
proving an honest desire and intention to submit, the blockade was raised and they mere once more a t liberty to renelv
trade and intercourse with markets in British territory.
Save for a few minor incidents, the uext ten years was
a period of comparative peace on the
Afghan
intrigues,
Waziristan
border, but in Pebruary 1892,.
1892.
the Amir of Alghanistan again begall to
intrigue with the tribesmen.
I n May a force of Afghan Cavalry and Infantry arrived
a t Wana under Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, and matters.
began to take a serious turn. I n July the Governmellt oE
India addressed a warning to the Amir, informing IGm that
no encroachment in Wazir territory would be tolerated, pending
a settlement of the frontier ; the substance of this letter was
a t the same time communicated to the fi'lahsuds and Wazirs,
who mere told to refrain from acts of aggression against
Afghanistan. The activities of Gul Muhammad, however,
created considerable unrest, and i t was found necessary to
concentrate 'a force a t Khajuri Rach as a precautionary
measure ; but i a September the Amir withdrew his troops
and the attitude oE the tribesmen improved.
In October, 1893, a Mission under Sir Mortimer Durand
went to Kabul a t the invitation of the Amir, and a n agreement
was signed by which the latter relinquished all claims to.
VCTaziristan.
In accordance with this agreement, preparations were
ma,de early in 1894 for demarcating the
Corllmis- new boundary.
As the attitude of the
sion, 1894.
trilsesn~en was uncertain, it was decided
to Place a large force on the li.ontier during the delimitation,
and it was also considered a favourable occasion on which to
accept an invitation, recently received from the Wana Wazirs,

-to take over and administer their country. It was finally
decided that the British and Afghan Cominissioncrs should
meet and start work a t Dolnandi on the Qomal, and a pro.clamation was issued to the Wazirs describing the line agreed
upon and informing them that the Governinent had no intention of interfering with tl~eirinternal affairs, but only desired
to establish peace. Large jirqas aasembled to discuss the
situation, and for the most part appeared to be prepared to
receive the Conlnzission in a friendly spirit.
The escort t o the Commissjon consisted of one Hcluadron,
.21st Cavalry (F. F.), 23rd Mountain Battery (I?. I?.), 20th
Infahtry, 53rd Sikhs (3'. F.), and 1st G~~rIclm
Rifles. Wana,
wlzich was to be the head.quarters of the Commission, was
reached on October 25th, viGi Spin and Karab Icot. Some
sniping into camp occurred d u i n g the march, but the attitude
.of the inhabitants was generally friendly, and a large jirg~c
of Wana Wazirs, which came into Wana during the afternoon,
.appeared pleased a t the arrival of the troops. For political
reasons, the camp mas pitched a t the eastern end of the Wana
plain and was surrounded by a, chain of piquets posted merely
for purposes of observation and not intended to hold their
*ownagainst a serious attack. In the latter event, they were
instructed to fall back on their supports and then t o the camp
perimeter, which mas t~ be the main line of defence; three
.of the twelve piquets were detailed for the defence of the
political camp situated a t some little distance from the main
,camp.
On the 28th, news was received t h a t a certain number of
Mahsuds headed by the Mullah Powindah were trying to create
pdissensions and prevent a representative jirga coming in.
It was reported that the Mullah had succeeded i n collecting
about 800 men, that he proposed to visit ICaniguram for the
purpose of increasing his force, and that he intended to attack
the camp a t Wana or harass convoys. On the evening of the
1st November news was brought in that the Mullah had
arrived a t Torwam with a following of a thousand men ;
~ i q u e t swere consequently doubled and the troops ordered
to be under arms at 4 A.M. The nest day messengers arrived
from the Mullah, but they were informed that no dealings
.could take place with him except through the jirga. The
camp defences were strengthened and the same precautions
-taken as on the previous night.
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The night
- of the 2nd Noveinber, which was very dark,
passed quietly till 3-30 A.M., when the
Attack on camp near
whole camp was suddenly roused by three
'TVana by ~ ~ l l Powina h
~ ~ Srd
a ~November,
~ ,
shots, follocved by wild yells and the
1884.
beating of drums. At the same time a
desperate rush of some fi6hundred fanatics was made straight
into the left flank and rear of the camp, held by the 1st Gurkha
Rifles. So rapid was the rush that before the Gurkhas could
turn out of their tents, the leading men of the enemy had
$climbedover the defe~lcesand penetrated into the middle of
the camp.
It appears that uilder cover of darklless the enemy had
crept up two large ravines, and, rushing two piquets jn their
line of advance, one of which had fired the three alarm shots,
had charged straight down on the camp. At Dlie same time
a large body of Mahsuds continued their course down the
ravine and had split up into two parties, one of which joined
the main attack on the left flank of the camp, while the other,
contiilniiig down the ravine, broke up against the rear-guards.
Nany of this party made their may into camp behind the
hospitals, where they did much damage among the transport
animals, and some of them succeeded in reaching the cavalry
lines, where they got to work cutting free the horses in the
hope of causing a stampede.
Meanwhile, the Gurkhas had stopped the main rush from
passing d o ~ nthe
i centre street of the camp, and the regimental
Teserve was fighting hand t o hand with the enemy. They
were soon reinforced by two conipanies of the 20th Infantry
and a compuily of the 53rd Sikhs (P. P.),
and the eiieiny was
eystematjcally driven out of the camp a t the point of the
bayonet. Re made two more but less determined attempts
t o gain a footing within the perimeter, but these were steadily
met, and our infantry got in several effective volleys with the
help of star shell.
At day break the encmy's fire slackened, and as he was
now evidently in retreat, the cavalry was ordered to pursue.
Within a few minutes of this order being received, the squadroil
had started and was quiclrly followed by a mixed detachment
of artillery, sappers, and in.Eaiitry. After coveripg about
three miles the cavalry came in sight of the enemy, but the
ground was here so bad that i t was impossible to move out
of a trot. On gashingbetter ground, however, they charged
and recharged the tribesmen with great effect.

1

In addition t o our losses in oGcers and nlen a t % ~ a n a ,
amounting to 45 killed and 7 5 mounded, the enemy sncceeded
in carrying off a large uulllber of rifles and Rs. 2,600 in cash..
More than a hundred transport animals wcre also killed or
wounded. The enemy's loss was estimated at about 350
ltillecl.
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The attack a t Wana made a punitive expeclition ine~ritable,
and three mixed brigades weTe accordingly
Pul~itivo operations, assembled a t Wana, Jandola and Bannu,
1894.
respectively, the whole under the cornlnand
of Lieutenant-General Sir William Loclchart, 1C.C.B. The
1st Brigade consisted of the original Commission escort,
reinlorced by the 2nd Battalion Border Regiment. The 2nd
Brigade incl~tdcdthe '28th Mountain Battery, a squadron
each from the 21st and 22nd Cavalry (P. F.), No. 5 Co., 1st
Sappers and Millers, the 33rd Punjabis, 38th Dogras, 57th
Rifles (F. P.) and the 1st Battalion, 5th Gurltlla Rifles (F. F.).
The 3rd Brigade consisted of the 21st lVIountain Battery (F. I?.),
the 23rd Cavalry (3'. 3.) the 51st Sikhs, 56th Rifles, and 59th
Rifles, all of the Pnnjab Frontier Force.
.
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It is unnecessary to describe in detail the operations of
these three brigades, as no fighting of .importance occurred,
our battle casualties amounting t o only 23 all told. Suffice
it to say, that the ,whole of Waziristan was completely overrun
fro111 end to end, all sections of the Mahauds iillplicated in
the Wana attack were punished, much damage was done to.
towers and defences, and a large quantity of forage and grain
and over 1,000 animals were captured. The Government.
terms were fully complied with, and the demarcation of the
boundary successfully accomplisl~ed.
Nevertheless: crimes of violence continued to be of frequent
occurrence during the next -few years. I n 1895, an officer
oE tlle 59th Rifles was stabbed near Boya, and his syce and
orderly dangerously womlcled ; a lance-naik o f the 56th Rifles
mas shot dead a t Mirailshah ; n party of Danra tried to enter
the post a t Miren~hahand sncceedecl in stabbing two sepoys ;
an officer of the 23rcl Cavalry was very severely wounded near
Boya ; and a sowar of the same reginlent on grass-cutting
guard was also shot clead near the same place. These an$
other offences necessitated a show of force in the Tochi Valley,
which henceforward became a permanent location for regular
Indian troops.
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The ncxt episode of importance was an unprovolred and
Attaolr on Political unexpected attaclr on a Political officer's
officer's escort in Upper escort a t J'laizar in the Upper Tochi Valley
Tochi, 1897.
in 1897. The Political Officer had proceeded t o Maizar wit11 a mixed escort to settle a dispute amoug
the local tribeamen regarding the incidence of a fine imposed
for the murder of a Hindu clerk. The tribal rnaliles met the
party and escort in an apparently friendly spirit, and, pointing
out a site to halt at, offered to provide a meal for the Mussalman
sepoys of the escort. The party were thus lulled into a false
sense of security. Suddenly a hubbub began in a village
close by, and the villagers, who had been liatening t o the
pipes of the 51st Silrhs which were playing in camp, drew off.
A man was observed to wave a sword from the top of a tower
and two shots were fired in quick succession from the village,
the second of which wounded a British officer. Firing now
commenced from other neighbouring villages, as the realilk
of which. another British officer was wounded. The guns of
the escort opened fire with case a t 100 yards' .range ; two of
their officers were quiclrly wounded but the gunners continued
t o fight their guns with great gallantry. As only sixteen
rounds per gun, however, had been brought with the escort,
ammunition soon ran short, and orders were given for a
retirement to the ridge. Meanwhile a general stampede had
occurred among the baggage animals, and when the retirement mas ordered most of the reserve ammunition and other
equipment had to be abandoned.
The enemy now appeared in force on all sides, but the
retirement, which began under such very trying circumstances,
was carried out with great deliberation and gallantry. All
the British officers were wounded, two of them mortally ;
but all continued to carry o11.t their duties and lead their
men. The gallantry of three szlbedctrs of the 5lst Silchs and
65th Rifles was especially noteworthy. Get;t;ing together a
party of their men, they made a most determined stand by
the wall of a garden, whence they covered the first withdrawal.
Bere they remained themselves until the enemy closed with
them, and one of them was killed. Under cover of this stand
the wolxnded were carried and helped away, the guns withdrawing to a low kotal about 300 yards distant. Here a.
fresh stand was made, the guns firing blank to check the,
enemy, as all the service ammunition had been expended.
One of. the battery officers now received a third, and thie
time a fatal wound, and another, who had fainted from losa

of blood and had been fastened on to the Political officer's
pony when the retirement began, was found to be dead on
arrival a t the kotal. The retirement was contin~~ed
by successive units, the enemy coming on in increasing numbers
and endeavouring to envelop the flanks, but on arrival a t
the Xheranni plain, reinforcements from Datta IChel joined
the party and the enemy was at last beaten off.
Iill~nediatelyafter the outbreak at Mabar, the local Wazirs
bad despatched messengers t o other sectjons of the tribe for
assistance, and they also approached the Afghan authorities.
For a long time it was uncertain what effect these appeals
~vo~zld
have, and a strong force under Major General Corrie
Bird, C.B., was therefore assembled a t Bannu to deal with
possible eventualities. The force consisted of two mixed
brigades, the first including one squadron, 21st Cavalry (F. F.),
23rd Mountain Battery (P. F.), No. 2 Conlpany, 1st Sappers
and Miners, 2nd Battalion Argyle and Sutllerland Highlanders
51st Sikhs (3'. P.), 55th Rifles (F. F.), and 33rd Punjabis ;
and the second, one squadron 21st Cavalry (3'.F.), four guns
of the 26th Mountain Battery, 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade,
14th Xilrhs, 6th J a t Light Infantry, and the 25th Punjabis.
Practically no opposition was encountered during the march
t o Shexanni and Maizar, both of which were found deserted.
All the defences a t these two places were destroyed, and
visits mere paid to neighbouring valleys known to have been
implicated in the outrage.
In the meantime the Tirah campaign had begun, but,
contrary to expectations, the operations against the Afridis
and Orakzais did not cause any special restlessness in Waziristau, save that they delayed a settlement with the perpetrators
of the Maizar attaclr. However, as the winter 01 1897
approached, the prospect of losing their spring crops reduced
the tribesmen t o a more subinissive mood, and a t the end of
October the head of the oflending section gave himself up
as a n earnest of good bebaviour in the future. The total
casualties a t Maizar, in addition to the loss of the British
officers already mentioned, had been 21 Billed and 2s wounded,
while our loeses in the subsequent operations were 6 killed
and 8 wounded. The most noteworthy aspect oE the campaign
had been the unusual amount of sicl~nessamong the troops.
The climate of the Tochi valley is a t all times trying, but
the rapid concentration a t B a m u in the middle of the hot
weather had no doubt, affected the consti butions of the men
'

T'8

on
.IcCSS

at
led

:irs
for
ies,
rab
:rie
i th
ned

@-I,
era

Lers
is ;
LH19

de,
his.
rch
:ed.
md
;,ell
I

2 uf;,
/dig
ris-

Lors
b97

ced
1 of
'bh
'Ld,

led

and rendered then1 more disposed to contract disease, and
less able to shake it off, than would usually be the case. The
principal diseases were diarrhea and dysentery, which took
an epidemic form and became very severe.
No sooner had the Government of India settled with the
Tochi Wazirs than the Mahsucls again
Mahsud
1900-1901.
B100kade9 began to give trouble, snd the punishment
of this tribe had to be undertaken for the
fonrth time. During 1898 and 1899, raids were of frequent
occurrence, and in January 1900, the levy post a t Zam and
the Public Works Departinent bungalow a t M~wtaza were
both attacked. I n October, the police post a t Nasran, eleven
miles north of Tank, was qurprised by Mahsuds, two sepoys
being killed and ten rifles stolen ; and, though the raiders
were intercepted and part of the booty recaptured, this was
only accomplished a t the cost of the liIe of the British officer
in command of the pursuit party. A Mahscld jirga mas
accordingly s~unmonedto Talllr and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 for
past offences was impossd, the jirga being informed that iE
Rs. 50,000 were not paid up within Sfteen days, a blockade
w o ~ ~ lbe
d imposed. At the conclusion of the fifteen days'
grace, the j i ~ q a returned and asked for a further perioa 01
two months in which to consider the terms ; this was refused,
and the blockade came into operation on December 1st.
The followjng prelirniuary measures were talren to ensure
the effectiveness of the bloclcade. On the east, small moveable
columns were located a t Jani Khel and Zam, and a, cordon
of posts established between Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan ;
in the south, the Gomal line was reinforced by putting regular
garrisons into Murtaza and Manjhi, two temporary posts
were established a t Torrnandu and Khwnzme Narai, and-the
existing posts a t Khajuri ICacB, Sarwekai, Haidari Kach,
,and Jandola were strengthened. A new post was also established in the Spin plain. South of the Gomal, the battalions
stationed a t Fort Sandeman and Loralai respectively were
moved up to form a cordon of posts on the Zhob-Waziristan
border. The troops originally employed on the bloclcade
consisted of the 21st and 25th Cavalry (3'.I?.), eight guns of
the 22nd, 26th and 27th Mountain Batteries, 17th Infantry,
23rd Pioneers, 27th and 28th Punjabis, 35th aad 45th Sikhs,
123rd Outram's Rifles, and half a battalion each of the 109tlz
Infantry and 124th Baluchistan Infantry.
c2

These meaaurcs were so Jar effectual that the l\iIahsuda
began to mala overtures regarding the payment of the fine,
and for some time payment ~roceededregularly, but in January
1901, a series of fresh offences begsn which made further
negotiations impossible. A mail runner was murdered near
Nili ICach, ancl the mail was looted near Sarwekai ; a British
officer had his baggage looted a d his two servants killed:
near Mnrtaza ; three sepoys of the 45th Silchs on grazing
guard " were lrilled near Jandola ; the militia post a t KaslzmirKar was attaclted, one hnvildar, three sepoys and three workinen being killed, and thirty rifles stolen. These and various:
other offences compelled the Government of India to introduce
a new procedure into the ordinary methods of a purely passive
blockade.
Hitherto, the tribesmen had invariably received notice
prior to the corninencement of active operations, affording
them the opportunity of coming belatedly to terms. It wasnow, however, decided that, while the blockade should continue as before, it should be varied and accompanied by sharp
attaclrs lasting two or three days at a time and undertaken
by sinall mobile columns acting simultaneously and by surprise. To enable this to be done, the following additional
uniis were employed : 29th Mountain Battery, 27th, 28th,.
and 29th Punjabis, 32nd Pioneers, 38th Dogres, 55th, 56th,.
and 58th Rifles (F. F.), 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles,
and 1st Battalion, 3rd Gurkha Rifles.
The first series of these operations commenced on t h e
23rd November and was directed against the Mahsuds of t h e
IChaiaara and Shahur Valleys, combined with demonstrations
from Jandola into the Tank Zam and from Datta Khel against
the north-west portion of the Mahsud country, the generay
object being to demolish all defences, capture prisoners and
cattle, and to destroy grain and crops. Four columns, each
consisting alrnost exclusively of infantry and varying in
strength from 900 to 1,250 men, started from Datta Khel',.
Jandola, Xarwelrsi and Wana ; all were opposed, and each
suffered some loss, but the combined operations were very
successful, due in large measure to the Mahsuds having been
lulled into a falr~esense of security by the inactivity of t h e
blockade.
Moreover, no sooner were these operations a t an end than a,
further series was projected. On this occasion, the Mahsuds,
being on the alert, carefully watched the movement of t h e
L T

troops, and there was little chance of taking thein by surprise.
A column of 2,500 rifles and 4 guns left Jaudola on the 4th
Dccember and bivouacked a t Dwe Shjnkai. Next day il;
withdrew to Guri IThel, the rear guard being so heavily plsessed
across the Uniar Raghza that i t had to Iaye~for the night on
the hills t o the north. During the 6th) on which date the
rearguard rejoined the main body, the eneniy made Irequent
attaclcs on the piquets but mere invariably repulsed, on
one occasion a t the point of the bayonet by a company 01
-the 29th Punjabis. During the withdrawal t o Jan'dola on
the 7th, the enemy showed increased activity and the 29th
Punjabis again distinguished themselves by repulsing a deter-mined attaclc and inflicting on the enemy a loss of 40 killed.
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The third phas3 consiated of combined operations by
tcolumn~from Jandola and Sarmelrai respectively which joined
hands at Dwe Shinlrai and then carried out a series oi raids
up the Bhinlcai Valley in three columns. Only slight opposition was encountered. The Mahsads, however, st111 evinced
no inclination to s ~ ~ b m iand
t , a fourth series oI operations
was consequently planned against them. For this three
columns were formecl, based respectively on Jandola, Jaili
Khel, and Datta Khel, and varying in strength from 2,500 to
1,400 men, the objective be?ng the punishment of Mahs~td
sections inhabiting the Shaktu, Bheranna, and Shuza valleys
and the capture of a large number of cattle known to be grazing
on the slopes of the Baba Ghar. The operations of these
columns were unif 01-mly successful. Standing camps were
now established at Zam, lHiranshah, and Baran, whence it was
intended to resume punitive measures as soon as the troops
had enjoyed a much-needed rest. By this time, how eve^,
the Mahsuds had lost heavily in men and cattle, and had
thoroughly realiscd that the innermost parts of their co~uztry
could be reached and traversed by our troops. They consequentljr opened negotiations for peace and the renioval of the
;blockade, and after the usual.delays paid up the fine ia full,
~ e s t o r e dall the rifles they had c a p t ~ ~ r e and
d , gave hostages
for the return of all plundered cattle. Our total battle casualties d~wiligthis campaign amounted to 32 killed and 114
wounded, those of the Mahsnds being estimated roughly at
126 killed and 250 wounded. In addition, 215 rdahsud prisoners
were taken, 64 towers were destroyed, 153 villages had their
defences levelled, and over 8,000 head 01 livestock were
aspt~ued.

The severity of the punishment inflicted on the Mahsuds
by these operations did not, however,
impress all sections of the Wazirs, and
belore the end of the year, an expedition
had t o be set on foot against the Icabul Khe1,-a branch of
the Darwesh Khel Wnzirs who inhabit the wedge of hilly
country lying between the Kohat and Bannu districts, east
of the Kurram river. For some years a number of outrages
had been committed in this neighbourhood, and in each case
the perpetrators were known to have talzen refuge in the
village of Gumatti, about S* miles from Bannu. This village
was accordingly surprised and surrounded a t dawn on the
6th February 1899, by a small column of troops from the
B a n i ~ ugarrison. Seven of the outlaws were capturecl while
trying to escape, but the remainder took refuge in two skrong
towers from which it was found impossible to disloclge them ;
and as a direct assczult would have incurred a loss quite out
of proportion to the object in view and the column had to
return to Bannu the same day, it was obliged to withdraw
witbout accomplishing its object. Three days later another
column from Bannu fo~undthe \rillage deserted, and blew up
the towers without encountering any opposition. The outlaws, who had now lost all hope of pardon, continued their
depredations on the border until, in 1902, the state of affairs
had become so intolerable that an expedition had to be sent
into the district. The troops employed were drawn from
the 21st, 22nd, and 27th Mountain Batteries ; the 21st, 23rd,
and 25th Cavalry (P. P.) ; the 51st, 53rd, and 54th Sikhs
(P. IT.), the 56th, 67th, and 58th Rifles (P. F.), and the 22nd
Punjabis, together mith detachments lrom the Kurram and
North Waziristan Militias. Pour columns were formed and
operated from Thal, Idak, Barganatu and Bannu respectively,
only the latter encountering more than slight opposition.
This column found itself conlroilted a t Gumatti by a strong,
fortified enclosure, thickly surrounded by trees, and held by
six outlaws. The mountain guns had no effect on the defences,
even a t 400 yards range, and Colonel Tonnochy, the officer
commanding the columa, was ordering them to advance still
closer when he fell mortally wounded. Two unsuccessful
attempts were made to breach the walls with gun-cotton, and
it was a t last decided to carry the place by escalade. This mas
accomplished by a storming party of the 53rd Silrhs (I?. F.),
though all three British officers were either killed or wounded.
All six outlaws were killed, our own loss amounting to four
Expedition ctgainst
the KabulKhol Wazirs,
1002.
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killed and fifteen Gounded. The total loss inflicted on the
enemy by the four coh~rnnswhich rounded up the district
amounted to 20 killed, 303 prisoners, 66 towers destroyed,
and 5,288 head of cattle captured.
I n connection with. this expedition, an incident occurred
which, though i t had no bearing on the course of the operations, deserves special mention as a fine example of a iorced
march carried out at very short notice. It had been arranged
that the whole 01 the prisone~sand cattle collected by the
Thal and Idak columns a t Spinwaln sho~ild,on the dispersal
of the fo~ce,be talcen t o Idak ; and in view of their large
numbers, i t had been decided to order out 100 men from
Idak to meet the Idak column on its return and assist in the
task. A message was accordingly despatched on the 22nd
November directing the officer comlnanding a t Datta I<hel
t o send 100 rifles to meet the Idak coltunn about half may
from Spinwam on the following day. The message did not
reach Datt-a Khel till after 3 P.M. on the 22nd, and 100 rifles
of 'the 56th Rifles (F. I?.) left that place two hours later.
Marching all night, they reached Miranshah (25 miles) by
1-20 A.M. on thc 23rd and Idak a t 5 P.M. on the same day,
having covered 49 milefi in just under 24 hours. Only one
man, a bugler, fell out during the march.
Pollowing the Kabul Khel expeclition, comparative pcace
reigned on the Waziristan border for some years, although .
in 1904, the murder of the BoliLical Agent at Waaa, and, in
1905, of the Comlnandant 01 the South Waziristan Militia
and the Brigade Major at Bnnnu, necessitated thc infliction
of heavy fines and the clismissal of all Mahsuds from the
S o ~ ~ Waziristan
th
Jlilitja. I n 1911, a iorce of about 2,000
Mahsuds invested Sarmrelzai, at the same time cutting the
telegraph lines and conlpletely isolating Jandola and Wana :
but the unexpected and rapid move of the Derajat Brigade
from Dera Ismail Khan to Spinkai within striking distance
of the enemy brought about his dispersal before any serious
damage Had beell done. Our posts at Spiaw~bmon the ICaitu
and a t Spins Ichaisora in the Upper Tochi were similarly
attacked without success in 1913, but no further important
operations were undertalcell against the Waziristan trgl~csprior
to the outbreak 01 the Great War.
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CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE WAZIRISTAN
TRIBES BETWEEN 4TI3
AUGUST1 9 1 4 AND 1 1 JUNE
~ ~1 9 1 7 .
On the whole the situation on the North-West Frontier
remained relnarkably quiet during the Great War, and it was
only against the Mahsuds that operations on an important
scale had to be undertaken. The position during this period
was one of considerable difficulty. The border tribes were
naturally excited by the entry of Turkey into the war; they
were encouraged by the preaching of a few prominent mullas
t o loolr towards Kabul and prepare for Jihad ;they heard the
wildest rumours about the military situation in India and 8
abroad ; and as the war wore on pro-Turlrish emissaries worked
incessantly among them to foment a general rising. The then
Amir, IIabibullah, however declined to depart from his declared
policy of neutrality and discountenanckd the efforts of his
more fanatical subjects to bring about a Jihad.
It was an essential part of the Government's policy a t this
time to avoid any unnecessary complications on the frontier,
the two main reasons' against the emljloyment of military force
being, firstly, that it would entail the diversion of troops
much needed elsewhere, and secondly, that it might lead t o
an outbreak all along the Border.
It was not therefore until the truculent attitude of the
Mahsnds had rendered military intervention absolutely necessary in the interests of general peace that a punitive expedition
against them was sanctioned.
The close of 1914 was marked by the outbreak of a series
of raids. It was supposed that Government was not in a
position to undertake'reprisals, and there was a runlour abroad
that the frontier posts were about to be evacuated.
At the end of November a Khostwal lnsl~lcarcrossed the
border from Afghanistan and looted the
rsCu,.Bio,,bydf.,h,
tribesman from ~ l i o s t sa~a'bat Miranshah before being driven off
1914-15.
by the Northern Waziristan Militia. The
Bannu n~ovesblecolumn advanced to Idak and other precau~ t prompt action of the
tionary measures mere taken b ~ the
Militia had had its effect and the lashkar withdrew to Khost.
I n January 1916 another unsuccessfnl attack by Khostwals
was made on Spina Khaisora in the Upper Tochi and on 24th
'
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JlIarch a Zashlcar estimated at 10,000 Zwdrails and other IChost
-tribes crossed the froutier and advanced the following day to
t h e neighbourhood of >firanshah Post. A colunin of the
Northern IVaziris~tanMilitia with a section of mountain artillery
moved out from the post and by mealis of a night march
succeeded in taking up a position across the enemy's line,of
retreat. On the morning of the 26th the enemy who was'in
saqzgars, was attacked by a force consisting ,of-.
2 squadrons 25th Caval~y(3'. P).
29th Mountaia Battery lees one section.
10th Jats.
52nd Sikhs (F. F.).
-under commaild bf Brigadier General V. B. Pane, C.B., and
driven in h'eadlong flight across the Durand Line harassed e n
rouie by the Militia detachment. The enemy losses were
'estimated a t 200 killedi and 300 wounded.
This action provcd a, very salntary lesson t o this part of
;the frontier, and 110 iilcident of any iniportance occurred in
the Tochi for over two years.
The IlIahsuds showed no inclination to aid these lashlca~s
froni Rhost, although they were smarting
of Mahsude, under the stoppage of their tribal allowances
3 0 14-17.
and restrictions imposed on them for their
failure t o surrender certain individuals d e m a ~ d e dby Government for their connection with the rn~~rder
of Major G. Dodd,
jC.I,E., Political Agent, Wana, who died a t Tank on 14th
April 1914.
The anti-British party led by Mulla Fazl Din, son of the
.notorious Mulla Vowindah, was eager to begin hostilities but
the majority of the tribe was restrained by the nzaliks from
following its lead. I n October however, Bazl Din's party
.asserted itself and a great increase in raids was the result.
During the followillg inonth a gang of about 90 blahsuds
attacked the road picluets between IChajuri Kach and Tansi
inflicting a loss of 5 killed and 10 wouncied, and a few days
later a party oi the Southern Waziristan Militia was ambushed
.near Tormandu qost losing 10 killed, 3 wounded and 13 rifles.
I n spite of these outrages it appeared that the bullr of
-the Mahsuds were anxious for a settlement with Government,
but certain irreconcilable sections notably Pazl Din's section,
.the Xhabi Khel, and the Abdur Rahrnan Khel continued
almost nightly t o raid the border villages in order t o implicate

the rest of the tribe. The hostile lorces a t work were too,
strong for the party in favour of peace. Fazl Din exchanged
visits with Lala Pis, a fanatical mullall of Ichost, and a member
of the Turkish Alghan party toured the frontier spreading
mendacious stories of overwhelming Turkish victories in
Mesopotamia and promising an early invasion of India.
e i i t i t is necessary t o
To understand the s ~ ~ b s e q ~ ~events
remember two deterniining factors ; the
Mahsud
situation
difficulty in which Mullah Pazl Din found
beginning 1917.
himself, and the implicatioiis of our own
policy at the beginning of 1917.
It was to the interest of those rnaliks in the tribe who
mere lriendly to us and whose sections desired intercourse
rvith British territory, to Break down the influence of the
Mullah whose continued hostility was the chief obstacle in the
way of a settlement, This they were in a fair may to
accomplish.
Our policy was to avoid for the present the final settlement
of the Mahsud problem. We had received grave provocation,
but it was not convenient, a t a time when troops were needed
for the Great War to exact in full measure the penalties due.
The hostile section6 of the tribe, with the exception of the
Abdullai, had no access to British territory and could not b e
affected by anything less than a punitive expedition. It
seemed advisable to take no action beyond entering the case.
against the guilty sections for future retribution, and meanwhile t o depend upon the restraining hfh~enceof the friendly
sections to prevent collision with the tribe as a whole.
I n accordallce with this policy the qnaliks of t h e friendly
Manzai sections were warned t o use theirNegotiations.
influence with the other section of the
Alizai clan, the Bhabi Ichel, the cbief supporters of the Mullah,
since they too would be helcl responsible for outrages committed
by the Bhabi Mbel. The Maslzai matiles then held a ji~ya
at Dwa Toi on the 18th January st which all the leading
Shabi Khel maliks and Mullah Tael Din. were present, and
announced their intention of attacking the Shabi Khel unless,
they made a temporary settlement with Gguernment, or a t
least promised to desist from further outrages. The Xhabi
Khel asked for time to consider the matter.
Meanwhile Government had sanctioned a scheme for
employing Mahsuds on the repair of the road between Mad
Ilessan and Bpinkai. This road had existed for some years.

and was acknowledged by the Mahsuds to be well outside
the limits of their territory. It was proposed to give contracts.
to the three main Mahsud clans who would arrange to supply
the labour required. The scheme was received favourably by
the maliks but was bitterly opposed by the Mullah who used
the not unreasonable argument that better roads make invasion
easier. As the Shabi Khel were still discussing the proposal
put forward by the Manzai, it was coilsidered undesirable
that their decision sllould be prejudiced by the Mullah's
arguments misleading though they mere, and the scheme was
abandoned end all work stopped on 18th Pebruary.
The Shabi Khel resolved against compliance with the terms
for a temporary settlement, and the recalcitrant sections pre-pared for active hostilities. It should be remembered Ghat
during the spring there are more Mahvuds in the south of
the country than at any other time of the year. The Nana
Khel of the Baddar and the Upper IChaisara bring their flocks
to graze in the Shahur valley, and the normal population of
these parts is increased three-fold. It is therefore comparatively easy t o raise a lashkar if sufEcient; temptation can be
held out to these tribesmen.
Mnllah Pazl Din decided that the.time for actioll had come.
He announced publicly that he intended t o attack British
territory as a reprisal for our breach of faith in attempting.
to repair the Mad I-Iassan-Spinkai road. Consequently on
26th February he collected a t Marobi a few hundred Shabi'
Ichel and some Abdullai, and on the 27th moved to the Spli
Toi reaching Barwand on the 28th. On the march he was
joined by large numbers of the Nana Khel who have aiways
taken the lead in hostile icovements against us.
At Barwaiid the i a s h k a ~now numbering about 1,500 men
was joined by the Wazir Mullah IIamz~illaanil some'ShalcniWazirs. An attempt made t o induce the Mansai malilcs t o
join the Jilzad failed, and these maliks returned to their homes.
As soon as the news oi.t;hese movements was received the
posts mere warned, and Major I-Itlghes-Southern Waziristan
- Militia with 70 men reinforced the garrison a t Barwekai bringing its strengbh up to 250 rifles.
On the evening of 1st March the post was cnt off. entirely
from telegraphic communication.
In the next few days, during which the attack on the postdeveloped, con~municationbetween Tanai and Sarwekai couldi .
only be made by heliograph vili Dargai Oba.

The lashlrar a t Barwand was joined on 1st March by parties
of Bahlolzai, so that its strength now stood a t about 3000.
Sniping into Sslrmekai began a t 2 P.M. on the 1st March.
This post stands on a spur of ICundi Ghar
T h o aftack on Sarwaat a height of 3,940 feet, the spur rising to
h i PO&, Mmch 1917.
the north-west in a series of steps, the
nearest of which, Garesi Sar, commands the post a t a range
of- 1,400 yards. The road from Dargai Oba crosses a nullah
full of- thick dwad palm alld then zigzags up to the post.
To the south-east on the road to the Khuzma Narai is a
tower, connected with the post by a trench. On the north
there were Eorrnerly two other similar towers, but these have
been demolished, and their sites are known as those of No. 1
and No, 2 tower respectively. To the north of these sites a
long nullah winds down to Barwand, distant about 5 miles.
There are many nullahs and much broken ground in the
neighbourhood of the post and it is easy for a force t o collect
without being seen by the garrison. Sniping from Garesi Sar
.and the slopes about it is an ordilisry occurrence, and can be
usually disregarded.
On this occasion, homever, the post was sniped on three
sides from sangars within a few hundred yards ; a party waa
sent out to drive the enemy off, but when heavily fired on,
was ordered to retire. This mas about 4 o'clock in the after.noon.
Major I-Iughes now decided to seize, during the night,
three sangars on Gsresi Sar, from which the lMahsuds a t a
range of 1,400 yards had been firing at the post. Accordingly
100 rifles under an Indian officer proceeded a t midnight and
occupied them with practically no opposition. At 7-30 A.M.
a party- of lEiO Mahsuds attacked the sangars but were driven
off with loss. As it was nccessary to carry up food and water
to the party on Garesi Sar, and the rationing parties were
invariably fired on, it was decided to withdraw it to the post.
With the object of covering the withdrawal, Major Hughes
proceeded with 50 rifles to take up a position in support.
The withdrawal commenced and was followed up immediately
by the enemy, the covering party under Major I-Iughes becoming
heavily engaged. Much hand-to-hand fighting ensued, but
by 5 P.M. t h e survivors succeeded in reaching the post having
suffered casualties amomting to twenty-one killed (including
Major I-Iughes), ten wounded and eleven prisoners. The
enemy casualties were some fifteen killed and twenty wounded.
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Major Davis coinmanding the Southern Waziristan Militia
learning of this action, moved out with 150 rifles on the 3rd
March from Wails and establishing heliographic comn~unicntion with Sarwekai learnt that the garrison had sufficient
rations and stores for a prolonged resistance. The eilenly
continued sniping at the post up to the 8th March on which
day they dispersed.
On receipt of the news of this affair the General Officer
Commanding Derajat Brigade ordered the moveable column
t o proceed from Tank and to insrch vili the Gomal route to
Sarwekai where it arrived on the 9th A4arch. On the following
day the force advanced to Barwand in three parallel columnst
with a view to driving off parties of the enemy who were
reported in that vicinity. Only slight opposition was encouutered. Kirris and enemy property a t Barwand were burnt
and the column witltdrew suffering two wounded casualties.
The column returned on the 11th March to Khajuri IZach
where it remained in a standing camp until the 3rd April
when it began its withdrawal to Tank, which was carried out
without incident. Meanwhile the 44th Infantry Brigade,
with the 23rd Mounljain Battery had arrived in the Tank
area as a reserve.
The minor raiding which had been going on for some time,
now culminated in an attack near the Gwalerai Narai on the
convoy from Khajuri Kach. The presence of enemy gafigs..
had already been reported and consequently thg escort had
been strengthened. On the 9th April the convoy started
from Khajuri Icach for N'ili Kach. When in the vicinity of.
mile-stone 38, fire was suddenly opened on two piquet groups
going into position, killing or wounding every man. An
attempt was made to re-establish the piquets but the increased
volume of fire forced the piqueting troops to withdraw. Our
total casualties were 18 killed and 2 wounded.
The 44th Brigade, which had meanwhile been withdrawn
from the Tank area, had already reached Kalabagh and Darya
Khan when orders were issued for the 1/4tlz Gurkha Rifles
and one section 23rd Mountain Battery to reiurn t o Tank.
Two companies of the 114th Gurkha Rifles with the section
23rd Mountain Battery reiliained at Tank while the other
half battalion joined the moveable column at Muxtaza, where
it had moved from Tank on the 10th April.
A general rising of the Mahsuds was not a nticipated, a.n&
it was not intended to take offensive action a t present. 1.t;

.was, however, necessary to keep open the comm~micationsto
.our various posts, and, ssfar as possible, to suppress raiding.
With these objects in view the Derajat Brigade was strengthened
by the 114th Gurkha Rifles, one section 23rd Indian Mouiitain
Battery, 107th Pioneers and No. 7 Company Sappers and
Miners. The two latter units were intended for the improvement of communications and the construction of a bridge
across the Gumal near Murtaza.
The llzovenble coIumn at Murtaza under the command of
Brigadier-General Baldwin, D.S.O., was now composed ofOne squadxon 11th 13:. E. 0 . Lancers.
30th Mountain Battery.
11th Rajpnts.
~ 1 sPuajabis.
t
67th Punjabis and
2 Colnpanies 114th Gurkha 'Rifles.
y the 9th
The Mahsuds who had attacked the c o n ~ ~ oon
were reported t o be still in the Spinkai
oolumn
area. This decided General Baldwin to
'olears route to Wana.
clear the route urn t o Wana and with this
object in view he began his advanLe on the 17th ~ ~ andn
arrived a t IChaj~rri ICach on the 18th wikhout opposition.
On the 20th the column moved to Tanai and the next day a t
7 -A.M. started for Wane. The route from Tanai crosses an
open plain for a mile and then enters the Sanzala Nala which
it ascends oh the right bank under Iow hills for another mile
t o Zaranni Oba where i t turns west up the gorge of the Sanzala ;
it then crosses a ridge and emerges at the Harab R o t tower
aix miles from Tanai : I n advancing through this defile tho
column ellcountered opposition, but owing to the skilful
handling of the piqueting troops ahd the close snpport of the
guns, -the r o ~ t ewas cleared for transpol* by 10 A.M. The
strength of the D'lahsuds was estimated a t 400. Our casualties
amounted t o 14 wounded.
The column reached Wana on the 21st without further
opposition and on the 24th returned to Tanai where it halted
until the 2nd May, being well situated t o support either \Vans
or Xarwekai. .
On tlhe 1st May a convoy of 80 cainels left Nili I<ach for
Kltajuri Kach escorted by o force composed
AttaOkinthe Gwalerj
of 378 rifles from the 21st Punjabis, 2/67th
Algsd l a b May.
Punjabis and 94th Russell's Infantry.

l

At 11 A.M. the p i q ~ ~ e t i itroops
~g
for four piquest were
fired on and all, except one man shot down. The supports
were attacked heavily and forced to withdraw. Meanwhile
the convoy had begun t o stampede and it was decided to
retnrn to Nili ICach, which was reached without further moles-tation.
The piqueting troops froin IChajuri Icach who had moved
out to meet those fro111 Nili Icach reached Gwaleri Kotal
without incident, and hearing firing a t 11 A.M. pnslzed on
and came across some 400 1Uahsnds carrying away their
wounded and loot ; these were fired on. Hurrying to the
scene of the action, the IChajuri ICach party came upon our
dead and wounded, who mere sent through t o Nili ICach.
Our casualties during the day had been severe, and amounted
to 2 British officers, 2 Indian officers, and 51 Indian other
ranks killed and 1 British officer, 2 Indian officers and 50
Indian other ranlrs wounded.
News of this action reached General Baldmin a t Tanai
the same afternoon, and he at once despatched a small columil
t o intercept the raiders on their return journey. The column
however, arrived too late to achieve its object. On the same
date the main column moved from Tanai, and arrived a t
Nili Each on the 3rd May.
The success of the attacks just described encouraged t h e
Mahsuds t o frrther acts of aggression and small gangs were
constantly crossing the border and plundering the villages
of cattle and other property. Considerable bodies of Mahsuds
were also reported to be abroad and several attacks on our
posts were attempted.
On the night of the 6th-7th May, a party of Mahsuds
attacked the Tormandu tower. An iron
On Tormandu
platform
and shield had been constructed
Post, 6th May.
for the assanlt, but the garrison was on
the aleri, the attack was beaten off and the device abandoned.
On the 7th, the wing of the 1-4th Gurkhas a t Tank was ordered
t o join the moveable column a t Nili Rach, and a company of
the 54th Sikhs (P. I?.) mas despatched to Murtaza to protect
the parties of Pioneers-vorking between that place and Spinkai,
the remainder of the regiment staying a t Tank.
On the evening of 9th May, Major L. P. Collins, D.S.O.,
114th Gur11:lza Rifles, who was in command
AOLion
a
t Sarwekai received iniormation from the
Ziarat, 9th May.
Political Agent who was present -in t h e

J

post that a strong party of Mahsnds was at the Khuzma.
Narai with the intention of returning t o the Shahur.
As Major Collins had received orders to intercept parties
of raiders he decided after consultiiig the Political Agent t o
hold the route by which the Mahsuds were most likely to,
return. Two miles east 01 Sarwekai is the well-known landmarl< of Palosi Ziarat, situated a t the head of the Danawat
Algad which runs towards Ilaidari Icach, and at the foot of'
Mamrez Sar which rises to a height of 4,077 feet, some 6001
feet above it. Two miles again south-east of the Ziarat is.
the Sheranna Algad. This was the region, east and south of
Pnlosi Ziarat which Major Collins decided to piquet in order
t o intercept the Mahsuds on their return journey. His force.
colisistecl of 250 rifles 114th Gurkha Rifles, 80 of the 11th
Rajputs and 120 of the Militia. With these he moved out
from Sarwekai at 1 A.M. on the 10th and posted one piquet.
on Marnrez Sar and lour others west OF the Sheranna, while.
it was still dark.
Soon after dawn smoke was seen issuing from a nullah
about one thousand yards distant from the most southerly
piquet and Subedar Mohibbullah, I.O.M., of the Militia -with
50 Gurkhas and 50 Militia was detailed to get above this spot
and drive the Mahsuds towards the line of piquets behin&
which was the rederve. At 7 A.M. the Subedar succeeded i n
surprising and openigg fire on a party of the enemy who were
cooking
- their food.
The Mahsuds were caught completely off their guardno ordinary occurrence- and a t first lost heavily, but there
was no panic amongst them and in a n incredibly short time
they were counterattaclring with extraordinary ferocity..
The rest of the Zasltlcar reinforced by a party of Shahur Shaman
Rhel, now joined in the attack on the picquets. Fierce fighting
ensued, durihg which our force gradually withdrew, hard
pressed by the enemy. A further reinforcement, in the shape
of 100 Dhurs, Nelczan Rhel, under Qhulam Khan, was seen
from Sarwel~aito be coming from the direction of Barwand,.
evideutly with the intention of cutting in between tile retiring
troops and the post, but it. was dispersed by the artillery of
the garrison, and the retirement was further facilitated by a
picluet of 50 rifles sent out on the right f l d from Sarwekai
t o the Waragha Tangi 8ar. The post was reached about
noon and as soon as the firing died down search parties were
sent out and were successful in collecting a certain number
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of the wounded. The strength of the enemy, who were almost.
exclusively armed with small bore rifles, was estimated a t
between four and five hundred, and their losses were ascertained
t o have been over 70 killed or died of wounds, amongst them
being their notorious leader, Sher Dil. Our casualties were
2 British officers, 1 Indian officer, and 36 rank and file killed,
3 Indian officers and 60 rank and file wounded, 70 Indian
rank and file miming.
Though our losses in this engagement were severe, those
inflicted on the enemy were also heavy and it mas reported
that the Mahsuds regarded the encounter in the nature of a
defeat, and paid a tribute to the steadiness and valour displayed by the Gurkhas in the hand to hand fighting that
took place.
As the whole of the Mahsuds were now openly against us
it was clear that our defensive policy mould have to be abandoned and a punitive expedition undertaken: The Shaman
Khel and Manzai sections, who hitherto had not been unfriendly asked for a guarantee that they would not be held
in any way responsible for ally future misdeeds of hostile
sections, but this of course, v a s impossible.
Pullitive operations having been decided on, the force
shown in Appendix " A " was concentratecl
Punitive operations
sanotionod.
in the*Derajat Area. The garrison of the
Tochi Area mas also reinforced, the whole
being known as the Waziristan Field Force and coming
under the cornlnalld of Major-General W. G. L. Beyaon, C.B.,

C.I.E., D.S.O.
For Political duties the following officers were appoiizted
to the force :Sir John Donald, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

,

. .
Major R. J. W. HeaIe .
.
J. A. 0. E'itzpatriek, Esq., C.I.E. .
Major F. H. Ilumphreys .

Chief Political Office~t o the
Wazirist'an Field Borce.
In charge of North Waziris$an.
In charge of the Bhittannis.
In charge of Wana and the
Mahsuds.

With regard to the policy to b: adopted, it was recognised
that a final settlement with the Mahsuds could not be effected
without either occupying their country in strength for a
considerable beriod, or by instituting an extended blockade.
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B u t such measures as these were out of the question during
the Great War, being too costly in men and money. There
remained a n act of temporary but not ineffectual retaliation
for onr recent losses and the present defiance, which would
perhaps at the same time afford a warning for the future.
This was a punitive expedition into the rich Khaisara valley,
which was expected t o produce +he desired effect without
exciting any feeling of alarm in Khost or Afghanistan generally, which had hitherto remained quiet and refrained from
interference. By devastating the Ichaisara we should be punishing the sections mainly responsible for the mischief done.
With this end in view, operations were finally sanctioned.
A lorce consisting of two brigades, each with a mountain
battery and a company 01: sappers and miners, was to concentrate a t Wana, carry out punitive raids in the Ichaisara valley,
and return to Wana where it would remain until the effect
on the Mahsuds could be judged. The pBsts of Sarwekai,
Khajuri Icach, Nili Iiach and Murtaza were t o be
garrisoned by a battalion each, while two battalions and '
Borne cavalry were to hold Jandola and the Derajat posts.
" Pour additional battalions were added to the Bannu
Brigade in the Tochi, where operations were to be of a defensive
nature only.
The rising of the river Indus and the floods occurring in
the Gomal greatly hampered the concentration of troops and
accumulation of supplies. The Mahsuds, however, still continued their activities and on the 13th May raided two tongas,
7 miles from Tank. This gang was engaged next morning
in the hills, 4 miles west of Rori village by a detachment of
six sowars of the 11th Lancers and thirty rifles of the 54th
Sikhs from Rori post who inflicted casualties.
A convoy with much needed supplies for Wana and Sarwekai
had been delayed b y floods which had made
Attaok near the Chota
G w &,i,
16th may. the Gomal unfordable. On account of the
large munber of camels, it was decided t o
move- the convoy in two echelons, and on the 15th May the
first of these, escorted by the 21st Punjabis and the 11th
Rajputs, with two sections of mountain artillery, under
Brigadier-General Baldwin, started from Nili Kach and reached
Khajnri Kach without incident. The aecond echelon, escorted
by t h e 1st Nepalese Rifles, two companies of the 114th Gurkha
Rifles, and a section of mountain artillery under the command
of Lieutenant-Colonel Sealy, 114th Gurkha Rifles lefti Nili Kach
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the lollowing day, troops froin Iihajnri Rach co-operating
in the piqneting duties iron1 that post to the Gwaleri Pass.
The advanced troops from Nili Icach reached the s~linrnit
of the Chota Gwaleri Pass at 8-15 A.M. without encountering
opposition, but on the van guard moving Eorward up the
main i~alabed it was ambushed and all but two ol its numbers
shot down. Large n ~ q b e nof Mahsuds were then observecl
a n the hills in the vicinity. Artillery fire was opened on these
causing them t o scatter only to reappear later and fire on the
main body which now had reached the slopes of the Chota
Gwaleri, Reports were received a t the time that the enemy
was moving in rear of the convoy. Numbers of thein conld
also be seen east of point 4601 (see Map No. 4) from which
position they were maintaining a des~iltoryfire. LieutenantColonel Sealy decided that it was not possible t o get the convoy
through, and a t noon began the return march to Nili ICach,
but owing to the diffic~~lty
in collecting the dead and wounded
,the echelon did not reach the post until 8 P.M. Om casualties
were 17 killed, 9 wounded, and 4 missing.
Our losses on this occasion were attrib~~table
directly to
athe premature advance of the van guard along the nala bed
before the establishment of at least two essential piquets on
features commanding the route. The sudden onsla~lghtof
the tribesmen threw the supporting troops into confusion
and before a counter-attack could be organized the Mahsnds
bad stripped the dead a2d' wounded and retired under the
fire of their covering parties.9
.
Meanwhile the troops a t the Gwaleri Pass endeavoured
without success to engage the retiring enemy. Attempts t o
establish communication with the troops
- from Nili Kach also
failed.
The news of the return of the second echelon t o Nili Kach
soon reached General Baldwin and the Headquarters of the
Wasiristan Porce, and instructions were issued for both echelons
$0 remain where they were until the arrival of reinforcementa
which were being sent up.$
~ r i ~ a d i e r - ~ e n eSouthey
ial
commanding the 43rd Brigade
a t Tank was ordered to proceed with the 54th Sikhs, the 107th
Pioneers, and one section 23rd Mountain Battery as
reinlorcemellts to Nili ICach, and from that place,
with the assistance of Lieutenant-Colonel Sealy's troops,
to attack the hostile l~shkur,reported as numbering about
%,000, and to clear the Gwaleri P ~ s s : The crossing of the
i
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Gomal, still swollen. by floods, delayed General Southey, and
it was not until the 20t'h that he arrived at Nili Kach. The
next day the column left for Ichajuri Kach wb.ere it arrived
without having encountered any opposition. General.
Baldwin's force co-operated from Khajuri Kach, as also did
6 aeroplanes based on Tank. The convoys now pushed on to
W'aiia and Sarv~ekai,under escort of General Baldwin's troops,
General Southey remaining at Khajuri Kach. Both places
were rationed wit,b a further month's supplies, and the escort
returned, after leaving the 1/4th G-urlxha Rifles a t aarwekai.
During the advance of the rationing convoys a half-hearted.
attack had been made 011 WTaaa Fort on the 18th) but tb.e
erlellly withdrew to Inzar Narai after three ]lours' des~~ltory
sniping. Sarwekai post was also sniped on the 21st and
22nd, but without effect .
Reports now came in from political sources that the
-1nshil.a~~
had dispersed a n d t h a t most of the tribesmen were
busy sowing rice and maize and harvesting barley, and that
ihe reaping of wheat was to begin shortly. A lull in hostilities
therefore seemed probable, and the general feeling among
the Mahsuds was said to be.in favour of an early agreement
with Government.
For the proposed operatiom into the Khaisara valley it
was necessary to have a reserve of a t least
Proposed plbn of
three
~veeks' supplies a t Wana, but the
operations.
difficulties of concentration both of these
supplies and the troops 011 account of tbe rising of the Indus
and the continual floods of the Gomal, made i t necessary t o
reconsider t h e line of advance. It had been intended that the
striking force should advance to Wana viB the Gomal route.
On account of the delay which had been caused, and of t h e
uncertainty as regards the Gomal river, it was now proposed
t o concentrate all troops a t Jandola and to advance t o Wana
vid the Shahur, still maintaining the Khaisara valley as our
objective. From a political point of view this was less desirable, as the Shahur route led us very near the border line of
certhin sections of the tribes who were reported wavering
betwcen hostile neutrality and active hostility, but this objection was no longer valid for even the alanzai section had
taken part in the attack on the convoy os the 16th instant.
Furthermore, it was important that the advance should take
place without iurther delay, so that the standing and newly
harvested crops could be destroyed before they had been.
threshed and buried.
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The advantages and disadvantages of the two routes,
briefly stated, are as followed :The Gomal route is outsicle Mahsud territory and is less
liable to attack than the Shahnr. There
Comp~risonof Goma1
is a motor road from Tank t o Murtaza, end,
and Shahur routes.
if ZL bridge were constructed over the Gomal
a t the latter place, mechanical transport could go straight
through to Nili Icach. As a set-off against these advantages,
however, the Gomal is constalltly in flood ; the country is
difficult, affording great opportunities for a few riflemen to
hold up whole convoys ; also, the stages are long anci the,
cliniate' is unhealthy.
The Shahur route, on the other hand, except for three
miles through the Shahur Tangi, is easier t o protect ; the
stages are shorter, which is a consideration during the trying
heat of summer and though floods clo occur they only close
the route lor a few hours and are not so frequent or prolonged
as those in the Gumal. Purther, a concentration of troops
at Jandola would have a steadying effect on the Rhittannis
and would strengthen them in their resistance t o a-t;tempts
by Mahsud raiders to cross their hills. Finally, it was calculated that by using the Shahur route, the punitive operations
into Khaisara could be carried out some ten days earlier
khan vi$ the Gomal.
The disadvantages of this route are that i%runs through
Mahsud territory, and though it is more easily defensible ~t
is also more liable t o attack. Moreover, it had t o he borne
in mind that no stage of the Jandola ronte, vici Chasan Rach
and Khirgi, was practicable for wheels and consequently that
camel transport, would be necessary fqom Tank onwards.
It was therefore decided that the advance should take
place via the Shahur, and. that the Sarwekai garrison should
be increased t o two battalions' and two guns before the with'
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General Southey, with the 11th Rajputs~the 54th Sikhs,
and the 1st Nepalese Rifles, with 4 gun8
Gomal posts rbtioned.
of the, 30th Mountain Battery, was ordered
'up the Gornal, vicZ Khajuri Kach and :Dergai Oba,
to
and ration all posts, incl.uding Sarwekei,, up t o the 1st July
at their strengths as they then were. The force left Khajuri

'

Kach on the 2nd June, carryillg o u t its mission and returning
without encountering any opposition. The coluinn then
marched vi& Mnrtaza to Jandola, where it arrived on t h e
9th June. By the following d a y the concentration of troops
which had been going on there i n t h e rneaatime, was completed.
The order of Battle of the S o u t h Waziristan Pield Force
will be found in Appenclix T.
The heat since the middle of M a y l ~ a dbeen severe, t h e
thermometer registering 120 degrees by day in tents, with a
minimum of 90 degrees by night in Tank, while a t Jandola
it was slightly cooler.
The Royal Air Force, which h a d been carrying out nunlerous
reconnaissances, had now obtained a sufficient number of
photographs t o compile a map of t h e Shahur route.
On the 29th May, the Mahsuds h e l d a jirya a,t lcsniguram,
which was attended by delegates from
Attitude of the Amir.
Ichost. At t h i s meeting Fazl Din read n
letter which he had recaivecl from the Amir of Afghanistan,
forbidding Mahsuds to go t o K a b u l for allowances as long
as they were at war with the I n d i a n Government, or to fight
unless their country was invaded by troops. The jirga passed
a resolution that they were willing t o resume friendly relations
with the Indian Government, a n d t o return all stolen rifles,
provided their prisoners and detenus were released and their
allowances contii~ued, but that otherwisc they would fight.
The Amir's letter promised to h a v e an important bearing o n
the situation, for i t showed the M a h s u d s that they could n o t
expect any assistance from Afghanistan and a t the same time
it held out some hope of a temporary settlement without a n
expedition. This hope, was however, of short duration a n d
we soon found ourselves forced t o a d o p t punitive measures.
Then came the attack on Tut Narai p o s t , an example of border
land daring which has few equals even in the annals of t h e
Mallsuds.
On the 30th Mav. news was received that lashknr of 1,200
&d collected w i t h the object of making a n
Capture of Tut Narei
. . immeattack on the Tochi. .All posts were
post, ~ 1 sMEW.
t
diately mr,zrn.ed, and a convoy, which was
through to Miranshah
returning from Datta Ichel, was
without halting at Boys. About half-past ten o'cloclr on the
following morning a party of five
and two girls mas noticed
T
h
e
p a r t y sat down in t h e
approaching Tut Narai post.
vicinity of the post and entered illto con%-ersetionwith sonle
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sepoys of the militia ghrrison who were standing close by.
Shortly afterwards three 01the Mahsuds, apparently unarmed,
approaclled the wire entanglement and persuaded a sepoy to
purchase for them some sweets from the post bunniab. A6.
the sepoy approached the main gate of the post he mas closely
followed, but without realizing it, by the three Mahsuds. In
response to a shout from the sentry on the wall of the post
the sepoy turned to order the Mahsuds outside the wire entanglement. It was too late. One of the Mahsuds producing s
revolver shot the sepoy while the other two dashed for the
gate about five yards distant reaching it a t the same tiine
as the guard commander. Before the latter could close tlie
wicket gate he too was killed. In an instant the three Mahsuds
were attacking the remainder of the guard shooting them clowll
before they could reach their rifles. At the first shot, the two
Mahsuds who were with the girls fired a t the scntry on the
wdl, and then ran towards the post Eollowed by the girls
who were throwing 08 their disguise. The latter turned out
to be ex-sepoys of the Militia. In the meantime a party of
about 30 Mahsuds who had been concealed in the holly-oak
jungle near by entered the post and kept the remainder of the
garrison whose arms were loclred in the bell of arms, confined
to their barrack rooms. The sentries on the wall were rushed,
but the Subadar in command seizing a wounded sentry's
rifle continued firing at the enemy until wounded himself in
three places. The telegraph office clerk mas chased from his
room and murdered, but not before he had seni; off the message
-" Please help, .raiders are plundering "-to
the Political
Agent a t Datta Khel. This message was received a t 11-6 A.M.
and was repeated immediately to Miranshah, whilst all local
chighas mere collected and sent t o Tut Narai. The prompt
assistance rendered by these chighas, who hurried to the scene
from three directions, combined with the Ere from towers
which conlmand the post on two sides, stopped the looting
and resulted in the raiders being driven off. The post was
occupied by the c72ighus a t about 12-30 r . M . their numbers
amounting t o some 450. The Mahsuds howcver, had succeeded
in breaking open the bell 01arms and decamping with 59 rifles,
120,000 rounds of ammunition, and Rs. 581 in cash. Our
casualties were six killed and eight wounded, those of the
enemy being estimated a t about a dozen killed and many
wounded, The raiders must have llunibered about six
hundred, of whom perhaps five hundred were Abdullai from
Makin.
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The success of the Ifahsuds on this occasion may be attributed to the care with which their plans had been arranged,
and to their lrnowledge of the habits of the garrison. Bor
example, the day chosen for the attack was Thursday, the
meeltly holiday, when it was certain that no outdoor parade
or field training would disclose the presence 01 large numbers
of tribesmen concealed in the vicinity of the post. The time
too was well selected. By that hour it conld be anticipated
that the inspection of rifles would have been completed, and
t h e .garrison engaged in bathing, or washing clothes a t the
pond belom the -post, or enjoying a siesta.
The Mahsuds too must have noticed and taken advantage of the error lnade shortly before, in changing the position
of .the sentry ~vatclzingthe mail1 gate. Instead of being on
the wall the sentry was posted formerly near the wicket gate,
fro111 which place he was able to watch the guard room, bell
of arms and magazine.
On the receipt of the news Major G. B. Scott, D.S.O;,
~omniandingthe Northern Waziristan Militia left Miranshah
immediately with a small column t o re-garrison the post.
O n arrival a t T LNarai
~
a t 9 A.M. on the 1st June the past
was found to have been but little damaged, and after reinforcing the post with militia the column returned on the
following day without finding any trace oP the enemy.
The Tut Narai incident now raised the question of the
distribution of troops in the Tochi and
Distribution of troops
the
policy t o be pursued in that area.
i n the Tochi.
The Chief Commissiouer of the North-West
Brontier Province considered that we should either (a)evacuate
Datta Khel, Tut Narai, and Spina Khaisora, which were, he
contended, 01 no strategic importance and would orlly dram
attaclrs, or (b) send a Brigade into Maahud country from the
Upper Tochi. Neither of these proposals was coilsidered
desirable, and it was eventually decided that a stronger force
should be located a t )!tiranshah t o deal with hostile mids in
the upper Tochi, but that the policy should remain one of
active defence.,
As Major-General Beynon had now assumed personal
command of the force which mas to advance from Jandola,
it was decided to form the North and South Waziristan Pield
Borces, the troops in the Bannu area comprising the lorn~er
and those in the Derajat area the latter, the whole coming
directly under the command of General Sir Arthur Barirett,
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G.C.B., X.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., A.D.C., Commanding the Northern
Army, whose headquarters were t o remain at Murree.
Troops of the South Waziristan Field Force remained as
shown in Appendix " B " while those of the Northern Porce
were now distributed as follows :At Bannu31st D. C. 0 . Lancers (less 1 squadron).
2nd Gwalior I. S. Lancers (less 1 squadron).
1 section 29th Indian Mountain Battery.
72nd Punjabis.
21103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
95th Infantry.
At Ikfiransl~ah1 squadron 31st D. C. 0. Lancers,
1 s q ~ ~ a d r o2nd
o Gwalior Lancers.
29th Mountain Battery (less 1 section).
l / l s t Kent Battalion.
10th Jats.
Shere Regiment.
Miranshah battalion (for protection of camp).
25th Punjabis. .
Bor zuor7c on road12th Pioneers.
The whde under the conlmand of Brigadier-General the
Hon'ble G. G. Bruce, M.V.O.
The lines of communications were organised as follows :(a) Administrative control from Rawalpindi t o Kohat,
Bannu, Tank and Darya Khan Railway stations,
inclusive, under an Inspector-General 01 Communication with headquarters a t Mari Indus, directly
responsible to the Northern Arrny Commander.
(b) In the Derajnt area, under General Beynon's orders, a .
defence commander and Inspector of Communications froni Darya Khan and Tank stations.
(c) I n the Bannu area, under the orders of General
Bruce, an Inspector' of Comm~~nicationsfrom
Kohat and Bennu to Miranshah, who wo~zIdalso
be Defeiice Commander cis-frontier.
As this Norther~lWaziristan ,Force was not called upon
after this date t o make any movement, me may now leave
it and return to the Derajat area and the events'that occurred
there,
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On the 1st June a Bhittalmi jirgn was held a t Tanlr a n d
it was decided to enroll one hundred of the Thatta sectioll
of the Daman Bhittannis for piqueting the two lower sect'ions
of the Jandola road, which duty they began on the 16th June,
Early 011 t h e 7th June a piqueting detachment of t w o
~ t t a c l ron piquoting British officers and -89 men of t h e 2 / l s t
party near ~ ~ h i r g7th
i,
Gurkha Rifles proceeding from Zam post
Juno.
towards Ichirgi were attacked by a p a r t y
of enemy estin~ateda t five hundred. The terrain where this
took pIace is flat and stony, and covered with small bushes.
The eiienly attacked the advanced screen and attempted t o
surround the whole j ~ ~ r t ybut
, were driven off after a fight
lasting twenty minutes and retired i11 the direction of t h e
Shnza. Our casualties were thirty-five killed, 2nd-Lieutelzant
Forster and seventeen other ranks wounded and three missing.
2nd-Lieutenant Forster was shot b y a wounded Mahsud lying
on the ground after the fight was over. The Mahsuds were
reported t o have lost heavily including two notorious Shingi
raiders and a Manzai malQcs.
A few days later a Wazir havildar commandillg Tiarza
tower occupied by a mixed detachment of the Southern Wazirist a n Militia succeeded in deserting with twenty-five rifles,
thirteen boxes of ammullition and four hand-grenades.
A relation who had chanced to be passing with some laden
bullocks was partaking of food inside the tower, when t h e
havildar on t h e plea that the reserve was insufficient sent
out the garrison except one Afridi sentry and the Adam Iihel
Afridi rnuharrir to collect firewood.
The Wazirs seizing their opportunity disarmed the sentry
and overpowering the muharrir loaded their booty o n t h e
bullocks and made good their escape t o Mahsud country.
On hearing this news a party of Machi Iihel Mahsuds
removed the kits and rations and burnt the tower, which h a s
'since not bcea re-built.
The Mahsuds had now become alarmed a t the concentration
of troops, and although certain of the malihs were undoubtedly
i n favour of a settlement, the majority of the tribesmen,
encouraged by Mulla Pazl Din, were bent upon opposing our
advance. The Wana and Tochi Wazirs were more or less
quiet, and had so far refrained from joining the Mahsuds.
On our side tlie conceptration 01troops was complete and b y
t h e 12th June all preparations for the advance were ready.
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VERTICAL PHOTOGRAPH OF ENTRANCE TO SHAHUR TANGI.

CHAPTER V.
THE SHAHUR
AND I~HAISARA
VALLEYS,BETWEEN
12TH. JUNE
AND 17~21
AUGUST1917.

OPERATIONSIN

Brequent reports had been comiiig in that the Mahsuds
were collecting in large numbers to oppose
Preliminary rcconthe
advance
of the striking
force which
neissancofrom Jandola,
. .
they anticipated would begin operations
in the valley of the Tank Zam and, as reliable inforrrlation had
been received that a considerable body of the enemy had
arrived in the neighbourhood of the junction of the Shahur
and Tank Zam, the column moved O L L ~from Jandola on 12th
June to attack it. The enemy, however, did not make a stand
but retired up the Tanlr Zam followed by a detachment of the
1.lth Lancers which withdrew after destroying some hamlets
and stocks of fodder. Air reconnaissance showed that no
large bodies of tribesmen were in the vicinity so the force
returned to camp followed. up by a few of $he enemy who
contented themselves with sniping at long range. Our casual!
ties were three wounded.
The following day the 43rd Brigade carried out a reconnaissance to the eastern entrance of t h e Shahur Tangi, the
Sappers and Miners and 107th Pioneers, a t the same time
clearing a double canal track up the river bed. Aeroplanes
co-operating with the troops reported all quiet as far as Haidari
Kach and information, afterwards confirmed, was received
t h a t the laslikar up the Tank Zaln had dispersed owing to
the heat and sca~cityof food.
It had been arranged that whenever the column moved
forward it should be accompanied by a convoy carrylng two
days' supplies for the whole force in addition to two days'
supplies in regimental and brigade supply column. I n view
of possible opposition a t the Shahur Tangi and uncertainty
regarding the state ol the route through the defile, MajorGeneral Beynon decided to advance to Haidari Kach in two
echelons ; the first of which would occupy the heights commanding t h s dangerous gorge and protect the passage of the
second with the convoy. Accordingly on the 14th June the
of Shshur 45th Brigade moved from Jandoln to
Tangi, 14th and 16th Chag~nalaion the right bank of the Mastang
Juno.
Alged at its junction ~ 4 t hthe Shshar
-
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,close to the entrance of the tccfzgi and there pitched camp,
without encountering any oppositioa.
On the follotving day the main body of the forct?, the 43rd
Brigade accompanied by the 21st Punjabis, 127th Baluchis,
ahd the convoy marched from Jandola to Haideri Kach,
h o
the
covered by troops from the 45th Brigade ~ ~ occupied
heights coinmanding the tnngi, the majority of t h e piquets
being posted on the left banlr. The rapid passage of the
lengthy baggage and supply trains demonstrated the value
,of the double camel track which had been cleared so expeditiously throughout the defile.
To' assist the advance of the main force a detachment
from Sas~velraimade a demonstration towards Tnran China.
This operation mas carried out successfully, three Mahsucls
being killed and two taken prisoners a t Kamardin village.
The opposition was slight and the detachment returned without
casualties to Sarmelrai.
The 45th Brigade having joillecl the main body of the
force at I-laidari Icach the troops were employed in improving
the double caniel road through the Bhahur Tangi and in
,destroying villages, crops, waterconrses, and mills, in the area
aronncl I-laidari Kach, Turan China, and the Danawat Algad,
s a d in reconnoitring the route towards Barwand.
The Illahsuds ev?clently calculating on the losce advancing
.LIP the Ta111c Zam had not removed their stores of fodder
and wood, while the rice fields too had been planted recently.
The thorough devastation of this area had an excellent
politiczl and nlilitary effect.
Prom information received i t was now evident that the
advance of the force and the destruction
Advance t o Barwand,
done
in the Shahur had roused the Mshsuds ;
10th June.
convinced by this time that they would
not be attacked from the Tochi and they decided t o oppose
&headvance up the Shahur. This it was probable they would
attempt t o do near Barwand, as it was reported t h a t a large
lashlcar was to assemble a t Ispana Raghea on the 19th. Mulla
Hamzullah too promised the assistance of a contingent of
Wazirs from Wana and Shakai. As there seemed no doubt
hhat considerable ntunbers of tribesmen were collecting the
114th Gurkha Rifles. and 1 section 30th Mountain Battery
were ordered to move from Sarwekai on -the 19th and join
;the force at Bar wand.
'

'
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a t Ispana Raghza and intended to attack
the camp that night. ,All t h a t occurred,
however, was intermittent sniping intocamp, and a determined effort to capture a piquet of the 54th
Sikhs posted on a spur on the left bank of the s t r e w . The
piquet was held by Subedar I3dcin Dad and thirty Punjabi
Mussulmans. This party had been unable to sangar itself'
dusing daylight as any movement brought down an accuratefire from. a near and coimaiiding ridge,' b~14i t managed to*
establish itself on a ledge of roclr which commauded the slope:
Attack on piquet
Barwand, 10thJune,

'

Alter dusk the enemy who numbered several hundred,
nlade repeated efforts t o rush the piquet, creeping up to within
twenty yards and calling on the defenders-their
coreligionists--to relinquish their arms, on which they
lvould be allowed to withdraw unharmed. These attacks
continued throughout the night. Assistance was rendered
from camp by searchlight and gun fire directed by lamp signal
froln the piquet. The day dawned and the piquet was a t
last relieved, only one bomb and three rounds per man a
remaining ; f o men
~ had been killed and the Ir~dianofficer and
twelve sepoys wounded. The courage and determination of
the defenders together with the possession of bombs and the
assistance rendered by the guns undoubtedly saved the piquet
froin exterminatioa.*
The success with which our troops and convoys i n the
Goma1 bad been attacked had no doubt given the Mahsuda
great confideilce in dealing with small bodies of our troops.
The gallant defence made by this undaunted piquet of the
54th Sikhs and ,the casualties i t inflicted did much to inspire
the tribesmen with respect for, and fear, of our troops, and
contributed in no small measure to the final settlement,
On the 20th the camp was moved to the western end of
t h e Ispana Raghza plateau where there is a perennial water
supply from the river, which just below this locality disappears
underground. The enemy made a determined attempt to
checlc the advance of the force and held a spur flanking the
Raghza on its northern side, and dominating it. Prom this
they were driven by the 43rd Brigade, tho spur referred to
above being attacked and carried with conspicuous dash by
the 1/25th London Regiment and 114th Gurkha Rifles. The
Mahsud lakhsar withdrew to the north and the occupation of
the Rakhza was not further disputed except by a few snipers.
Our casualties were six killed and sixteen wounded. On this
day the force was joined by the 11th Rajputs from Sarwekai.
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The climate was now more pleasant and the nights cool.
A halt was made in order that supplies might be collected
for the next advance, and the work of devastation systematically carried out in the neighbourhood.

* Our total oasualties for t h e 19th were : 9 killed and 3 3

wounded.
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Due north of Ispana Rnghza and about two miles froin it
over a pass, is the village of Nsnu in a
Attack on Nanu d l valley of the same name running. eastward
!age, ~ 1 sJUIIO.
t
and joining the Spli Toi. This village was
the home of Kutab Khan, the chief malilc of the Manzai section,
a grandson of Umar Khan and son of Badshah IChan-names
well known in the history of our relations with the tribe.
Xince the village was being used as a base by the Ealc1zsar
now in the held, it was thought that its dests~~ctioa
would
affect the moral of the Mahsuds, and Major-General Beynon
decided to attack Nanu on the 21st.
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On the night of the 20th-21st an alarm was raised on the
north face of the camp that about forty of the enciny had been
seen near the perimeter. Some wild firing broke out but it
was soon checked, and i t was found that no attack in force
was being made. It is not unlikely thai; such an attack was
contemplated, but finding the camp prepared the enemy
abandoned the attempt. The drums of the Mahsuds in the
hills to the north could be heard distinctly, and in the morning
considerable numbers of the enemy were to be seen on the
ridges near the Nanu Pass. The pass itself is commanded
by three rocky eminences on the north-west and the whole
terrain is a'dmirably suited to defence. The Mahsuds made
use of every advantage, and had coiistructed well sited and
coastructed samgurs on the forward slopes of the hills.
Shortly after the 45th Brigade had begun its advance
towards the pass air .reconnaissance reported that about three
hundred of the enemy had been observed in the vicinity of
Nanu, apd it was evident that the tribesmen had determined
to make a stand on this occasion. T& 216th Sussex Xegiment
moved against the pass itself while the 2/lst Gurkhas were
directed on the high ground to the south of the Pass and the
Mahindradal Regiment ordered to seize the rocky heights
commanding the pass on the north-west, the 55th Rifles being
held in reserve.
As it was soon apparent that considerable opposition would
be met the 43rd Brigade was ordered t o reinforce the 45th
Brigade with its artillery, and to hold a battalion in readiness
to assist if needed. Some difficulty was experienced by the
2/1st Gurkha Rifles and the Nepalese regiment in capturing
the rocky heights dominating the pass but by 10 A.M. with
the aid of steady and accurate gunfire the whole ridge hsd
been carried, the Mahindradal Regiment in particular dis-
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tinguishing itself. Major Harte, 6th Gurkha Rifles, Selzior.
Supervising officer of the regiment was killed a t the head of
his men, just before the summit was reached. The pass was
occupiecl and the Sussex Regimefit pushed on to piquet the
hills colnrnanding the viuage, and to pursue the enemy who was
being harassed in his retreat by the low-flying aeroplanes.
Two guns of No. 1 British Mountain Battery now came up
Lhe pass and were of great assistance in supporting the advanced
piquets, which were under hcavy and accurate fire.
The work of demolition began and the village was completely destroyed by 2 P.M. In the meantime all animals
except those absolutely necessary were sent down the steep
and rocky track to camp. AS the Lewis guns were to be
man-handled the mules were also sent back to camp. All
impediments were thus cleared away, and the withdrawal
began ,at 2 F.M. The piquets retired quickly and skillully
and the whole brigade returned with slight nlolestation t o
camp a t 4-45 P.M. Our casualties were twelve killed and forty
wo~mded.
It appeared from iniorlnation subsequently received that
the Mahsuds had intended to make a bold
Birst overtures for effort to stop the advance of the lorce.
pence by M ~ L L S U ~ S ,
Their defeat however, brought home t o them
the futility of opposing the Government, and three days later
the first emissaries of peace began to come inio camp.
On the 22nd June the 43rd Brigade destroyed a large
village in the Waspas valley known as Shah Salim Mela. This .
was effected with little opposition although the enemy had
made careful preparations for opposing the advance of a force
attacking up the valley. The-whole of the defence was t ~ ~ r n e d
by tthetroops advancing along the hill commanding the valley
below. This action disconcerted the Mahsuds who retired
upstream towards the Ichaisara. The village was deserted.
1-1;shundred houses and all property were effectively burned
and the force withdrew followed by a few snipers. Our
casualties were one killed and three wounded. A suficiency
of supplies had by this time been collected a t Ispana Raghza
to enable a post to be established there and a raid made iato
the Ichaisara valley.
The general situation was now reported to be as follows :Situation, 22nd June. Lashkars numbering about four thousand
in all were collected near the force, their
numbers fluctuating as portions went away for rations. Small

parties had been organised t o harass the troops, but none
had come down below the Shahur Tangi. The routes threatening Jandola-Tank line were said to be clear. According to
spies, the Manzai, Shanlan Iihel, and probably, the Bahlolzai,
were quite ready to open negotiations, if given full safeconducts. Fearing danger from Datta Khel, the Abdullai
aiid Bahlolzai whose homes lay towards the Tochi had not
joined the 1ashlca1-s in the Khaisara. The Bhittannis were
working well in piqueting the Jandola-Zam line and our own
arrangements for convoys through Ilaidari ICach were, on
the whole, satisfactory ; the route through the Shahur Tangi
had been bloclred on the 20th by spate and delaya occprred
on several occasions, while there had been a good deal of
siclmess, mainly diarrhoea, among the troops on the Line of
Communication.
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On the 23rd, the 11th Rajputs, Mahendradal Regiment,
1 section 30th Mountain Battery, and half
Advance to Narai
23rd J ~ ~ 8~ squadron
.
11th Lancers, were left to
guard Ispana Raghza post and secure the
passage of convoys, - while the remainder of the force, namely
seven battalions, twelve guns, two companies Sappers and.
Miners and a half-squadron, moving on light scale ol baggage,
without tents and with three days' supplies, advanced to
Narai Raghza, about seven miles, burning villages, destroyiiig
water-mills and blowing up towers on the way. The 45th
Brigade lurnished the advanced guard and piqueting. troops
and left camp a t 6 A.M. being followed by a working party of
the 7th and 11th Cpmpanies of Sappers and Miners to improve
the route where needed. The most formidable obstacle of
this stage is the Tangi below Narai Raghza, which is about
fprty yards long and narrows down in places t o twelve feet.
It is commanded by steep heights on both sides and i t mas
expected that the Mahsuds would meek our advance here.
But there were only a few of: them on the hills by the Tangi
which were cleared by gun fire and occupied by our piquets,
the Mahsuds retiring to the hills surrounding the Narai Raghza.
The advanced guard reached this plateau about 1 P.M. and was
heavily attacked from the north. The road through the.
Tangi was now improved and all transport was through by
3 P.nf.

The enemy meanwhile, mere t e n a c i o ~ s l ' ~holding the
heights on the west, north, and north-east of the plateau ;
the laying out of camp was done under fire ; and the piquets
E

66

1

were posted with difficulty. A piquet of the 1125th London
Regiment on a hill to the west of camp, was hard pressed
for some time, but it was supported by gun fire and ultimately
protected by the advance of a company of the 114th Gurkha
Rifles who occupied the spur on the north of it. This company
met with considerable opposition and made slow progress,
losing two men killed and seven wounded. It was relieved by
the 1st Nepalese Rifles and did not return to camp till 9-30
P.M. inuch hampered in the
darlr by casualties. After
10 P.M. the attacks ceased and the night passed quietly. A
reconnoitring party of the 114th Gurkha Rifles which had
gone out in the direction of the Shrawanai Pass returned to
camp a'; 6-30 P.M. and reported that the heights on each side
wore held b y the enemy. Our casualties this day were three
killed and ten wounded.
On the 24th June the 43rd Brigade was ordered to seize
the Shrawanai Pass and hold it to enable
Aotion near Shrathe
45th Brigade t o pass through and carry
wanai Pass, 24thJune.
out the work of destruction in the Khaisara.
~t 5-40 A.M. the guns took up a position four hundred
yards north-west of the camp to cover the advance of the
43rd Brigade.
The position held by a body of the enemy on the north of
the pass was indicated by aeroplanes which dropped smoke
balls. As this position was seen t o be some distance from
the pass, t h e 1st Nepalese Rifles mere sent to occupy a hill
between it and the line of march to the pass. This was accomplished without any opposition and deceived the Mahsuds
into thinking that an attack on their position
was intended.
The enemy regarding the Nepalese as an advanced guard
of this attack remained where they were. The 114th Gurkha
Rifles now occupied the hills on the south of the pass which
they reached without opposition a t 6-45 A.M. and began to
move west piqueting the route. The 54th Sikhs, a t the same
time, seized the pass itself and occupied the hills on the north
of it with the Nepalese on their right flank. The enemy were
useless.
thus cut off from the pass and found their position
The piqueting of the pass was completed by [9 A.M., and
the 45th Brigade then moved through the piquets to the
summit and thence to the ridge, about a mile further on,
overlooking the Hhaisara villages. The rapid advance of this
brigade enabled it t o occuupy the ridge before the Mahsuds
could assemble in sufficient strength t.0 resist. They were
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now streaming dowil tne western slope of the hills north of
the pass, but our g ~ n posted
s
on the lcotal with the 43rd Brigade
gave effective support t o the advancing troops and t o their
piquets on thc right which froin this time to that of the retirement were incessantly attacked. A few Mahsuds gained the
northern extremity of the ridge and constrrzcted sa?zgnrs
there. During the piqueting and subsequeilt advance aeroplanes with Lewis guns harassed the enemy, and assisted our
operations.
The destruction of villages east of the stream and north
of Icundiwan was now begun. The villages of Abbas I(he1,
Warza, Manzai, Nana I<lzel, and Ghazi Kot were set on fire
and destroyed, and some of the Mechi Khel towers to the south
were blown up. Most 01the opposition came from the Mahsuds
who were attacking the right flank guard. While the 211st
Gurkha Rifles and the Royal Sussex Regiment were carrying
out the destruction of Abbas Khel, which is a long and scattered
village, a determined wsh was made on two platoons of the
55th Rifles, who were occupying a ruined graveyard, 1,000
yards to the north of the first group of houses. The enemy
came within three lzuadred ~ a r d sbefore being driven off by
rapid frre.
"

The withdrawal had been ordered for 2 P.M. b ~ casualties
t
among the 55th Rifles ilecessitated its postponement for half
an hour. The retirement was followed up closely to within
three hundred yards of the summit of the pass, which mas
reached by 3 P.M. by the rearguard of the 45th Brigade. The
dangerous flank was the northern one where the ground is
much broken and covered with bushes. Here two sections of
the 23rd Mountain Battery, which had been covering the
retirement to the pass, found themselves in some danger of
being cut off, but on receiving orders t o retire they limbered
.up smartly and went at a rapid pace up the narrow track to
the pass and down t o their original positions north of the camp
covering two miles in three quarters of an hour.
The rear guard of the 43rd Brigade was furnished by the
54th Sikhs and one of their piquets was also in danger for
a time. About thirty of the enemy had collected in dead
ground three hundred yards from the piquet, and, in spite of
heavy covering fire from other piquets and aupportsl succeeded
i n firing two volleys into the piquet on its retirement. The
enemy did not continue the pursuit beyond the summit of the
E2
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pass, and camp was reached a t 6 P.M. Our casualties thh
day vere five killed, twenty-six wounded, and one missing.
T v o emissaries from a ji~gaa t I<aniguram arrived this dlay
in camp to aslr for the terms of peace and
$Irri
:
&
'
of
peace a n armistice. Maj or-General Beynon had
ern~~sarles.
intended t o spend a second day in the
destruction of the Khaisara and had made his supply arrangements accordingly. He was, however, now assured t h a t the
damage already done in the Ichaisara was sufficient for political
purposes and did not, therefore, consider that the further
loss of life, which a seconcl move into that valley would have
entailed, was justified. A return to Ispana Raghza was,
therefore, ordered.
On the 25th, the 54th Sikhs with half a company of Sappers
and Miners left camp a t 6 A.M. and in conjunction with the
30th Mountain Battery destroyed a large village one mile
north-east of camp, which had proved to be a nest of snipers.
The force then began to withdraw to Ispana Raghza, t h e
43rd Brigade moving first and piqueting
Withdrawal to fspana
the
route, while the 45th Brigade followe&
Ragksa,
the transport as rearguard.
A large number of Mahst~dswho had collected on t h e
Shrawanai Pass with the intention of opposing a second raia
into the Xhaisara, now seeing signs of a withdrawal began to
advance. A piquet of the 54th Sikhs and a covering party of
the 114th Gurkhas therefore remained in position west of
the camp until the transport had passed through the tangi,
when the 30th Mountain Battery shelled the pass eflectively,
information regarding the result of their fire being given
them from the piquet by signal. Two other piquets on the
north and one on the south of the camp also remained i n their
positions till the tangi was reported clear of transport.
The retirement down the tangi was necessarily slow anlt:
it was not till 9-30 A.M. that the rearguard could begin t o
move. During the withdrawal of the piquets a party of suipers
worlred their way round the right (n&th) flank of the first
gun position near camp to within 300 yards of the guns, but
the escort of the 54th Sikhs saved the section from the casualties
which i t was in danger of suffering by a rapid advance, before
which the enemy retired. Almost immediately after this,
the last piquet was withdrawn, and the rearguard and guns
retired through the tarzgi. The enemy at once descended
from the hills and occupied ow camping ground. There
'
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they were heavily shelled by the centre section of tl-te 30th
Mountain Battery, while both the centre and left sections
engaged targets of the enemy appearing.on the heights ilortll
and south of Lhe tangi. The intention of the Mahsuds hacl
evidently been to,envelope our rearguard, but the positions on
either side of the tnfigi had been occupied by our piquets
which were withdrawn under cover of the guns. The retirement was completed without a casualty, though one sepoy
had been wounded in the attack on the village, and camp
was reached about 3 P.M. Towils and villages which hacl been
left standing owing t o the hurried advance were now desti-oyed
and the work of devaatation in this area completed.
During the operations of the striking force the B.E. 2 C
aeroplanes based a t Tank proved to bc
Value of aeroplanes.
of the greatest assistance. Owing to the
high temperature prevailing co-operation, which was requested
sparingly, usually took the form of a preliminary reconnaissance
carried out ahead of the column by one ors two machines,
which summoned others frorn Tank when i t was observed that
the force was being opposed.
Apart from co-operating with the column in this manner
independent raids were carried out almost daily on parts of
the country not being visited by the fo~ce. On the 22ud
bombs were dropped with considerable effect in the Kaniguram
valley and in a particularly successful raid on the 26th a
number of direct hits mere obtained on hollses in Makin and
Marobi, the latter being the home of Mulla Yazl Din.
The political reports now available showed that the llahsuds
were in a more reasonable state of mind; the defeat that
they had suffered a t Nanu, tlle destruction oi villages ancl
the raids of the aeroplanes oil regions formerly considered
safe from our attack, had disheartened them, nor could they
ally longer hope for help from I<a,b~11. A letter from the Ainir
to the Viceroy dated June 23rd showed, indeed, that he was
endeavouring to check the spread of disorder.
On his return to I s ~ a n aRaghza on the 25th the Chief
~olit:cal 0ffiGr received messages to the
Terme
given t o
effect that some of the principal maliks
~ahsuds.
were anxious to treat for peace, and also
that a representative jiryn at Kanigurarn hadLwritten asking
for a specification of the terms to be imposed by Government.
The jirga appealed too for a suspension of hostilities for five
daya in order that the jirga might consider them. The terms
'

of the Government of India which mere sent them were
briefly as follows :-

(a) The settlement of Major Dodcl's murder case by tribal
custom as against the Abdur Rahman R l ~ e l .
( B ) All rifles capturecl from the military and inilitia since
March 1st were to be returned.
(c) The prisoners now with the Mahsuds were to be released.
(a) The outlaws from British territory were t o be surrendered or expelled.
(e) A guarantee for future good be'tlaviour was to be
given.
The military and political requirements now seemed to be
identical ; the operations had so far been successful, the troops
required a much needed rest, and an opportunity had occurred
for giving tlie Mahsuds that chance of colzliilg to an
agreement which i t was OLU declared policy t o offer them.
Accordingly on the 26th June offensive operations including
aerial raids were suspended pending the
Hostilities suspended,
results of the Mahsuds' deliberations, the
26 th June.
days of grace t o end on the 1 s t J u l y . The
force remained halted a t Ispana Raghza unmolested by the
enemy except for the sniping of a water party on the 26th
resulting i n two British privates being wounded.
As it seemed probable that the force would be inactive for
some time, it was necessary t o find a suitable camping grouacl.
The present site a t Ispana Raghza was inconvenient and the
water was rapidly receding horn the west side of the plateau.
The locality marked on the map as Boji Khel (or Abbas Khel)
about 3 miles up stream was finally selected.
Before leaving Ispana Raghza 250 rifles of t h e 54th Sikhs
were sent out on the 27th to destroy all the water channels
near the.site of $he Barwand camp as this was t h e spring
settlement of the Bahlalzai, t,he only section which had stood
out against the rest of the Mahsuds in their desire for a settlemelit nqd had refused to send emissaries with them on the
26th. They.mere, therefore, considered as being outside the
terms of the armistice. On the 29th and 30th J u n e the force
trnllsferred its camp to Boji Khel the situation of which but
for the steep ascent to the camping ground from the river
bed ~vasexcellent and the water supply ample slxd good.

leased.

jusren-

Everits now turned on the peace aegotiations wl~ichwere
being conducted by [;he Political offic.ers
Mahsud hostages and
of tphe force. The maliks agreed to the
emrendor of rifles.
terms imposecl and as sl token of good
faith 9 of them, three from each of the main sections of the
tl-ibe remained as hostages in camp. 01.1the 9th a first instalment of 124 rifles was surrendered, and the malilcs arranged
to send ouL parties t o the various sec.tions of the tribe to
collect the balance.
In view of the satisfactory attitude of the.t'ribe the force .
Withdrawal to Manzal. moved balk witl~outincident, on the 11th
and 12th Julv to a ca,mw, at Manzal a t
the junction of the Shahur an3 Danom~t'+alleys thereby
ellabling cultivation t,o be commenced and villa,ges restored
in the upper Shahnr valley. Rifles and prisoneG vere+now
being s~~rrendered
in batches to the Political Officers a t SarweBai
and finally on the loth August a f~tl1ceremo~lialjirgn was
held a t Sarwekai attended By the Porce Coininander, General
Beynon, Sir Jolin Donald, Resident in Waziristan, and some
3,000 Mahsuds. 208 Government a d 83
Bull jirga intorviewed
~lt Serwelcai
10th militia rifles, valued at nearly t h e e lakhs
August+
of rupees, had been snrrcludered and all
plied with.
.
prisoners and lrjdnapped I'lindus returned.
About 95 rifles were still outstanding, but ol thesc 19 had been
taken to Afghinistan and were irrecoverable by the tribe,
40 had been sold to Wazirs in Birmal, and the rest could iiot
be traced. The Mahsud~however, handed over rifles of their
own as securit.y for the return of all recoverable rifles, and
hostages were also appointed for this purpose.
I n connection with the murder of Major Dodd both men
suspected of connivance in the outrage were duly tried according to tribal custom and ncquittecl. The forrnal mitten
agreement with the tribe WRB carelully explained and attested,
and a duplicate copy mas llancled to the leicling malilrs. Pence
with the tribe was then announced and
Peace announoed.
Bri-tish territory o ened to then1 for trading
purposes. The ji~ga led by the ma iks having repeated the
peace was dismissed to .their 110~1~s
solemn prayer on end~~riiig
by the Porce Commander.
The force
returned t o Ja,ndola, the 43rcl Brigade with
-force headquarters on the lltl; and the
Force roturns
to
an do la.
45th Brigade on the following day. The
demobilization of the force and return of
-
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troops to India was then begun in accordance with a programnle
drawn up by Army Eeadqnarters.
The force had t h ~ i sfully accomplished its taslr, and, although the operations had lasted only a
Climatio conditions.
short time, they were carried out during
HeJth oftroops.
the hottest and most enervating season of
the year in one of the most unhealthy areas in the !CransFrontier Provinces where dysentery, diarrhcea, malaria and
sandfly lever are rife. Of all frontier expeditions there was
none in which the troops had undergone more adverse climatic
conditions, or in which they had undertaken more continuous
hardship and fatigue. During the operations the trcops were
marching at d a m , piqueting heights and fighting all day in
a broiling sun, and reaching camp late in the eveaing to construct the defences of their bivouacs. The diurnal variations
oB temperature too which averaged from 20 to 43 degrees
and were sometimes even in excess of this, were remarkable
and added considerably to the hardships of troops on a reduced
scale of baggage. The British troops and Gurkhas and a
good proportion of the Indian troops were young and
uas.easoned, and it is therefore not s~uprisingthat the arduous
ca,mpaign affected the health of the force, and that a high
sick rate prevailed. Statistics show that in the South Waziristan Force the general admission rate mas 33'22 per cent.
The admission rate for the British ranks was '65.39 per cent.
and for the Indian ranks 41-59 per cent. On the other hand
the death-rate mas remarkably low.
A statement showing the casualties from loth May to
15th July mill be fomd in Appendix 'C.'
Another unique feature of the campaign was that i t was
the first occasion on which the Royal Flying Corps, British
Territorial battalions, and regiments of the Nepalese army
hacl participated in operatioris against the tribesmen of the
North-West Prolitier. The last-l~amed troops \yere nccompanied in the field by their General, Sir Baber Sbanlshere
Jang Bahadur Rana, K.C.I.E.
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CHAPTER VI.

EVENTS
LEADING UP TO THE CAMPAIGNOF 1919-20.
During the period froin August 1917 to the outbreak of
oampaign in the third Afgheu War on the 6th May 1919,
Waziristan
during the situation in Wsziristan remained ~iorrnnl.
Afghan WET,1919.
The beginning oE hostilities vith Afghanistan found the troops in Waziristan distributed as shown in
Appendix D, and the Bannu and the Derajat Brigades with
the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militias mere brought
eulder the command of Major-General Woodyatt, C.B., C.I.E.,
and constituted the Waziristan Force, under the orders of the
General Officer commanding, the North-West Frontier Force.
The plan of campaign allotted an active defensive role to
the Waziristan Force, and it was decided that if necessary,
the areas which lay between the administrative and political
borders and held by militia garrisons should be evacuated
temnporarily ; for their retention would have involved us in a
series of sieges demanding measmes for their relief and consequent dissipation of transport from the principal theatre of
operations.
About the 21et May infornlation was received of a concentration in Ehost, alld of the nlovernent of Afghan troops
towards the Upper Toclzi and in the direction of Wana.
Major-General Woodyatt mas instructed, therefore, not t o
.despatch troops up the Gomal valley to Wana or to operate
beyond Miranshah, as it was considered that the troops a t hi8
disposal were not suEcient for any widely extended operations.
As i t seemed probable that the presence of Afghan reg~~lnr
troops on the borders of Waziristan would result in a general
rising of the Mahsuds and Wazirs, and since it was impossible
to despatch troops to support the militia posts in the Gomal
it was decided, in view of the uncertain behaviour of the
I<hyber Rifles even when closely supported by regular troops,
that i t would not be possible to trust the Waziristan Militias
when left unsupported. Orders were issued, therefore, tliat
should Aighan regular troops advance to the vicinity ol Wana
and be joined by the tribes, Wana and the Gomal posts were
to be evacuated, the British officers withdrawing to India
~ t such
h men as remained loyal. Similar orders applied to
(
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the garrison in the Upper Tochi, and to those a t Spiuwam and
Shewa.
On the 24th May Bsignclier-General P, G. Lucas, C.B,,
D.S.O., cormlanding the 67th (Bnnlm)
mzirisian,
situation in
M~~
Northern
ION.
Brigade, desiring t o ., reassure the Militia
garrisons and the tribes in the Upper Tochi,
despatched the moveable column, which is held permanently
in readiness a t Dardoni, the new cantonmeilt near Miranshah,.
to Muhammad Khel. I11 consequence, however, of jnformation received that General Nadir IClian i n Khost was preparing
to move either towards Thal or Miranshah, the General OfficerCornmanding the North-West Frontier Porce ordered the
immediate return 01 the column to Dardoni where it wo~ddbe
more suitably placed to meet the threatened attack. OD
receipt of this order, Brigadier-General Lucas decided to order
the evacuation of the Upper Tochi posts as he considered the
withdrawal of the moveable column would be followed inevitably .by the .wholeaale.defection of the garrisons with their
rifles and ammunition.
'The evacuation of the militia posts began on the 25th
Evaouation of Upper May, small col;rnns
oy regular troopa.
Tochi posts.
.
visiting Datta Khel, Tut Narai, and Spina
Khaisora. As transport waa insufficient
only the more valuable stores were re&oved the remainder
being destroyed. The garrisons returned with the troops to.
Muhammad Khel. Boya post was also evacuated and handed
over for safe custody to Khan Muhanlmacl Khan, a D a ~ r
malik who was considered to be trustworthy.
The news of the evacuation of the Upper posts and the.
destruction of the stores quiclcly spread among the tribesmen, .
and by dusk large numbers of Wezirs had collected in the
vicinity of Muhammad Icl~el~ l n dBoya.
Troops had been out since 6 A.M. and it was necessary t~
give them a rest so the return march t o Dardoni was ordered
~ this
t time the Wazirs having overto begin a t 8 P.M., b ~ by
awed the adherents of Khan Muhammad Khan seized the post
a t Boya and begaln to sack it. Consequently the march of
the column was interrnpted by a treacherous attack as the
transport was fording the river. Owing to the darkness
thcre was considerable confusion, and several transport camels.
carlying mmm~~nition
broke away. After a short halt to drive
off tlie attackers and to re-organize the transport the c o l ~ ~ n ~ n
proceeded unmolested, except lor acc,asiollal shots a t the

rearguard, and reached Dazdoni a t 5 A.RI on the 26th May.
I-Iere i t was discovered that about 150 of the Militia taking,
advantage of the darkness had deserted during the march.
of evacuating the militia posts of Spinwarn
The
(Kaitu River) and Shema presented great
Withclrawel of garri.
sons of Spinwam and
difficulties as these were situated 21 and 24
Shewa.
miles respectively from Idak, the post t o
which the garrisons were to withdraw. Owing Lo the absence
of water on the route there were no intermediate posts, which
might have afforded a sanctuary for the militia if hoily pursued
from Spjuwam. It had beell reported too by the political
authorities that the tribesmen of this area were very uneasy
regarding the situation in Rhost and the Tochi, and that
comment was rife on the absence of reinforcements for these
outlying garrisons.
Lieutenant Poulton, Northern Waziristan Militia corn-.
manding the posts a t 8pinwam and Shewa who had been
made aurare of the intention to evacuate these posts in the
event of Afghan regular troops crossing the frontier and being
joined by lasldcars of local tribesmen, was keeping in close
touch with the situation. To assist the withdrawal ol the
garrisons arrangemeilts were made also for three squadrons
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel B. P. E1l~voocZ,
31st Lancers to move from Khajuri towards tlle Kaitu in
support of the militia when the necessity for their retirement
arose.
On the 24th news reached the oEcer cornmailding a t
Spinwan1 that General Nadir Khan with his force including
artillery had left Spinkai Lashtj, a village on the Kaitu, had
crossed the frontier and xras expected at 'Spinwarn on the
25th. Consequently orders were issued Lhat the garrison of
Shewa should withdraw on Spinwarn and prepar. t'ions were
put in hand for the further retirement to the Tochi.
As was anticipated the invasion by the Afghan forces was
the signal for raising the standard of revolt and the tribesmen
01 the Upper Icaitu, flocked to join Nadir Khan or collected
to assist his enterprise. The withdratval of the Xhewa garrison
was harassed by Wazirs fro111 Datta IChel (Kaitu River) and
n Mohmand subedar and 15 of his men were taken prisoners.
It was a t first thonght that these ~llilitiamen had deserted but
the outcome of subsequent enquiries regarding their escape
from the Afghan forces before Thal, removed all suspicion
on this occasion.
regarding their condl-~lct

The retiremeui; fitom spinwain was carried ont with skill.
'The small militia force had scarcely crossed to the right bank
of the river when it ~vasseen that Afghan regular troops and
.armed tribesmen were ~vithintllrce hundred yards of the burning
post. Su?ported by the squadrons from Ichajuri the militia.
withdrew a,cross the open Sheratulls plain and by the afteriioo~zof the 25th had reached Id&, and the cavalry had returned
to Ichajuri. The militia marched the following day to their
headquarters at Miranshah.
The timely decisioii made by the General Officer Cominanding the 69th (Bannu) Brigade to evacuate the Upper
'Tochi posts was more than justified by the subsequent events.
Had the withdrawal not taken place when it did, the majority
,of the garrisons thinking they had beell abandoned would
have deserted, and the Wazirs having risen and being support+edby the Afghans, no troops could have been spared from
Dardoni to assist the retirement of the loyal portions of the
militia.
Consequent on the evacuation of the Upper Tochi Posts
and the withdrawal of the moveable column t o Dardoui the
Upper Tochi Wazirs consisting of the Madda IChel, Mamar
IChel, and Khiddar Khel streamed down after the column,
carrying with them the Upper Daurs ; a large nunlber of
Mahsuds also joined the lashkars which collected rapidly near
Miranshah.
A most serious situation had now arisen in Miranshah
f$
1: Situation in Miran. post garrisoned solely by the Northern
:shah.
Attitude
of TYaziristan Militia. Letters had been reNorthem Wazidatan
ceived previously from Afghan officials in
Militia.
IChost calling on the Wazir officers of the
militia to desert with their companies, and to take part in
the expulsion of the British Irom MTaziristaiz. The recipients
brought these comniunications to the notice of their British
Officers, and this action was taken at first as evidence that
the local elements of the corps iutended to adhere to their
allegiance. The incidents of the last few days, however, and
the fact that their sections of the tribe werc pow in open
revolt had excited the Wazirs still in the post.
On the 26th, therefore, a detachment of two h ~ ~ n d r e d
rifles of the 1/41st Dogras was added to the garrison with the
object of steadying the Wazirs and supporting the loyal members of the militia. During the following afternoon, however,
instigated by Jemadar Adjutant Tarin, a Tori Khel Wazir

and Subedar Pat, a Madda IChel Wazir, who had frequentlydistinguished himself in the field and had beell awarded the.
Indi,an Order of Merit, the Indian Distinguished Service Medal*
and the Croix-de-Guerre, about six hundred Wazirs of the
militia mutinied and openly declared their intention of leaving
the post with their rifles and joining the jihad. The Khattaks
remained staunch;but it was by no means certain what attitude
the trans-frontier portions of the corps would adopt. At the.
request of the 'Political Agent a further detachment of one
hundred Dogras and one gun reinforced the troops in the
post.
Owing to the situation of the barrack rooms and the.
scattered positions held by the loyal Ichattaks, the doubtful
and much excited Afridis, and the hostile Wazirs, it was quite.
impossible to isolate the rebels or to adopt any vigorous and
concerted measures against them, as any movement inside
the post led the Wazlrs to induxlge in much indiscriminate
firing. The Dogras had been disposed in colrllnanding positions along the parapet wall and over the gateways, but under
cover of darkness the Wazirs dug holes through the outer
walls of the post and made good their~escapewith their rifles,
but suffered casualties in so doing. With the departure of
the rebels the situation mas m ~ ~ cimproved
h
and discipline
and order soon restored.
Ccomn~unicationvith Bannu except by wireless had now
been interrupted by the hostile tribesmen and the reportcd'
advance of Afghan troops to the frontier above Dardoni
pointed to an impending attack 011 Dardoni itself. The
dcfences were improved, and a covered way protected bv
wire was constructed from the camp to the water sr~pply
some six l~undred yarda north cif the camp.
The ttribal lashkars, who hnd been led t o believe that our
military ~vealmess v ould also necessitate
On
Tochi
the evacuation of Dardoni and Miranshah,
posts.
maintained their positions on the neighbollring hills awaiting their opportunity to fall on tho retiring
troops and sack the posts, looting the treasure the latter were
believed to contain. The bolder spirits sniped the posts and
burnt the deserted sa~ai,but any further enterprises were
driven off b y the troops with loss.
On the night of 26th-27th Nay all the Lower Tochi post8
except Saidgi were attacked and i t war L~urtherreported that
the Militia garrisons of Thal, Surkamar, Isha, Khajnri* an&

SlGnki hacl deserted with their rifles and ammunition. It is
.only right to inention that the IIhattaks of these garrisons
in nearly every case succeeded in reaching either Idak or
,Saiclgi with their equiprneilt.
Such t l ~ e nwas the grave situation caused by a policy,
tvliich had demanded h~rrriedretrograde movements of our
troops, nccoinpanied by the destruction oi much valuablc
stores, withotrt a single shot being exchanged with an Afghan
tribesman or regular, thus violating with lamentable results a
well-lmo~mprinciple in warfare against an uncivilized enemy.
'rhis mas the state of affairs in Northern Waxiristan which
faced Major-General 8. 13. Climo, C.B., D.S.O., who had
,assumed command of the Waziristan Yorce, with full political powers, on May 27th in relief of Major-General Woodyatt
who had been transferred to the command of 4th (Quetta)
Diviuiou.
The situation in Southern Waziristan was not a whit less
serious. During the first fortnight in May
Situation in southom
the situation at Walza and in the Gomal
'Wnziristm.
.. - - --. Ahtitude
.ol.S!uthern Wazirifitan had given no cause for alarm. The Southern
.Milltla.
~ a z & i s t a nMilitia with its headquarters a t
Wana was holding twelve outposts. The corpq consistecl of 8
Britisll Officers, 37 Pathail offic+ers and nbont 1,800 rifles,
Lcomp~sed
as nlider--.-
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Wazirs
Khattaks
Yusafzais
Bhittannis
Afridis
Orakzais
Gadnns
Shiranis
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360
90
40
780
130
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About May 21st reports ]lac1 been received of the movenient
of Afghan reg~dartroops towards Mns%Nilca with the object
of advancing on Wana. Major Q. H. Russell, the Commandant
of the Southern Wazhistan Militia was a t headquarters, and
was in constant comnunication with the Political Agent
Major C. G. Crosthwaite,.O.B.E., who was paying the Mahsuds
their allowa~cesa t Sar-welcai. On ;May 22nd 1VIajor R~lssell
received from the Political Agent the instructions issued by
the Hon'ble the Chief Cnrnmissi~nerregarding the policy to be
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a d o p t e d in the event of Afghan regular troops crossing the
frontier and being supported by the local tribes. The former
bega'n his preparations by despatching officers to cortain
i m p o r t a n t ou.tposts to await orders.
O n May 25th the report of the evacuation of the, Upper
Tochi posts arrived a t Wana like. a bolt
The eyacuation of
oent on
*he Wan& A ~ ~ C Y . horn the blue. The Political Ad
learning the news conferred by telegraph
~ 4 t ht h e Commandant and Extra-Assistant Commissioller who
were both a t Wana, and as senior officer in the Agency decided
t h a t t h e evacuation of the Southern W a z i ~ i ~ t aMilitia
n
posts
should begin before the situation in the Tochi became gellerally
known and the 1\1I:thsnds had time to rise. The evacuation
was therefore fixed for 6 P.M. on the 26th
The withd r a w a l of these Militia ga.rrisons was an operatloll of extreme
difficulty and danger. It had been arranged previously that
t h e garrisons of the posts west of, and including, Khajuri
K a c h would withdraw into the Zhob ; those of the renleindar
concentrating on Murtaza.
Captain H. R. Traill with Lie~~tenants
R. E. Hunt and
A. R. Barker left Wane at 6 P.M. 011 May 26th with sixty
infaantry and tell sowars, and proceeded vici the Tora ~ i z h a
r o u t e t o Karab Kot. There Captain Traill and Lieutenant
Hunt were to evacuate tthe garrison and move on to Tsnnj.
Lieutenant Barker in the meantime 7ven.i t o Khajuri Kach
with t h e object of withdrawing the garrison to Moghal Kot
in the Zhob.
At 7-30 P.M. Major Russell assembled the Pathan officers,
a t W a n a and informed them of the orders he had received
and of his intention to move a t once. The officers, though
somewhat surprised, appeared to understand ihe necessity of
t h e mithclrawsl and cljspersed to make the necessary arrangem e n t s for their coinpalliee, as transport was sufficient only
for t h e light baggage of the officers, and some treasure.
Everything sppeared to be going well when several shots
were heard, and it was found that the Wazirs and some Abidis
with their officers had seized the Keep, containing the Creasure,
ammunition (about six hundred thousaiid rounds), records,
eta., and the transport for the same. Efforts were rmde to
quieten the inen in the Keep, but without success.
Great disorder now prevailed inside the fort and all that
remained of the transport were eight riding camel% AS the
t o the Zhob was to consist of forced marches,
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and there was a -probability of the camels being required for
the transport of casualties no baggage was taken. Those of
t h e men who remained loyal ~mmbermgabout three hundred
paraded a t 9-45 P.M. and sliortly afterwards set out on their
perilons jo~~rney,
~~ccornpani~d
by the following officers :Major G. 13.Russell .
Captain 0. T. Burn-Murdock
Lieutenant 0. S. ~ e e s e
.
Major Owen
Lieutenant E. J. MacCorstie

.

!I

.

.

Southern Wazkistan Militia.
Medical Officer.
Garrison Engineer.

A circuitous route towards the Pir Gwazha Paas was taken
with the object of proceeding vid Toi Khula post. On reaching
the pass the p&y was re-organised and it was found that
there was no Afridi officer present and only four or five sepoys
of that class. There were no Wazirs preeent. The remainder
-consisted of sepoys and recruits and about one hundred 11narmed followers, nativea of India.
The coluilm marched all night and at 7 A.M. on 27th May
arrived within 1,400 yards of Toi Khula post. Attempts to
gain comm~~nication
with the garrison mere greeted by rifle
fire from the east followed immediately by several ragged
volleys from the post. As it was apparent that the garrison
had been evacuated and that the local Wazirs had already
seized the post, Major Russell decided t o continue the march
tq Moghal Kot, a distance of fourteen miles.
The day was esceedingly hot, the ascent to the Tesh plain
steep, all were worn out after a night march of over twenty
niiles and ,110 water 3vns procurable en route. Progress was
consequently very slow, and it was only with the greatest
diffic$ty that the c o l ~ ~ i nTvas
n kept together. Parties of
Wazirs continued unceasingly to harass the reerguard.
The Tesh plain having been reached, the going became
easier and it was here that a junction was effected with Captain
Traill's party con~listingof the loyal elements of the garrisons
of Karab Kot, Tanai, and Toi I<hula, The t~ibesmeuappearing in considerable numbers became bolder in their attacks,
and it was alinost impossible to get the piquets into position.
Fortunately for the weary column the Zhob Militia horn
Moghal Hot assisted in piqueting the last two miles of the
ronte. Mugha1 Kot was reached a t nightfall but atragglera
continued to come in during the night ancl ;L great many clid
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not arrive until the next day. Here Lieutenant Barker witla
seven sowars, all tbat remained of the Mhajuri Each party,
joined the column.
The situation was reported to the Political Agent in the
Zhob, who suggested that the post should be evacuated the
following day and the marc11 continued to Mir Ali Khel. This
was, however, out of the question as the men mere exhausted,
footsore, and incapable of marching. The total number of
r a e s with the column was three hundred, but about one
hundred of the men were recruits and a t least half of the
remainder were trans-frontier men and therelore of doubtful
reliability in the crisis which had arisen. During the uight
of 28th-29th May the tribesmen sniped the crowded post and
inflicted several casualties.
On the morning of the 29th the only supplies available i n
the post were flour for one and half days a ~ gram
d
sd6cient
for three daysy animal rations. During this day heavy saiping,
wounded eight Inen and killed the water bullocks. 'fhis
made i t more difficult than ever to obtain water, and several
ca~ualtieaoccurred during the attempts made t o fetch it.
The evacuation of the po'st wds now imperative and arrangements were made for the withdrawal t o begin a t 6-30 A.M.
on 30th May. One hundred and thirty rifles of the Zhob
Militia accompanied by one hundred moullted infantry of the
same corps were t o leave Mlr Ali I<lzcl at 3 A.M. and piquet
half way to Moghal Icot. F r o n ~this point the mounted troops
were to push through towards Moghal Kot, where i t was
estimated they should arrive at 6-30 A.M. On the follow~ng
day as there was no sign of the mounted infantry a t 8-30 A.M.
Major Rtzssell ordered the evacuation to begin ; heavy enemy
fire was opened immediately by the tribesmen. Unfortunately
t h e first piquet t o be posted went too far and, fading t o return
when signallecl to do so, moved in the directioli of Mir Ali
Khel. This movement became infectious and soon numbers
of the militia were t o be seen fleeing in the direction of Mir Ali
Iihel, many abandoning their arms en route. Thc officers
attempted to stem the route but in no case with success, for
when an officer turned away from those he had collected,
the men immediately disappeared. After fo~uor five miles
had been thus traversed the mounted infantry of t l z ~Zhob
Militia appeared in sight holding piquets to cover the progress
of the column. Efforts mere again made to rally and reorganise the Southern Waziristaa Militia party in rear of the
P
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Zhob cavalry. These were partly successful but the men
rere quite out of hand ; the Pathan officers and non-commjssioned officers no longer had authority, and there were very
few men who were at that time in possession of their rides.
The appearance and action of the Zhob Militia stopped
the oilrush of the Wazirs who had hitherto been carrying out
a vigorous puusuit ; and the survivors of the Waziristan Mlitia
made their way to Mir Ali Khel.
The officer casualties during the vithdrawal from Mughal
Iiot were :Captain 0.T. Burn-Hurdook
Captain H. R. Trail1 ,
Captain A. B. Reilly
Lieutenant C. S. Leese
Lieutenant E. J. MacCrostie

.

.

Major G. H. Russell
Lieutenant R. E. Hunt

, S. W. Militia.
S. W. Militia.
Zhob Militia.
, S. W. Militia.
/
. 1-25th London Regiment,
Garrison Engineer, Wana. j

. .
.

.

Wounded.

.

. . S. W. Militia.

s

S. W, Militia.

. The above casualties with the exception of Captjin Reilly
occurred at the beginning of the action and within one mile
of Mugha1 Kot when the officere were attempting to stem
the route. The Extra-Assistant Commissioner Khan Bahadu5
M~hammadYar Khan was also killed. The casualties among
the other ranks are not known accurately but are believed
t o have been about forty Billed and wounded. Some of the
column made their escape wid Mani Khwa and the Sherani
country, and reached the Derajat some days later.
Regarded merely as a feat of endurance a t this period
of the year,. the withdrawal of this party was, of itself a fine
achievement ; lout taking into consideration the aJmost insurmountable diffic;llties which beset it on the road and the
dangers through which it emerged, the exploit stands out as
one of the fineat recorded in the history of the Indian frontier.
The success of the operation was due in large measure to the
personality of Major G. H. Russell, 126th Baluchistan Infantry
who conducted the withdrawal with remakable slril, courage,
and endurance, and set a fine example to those under him.
The steadfast fortitude of these men in circumstances before
which most would have quailed, is a stirring example of the
height to which the devotion of the British officer can rise.

The evacuation of the other Soutllern Waairistan Militia
posts mas carried out wit,hout any further incident except
that large nun~bersof Afridis and all the Wazirs deserted
during the night of the withdrawal to Murtaen.
Of the original strength of the Southern Waziristan Militia
less than six hundred finally reported themselves a t Tank
where the corps was reorganised. The number of desertions
-was estimated as more than 1,100 and among the losscs were
about 1,190 rifles, 50 muskets and about 700,000 rounds of
-303 ammunition. The Wazjrs and Mahsuds busied themselves loot.ing the evacuated posts, and as was aiiticipatecl,
this had deferred their incursiolls into British territory.
To return to thc events in the Tochi where the posts a t
Dardoni, Miranshah, Idak, and ~ai&giwere
Situation in the Tochi
in a state of siege.
at the end of ~ a y .
On May 27th an aeroplane on reconnaissan~efrom Icohat
aver Spinwam arrived at Dgrdoni and landecl. Although it
crashed'when taking off the effect of its appearance on the
Zashlcurs investing Dardoni and Miranshah was consirlerable,
a n d large numbers of the tribesmen were reported to have
returned to their homes.
A local mulln created a mi1.d sensation a t this tiliie by
claiming t o be able to bring to destruction any aeroplane by
casting a ape11 on it.
His boast was short-lived however, as an effective bombing
1'
air raid was carried out i11 the Tochi on June 2nd.
On the 28th May reports, afterwards confirmed, mere
received that the Afghan force with its attendant Zasklcurs
fit Spinman1 had moved from that place towards Thal. The
moveable colulzln from Bannu however, remained a t K ~ u r a m
Garhi, as it was possible that there might be a repetition of
.an Afghan concentration a t Spinwam
or in the Lower Tochi.
On this date the troops'available in Bannu were three
squadrons of cavalry, one section of Sappers nncl Miners,
two mountain guns, two battalions of infantry and details
from the 2-2nd Grusllha Rifles and 112th Infantry ; of these
o n e squahon of cavalry, 2 guns and portions of both infantry
battalions were on poveable column duty a t IJusrgni Garhi.
I n view of the possibility of an incursion of ~ a h s b d into
s
British Territory from the IJhsisora and X h a k t ~direction,
~
and the probability of encountering strong opposition in the
Bhinki defile in an ad,vance into the Tochi valley General
-
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Glimo decided to postpone any attempt to reopen communicatioll tvith Dardolli ancl to relieve IdaB which was reported to
be closely illvested, until the arrival of the Headquarters
43rd Infantry 13rigade and one mountain battery and two
battalions which were then en route. The Militia garrison a t
Said& hornever, was reinforced by forty regulars from Bannu.
In the n~eantimeJandola post garrisoned by regular troops
was being besleged by a large Mahsucl.
Attitude of Mahsuh.
lashkar headed by Mullah Fazl Din.
Conseq~~ent
on the evacuation ,f the Southern TVaziristan
lfilitia posts and the considerable quantity of booty which had
fallen into the hands of the Waeirs, the Mahsuds had become
very restless, and thinking probably that it was the intention
to eva,cuate Jandola had assembled in large numbers around
that place, A force under Brigadier-General P. J. Miles, C.B.,
had begun to a.ssemble a t Xhirgi on the 29th May when i t
became known that commnnics'oion with Jandola was intexrupted. Other posts had also been threatened by Mahsud and
Sherani lashkars, notably Pllurtaza, Gomal., M a j h i and
Zarkani, and many urgent demallcls for military assistance
'for posts held by the Prontier Constabulary were receivecl
from the civil authorities.

On the 1st June the Waziristan Porce was withdrawn
from the command of the General Officer Commanding the
North-West Frontier Porce ancl came clirectly under t h e
orders of the Conimander-in-Chief.
The Headq~~mters
of t l ~ e43rd lnf&ntry Brigade having
arrived in Bannu on the 30th lVIay, t h e
Formation of Tochi
ReIief column.
fosniation of the Tochi Relief Coluinn

01 tribesmen were reported to have re-assembled in the villages
on both banks of the Tochi in the vicinity of Darpa I(he1.
The General Officer Commanding the 67th (Bannu) Brigade
at Da'rdoni decided to disperse these lashlcars and to destroy
certain villa,ges whose inhabitants were lrnown to have committed offences, and to have participated in attaclrs on the
posts.
The following day the Dardoni Moveable Column with 250
rifles of the Northern Waeiristail Militia moved out and fought
a very B U C C ~ S S ~action.
U~
The enemy mas put to flight with a
loss of about 90 and the towers from tvl~ichhe bad been sniping
Miranshah post were clestroyixl. Our casualties were :2nd-Lieutenant P. H. B. Furley, 1/41st Dogras and two
Indian ranks Idled, and five Indian ranlrs wounded.
The results of this action had a inarlred eflect not only
on our own troops and the Militia, but
Toohi posts relieved.
also on the tribesmen w110 were now
convinced that our Iorces co~11dand wo~11doperate against
them, and also that no iurtlzer evacuation of the Tochi was
contemplated. To this fact m ~ ~ be
s t ascribed the almost
unmolested march of the Relief Col~zmnwhich left Bann~zon
the 2nd Jnne on which day Saidgi was reached without incident. The following day the colunm was able to traverse
the Shinki defile withoat opposition ancl re-occ~~py
IEhajwi,
from which place a, squadron of the 31st Lancers was sent on
ahead. The latter on reaching the vicinity of Idak village
sighted parties of hostile Daurs. The cavalry got to close
quarters and charged a party of fifty men killing 8 of them
with the lance. The remainder got into a 1na2awith precipitous
banks whese the cavalry could not follow but several were
seen i;o fall wounded or killed.
The main body of the column arrived a t Idalr a t nocjn,
The
but the rear guard did not reach camp until 5-30
march was extremely hot ancl trying to the troops, and there
,were sixty-four cases of heatstroke or heat exhaustion.
opened up cornmnnication
On the 4th June the col~~rnn
with the Dardoni force, which was now reinforced by the
1-103rd ~ a h r a t t aLight Infantry from the Relief Column.
s
now
Punitive measnres against the lower D a ~ ~ rwere
undertaken bv colnmns oaeratine: from
Punitive
moasures
Dardoni u n d k the ordersLoE ~ G ~ a d i e r pgainsa lower DLLUCS.
General 3'. G. Lncas, C.B., D.S.0. These ,

operations, which were carried out in very hot weather, had
an cxcellenl; political effect b u t 'were to some exteni; limited
by the necessity of Beeping the troops ready to concentrate
rapidly for co-operation with the I<ohat-Icurrarn Force,
but the villages of Spalga, Anghar, and Tughri were burnt,
ancl fines were inflicted on others which had not been so
deeply implicated'ia the attacks on Idak and Miranshah.

This exploit, full of a fine.cavalry spirit did much to restore
the situation in the area, and to calm the excited inhabitants.
A force despatched to the relief of the Gomal police post
succeeded in evacnating the garrison, and Draband and
Kulachi were occupied by mixed detachments on the night,
1st-2nd June. On the following day a Wazir Zaslzkar of about
four hundred was clriven into the hills .with a loss of thirty
men, and Manjhi post was reinforced by a column from Tank
after some fighting. On the 4th a lushkw of five hundred
Mahsnds which was threatelling G i r d post was driven off
and the garrison reinforced. Jandola, though the water
supply had been cut and the post surrounded by Mab.suds
and Bhittannis, had not been seriously assaulted.. The garrison
hacl supplies up to the 24th June, and vater storage for 15
days from the 201;li May. Wholesale desertions had occurrecl
fro111 the Frontier Coastab~~lary
a t D o m n d i , Moghal Rot,
Drazinda, and L~lni. Chaudl~wanwas attacked on the night,
4-5th Jzme, and partially looted by about two hundred Sherauis-
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w i t h t.he arrival of three Indian infantry battalions from
thc Tochi, Ma,jor-GeneralClimo was enabled
Relief of Jandole,
9th Juna
to arrange for the relief of Jandola. Consequently a force under the command of
Brigadier-General P. J. Miles, C.B., left Ichirgi for Jandola on
the 9th June. An aerial reconnaissance the previous day bad
reported the route between Rhirgi and Jandola gractically
deserted and very little movement in the village of Jnudola.
The latter fact was due. t o the Bhittanni inhabitants having
learnt of the assembly of a relief colurnn a t IChirgi, and fearing
punishment for their misdeeds had removed their families
and cattle to the hills. Little opposition was anticipated,
and, in fact, Jandola was reached without a shot being fired.
'The post of Jsndola was under the cormnand of Captail1
R. C. Anderson, 76th P~l~lja~bis
and had a garrison of2
British officers .
Indian officers .
4
Indian other ranks
.
. 170
Sub-Assistant Surgeon
1
Followers .
. 15
There were also in the post a few members of the Postal Department and two Supply Agents. The garrison was found t o be
in excellent spirits despite their experiences since thc post
was cut off on May 28th. The water ration had been limited
to two-and-a-half wsqter bottles daily for drinking, coolriug
and washing. 'The discomfort and privation entailed by snch
a limited water-supply a t a time of the year when the tl~erlnometer stood sometimes a t 115' Fahrenheit can well be
imagined. To conserve the wate~-supplyall animals were
turned out OF t-he post at the beginning of the siege.
A gallant detachment oi ten rifles uncler Havildar Bari
$her, 2-76th Punjabis, in the isolated tower about eight
hundred yards froin the post, proved itself equal to the
occasion and in spite of an uncerthin water-supply defended
the tower for fourteen days against frequent s~ttaclrs.
During the siege a havildar of the local Bhittanni Levies
succeeded occasio~ztll~
in elncljng the enemy a t night and
conveying water .lo the tower ill three or four watei boitlca
a t a time. For his gallantry this havildar was promoted.
and was awarded the Inclian Distinguished Service Medal.
The post having been re-victuallecl and the ga,rrisor~
relieved, the colunln retarned to Ichirgi without incident on
the 11th June.

About the 9th June reports were received and were subsequentljr confirmed that, in spite of the
Afghans in Wnna.
terms of the armietice between the Indian
and Afghan governments, an Afghan force of about three
hundred men with two six-pounder nioul~tninguns had reached
Wana and occupied the deserted post. This detachment
appeared to have been given a purely passive role and t o have
confined its activities mainly to anti-British propaganda
among t11e tribes.
0
1
1 the 11th June, on receipt of reliable information that
the village of Drazinda in Sherani country
Raid on Draeinda.
was serving the purpose of a, supply dep6t
for the various Sherani and Wazir gangs in the vicinity, an air
raid vras carried out against it and a number of bombs dropped.
This raid was followed by another carried out by four squadrons
of cavalry and a section of mountain artillery with twa
aeroplanes co-operating. The large village was destroyed
and over five hundred head of cattle captured. The effects
ol: these raicls was considerable and for a time the activities
of the tribesmen showed a marked decrease.
Towards the end oE tlie month active operations except
when forced on us ceased on account of the great heat that
was prevailing, and of a severe outbreak of cholera, which
originating a t Kohat spread to Bannu and the Tochi valley
and finally to the Derajat. This -6pfdemic accounted for
169 deaths out of a total from a11 causes 1113 to this date of 319.
Early in Juilr a small force of pll arms was concentrated
a t Dardoni witli'the object of co-operating
. Preparations for ad- with the Kohat-K~~rram
Porce in a n advanoo into Khost.
vance into Khost zhould the peace negotiations then being conducted between the Indian and Afghan
governments fall through.
The assembly of this colulnn was interpreted by the tribes
as preparatory to an advance into the Upper Tochi, and on
the 7th July the Political Agent reported that a large ZashLar
of Waeirs and Mahsuds were taking up a position near Boya.
Next darya half-hearted attack was made on the North Waziristan Militia piquets as they moved out from Isha. The
militia casualties were four killed, and on
Attack om Bannu
the 14th a cleverly organised night attack
xorodrbme.
on the aeroplane shed a t Bannu was carried
out by a band of about seventy Wazirs and Mahsuds.
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The aerodrome, which is situated about five miles out of
Bannu on the Tochi road, was guarded by a platoon of 2127th
Punjabis. Reports had been received that such an attack
was ~~ontemplated
and in consequence a barbed wire eatanglement surrouncling the hangar was in process of construction.
At a b o ~ 1-30
~ t A.M. the tribesinen rushing through a gap in the
mire made a determined attempt to brealr in the doors of the
hangar bnt were couiiterattaclred wit11 bayonet alld bomb
and driven off with loss. No damage was done to the aeroplanes. Our casualties were two Indian other ranks billed
ancl five Indian other ranks wonndecl.
On the 21th July conseq~~ent
upon the capt~zreby Wazirs
of a convoy a t Icapip in Zhob, and subsequent reports that
large Wazir lashkars were harryins that district, Major-General
.(=limo concentrstcd a t Nurtaza a force of one squadron of
cavalry, one section 01 mountain artillery and one aiid a half
battalions of Indian infantry, as well as a large amount of
supplies, his intention being to give the impression that preparations were on foot for an advance up the Gomal and thereby
t o draw the Wazir laslzEars back toboppose this force. The
strategem was completely succeasfi~l.
Beve~almilnor enterprises were carried O L I ~bv the tribesmen
agahst our road iquetsd in the TocM
Attacks on road
between
the 28th ~ d yand the micldle oi
piquets in the Tochi.
August. On the 29ih July a Northern
Tvaziristan Militia piquet was ambushed near Khajuri losing
three killed and scven wounded and nine rifles ; oil the 3rd
August piq~zetssouth of the road between Isha and Miranshah
were engaged a11 day with tribal lashkars and suffered some
casualties ; oa the 8th August a detachment of the 82nd
Punjabis moving out to piquet the road between Saidgi and
Shidd was cleverly ambushed by about two hundrecl Abdullai
Mahs~zds~ ~ n d etheir
r
veil-known leader Musa Khan, and
suffered heavily losing one Indian officer and nineteen Indian
other ranlrs killed and fo~zr other ranks wounded. The
enemy's casualties were estimated a t about twenty including
a prisoner who died of his wounds.
The situation in tlie Tochi was unchanged, and on the
morning of the 23rd the piclueting troops from Xaidgi were
attacked by about two hundrecl and fifty Wazirs who finding
their lineeof re$seat threatened withdrew with their casualties
estimated a t thirty-five killed and wounded. Armoured cars
iii this action mith considerable
from Bannu co-oneratecl
I
effect ."
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These incidents and notably the last-mentioned car! bo a
attributed to a lack of experience in obser~ingthe princlpfes
of frontpier warfare, and a failure, to recognize .the necessity
for careful scouting and scrutiny of the grouncl to be traversed
and far constant vigilance
dealing with enemies 11ke
the Mahsuds and Wazirs, w11o fire experts in the a r t of ambuscade.
During this period Mahsud and Wa,zir gangs, varyillg ~ J I
strength from seventy to ~ T V O hundred showed increased
activity in the Derajnt and troops were constantly 011 the
move endeavouring to intercept thcni. Several 01these bands
mere encountered but they invariably retired to the hills a s
soon as they observed any sign 01 converging rnovelnent
against tlieni.
The climatic conditions mere bad and although the cholera
epidemic had been stamped out, l;he troops were subjected to a
great strain owing to the daily piqueting of routes for the
passage 01 convoys, ancl to minor operations Btwing the intense
heat. A noticeable and reassuring consequence 01the keenness
and good moral of the troops was the vigorous co-operation
of the police and village pursuit parties during this period.
About the middle of A ~ ~ g uMahsud
st
raiding gangs became
especially active and Tank Clty was attackRoids by Mahsuda
ed on the nights of the 14th and 15th. On
in ~ u g u s t .
the first occasion the raiders succeedecl in
carrying off cloth and other articles valued a t Rs. 15,000 but
on the Eollowing night tlic thieves wcre driven off with a loss
of six killed, several woui~ded,and one man taken prisoner.
By employing the ancient ruse of demonstrating a t one
side of the post to induce the garrison to concentrate there
while another party dug a hole through the opposite mall, a,
gang of about fifty Mahsuds effected an entrance into Girni
post during the night of the 27th. The Mnhsuds were finally
ejected a t a cost to the garrison 01 two killed and four mounded
and two rifles. This incident was fol!omecl by a n outrage
typical of the wanton cruelty so frequently displayed by
Malisuds. A
consisting principally 01 Sllaman Khel Mallsuds
returl-ting from a rald a t Isa Khel in the Mian~validistrict
mherc it had secured sixteen rifles from the local policie attackecl
a Labour Corps ca~nlpncar Gambila on the night of the 29th
August. Of the Labour Corps fifteen mere lrilled and Eomteen
wounded, but on the arrival of troops and police the raiders
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ret'ired towaris the border. During the rnnning fighb t'hat
ensued fresh parties of Prolltier Coilstabulary took up the
pursuit a i d the Mahsuds finally reached their hills having
lost 15 killed, several m~ouncled,alld two prisoners.
Prom reports subsec~uentlyreceived it mas estimated that
a t least thirty Mahsucls died of thirst, heat exhaustion, or
wounds.
The first half of Septen~berwas marked by a comparative
freedom froin raids; and on the whole that nlonth wasqonsiderably quieter than the previous one. Climatic conditions
began t o show iniprovelncllt tlzough the heat by day was
still severe.
The chiel: event of the month was an action which occurred
near Za~kanion the 19tl1. On receipt of ,a
Action at Z'*kani~
report that a party two hundred strong,
19th September.
consisting of Mahsuds, Zalli Kliel Wazirs,
some militia deserters, and a few Xheranis had collecied near
t h e Sheikh Haidar pass BIajor W. G. IT. Durham, 27t'hLight
Cavalry, mith one squadroll and a Xtokes inortar le4t Draband
and arrived a t Zarlrani a t dawn. Major Durham accompanied
by tcn somars and twcnty rifles of the Southern VlTaziristan
Militia proceeded to reconnoitre thc approach to the Sheikh
I-Iaidar pass. While traversing some broken country covered
closely mith tanlarislr h~xshesthe party was attacked. Major
Durham was killed, some of tlhe inilitia captured, and the
cavalry detachmeat fell back. Part of the troops a t Zarkani
advanced to the scene of the occurrence and gained touch
with the enemy but in the face of superior numbers were compelled to retire to Zarkani with slight loss. Our casualties
in this action were one British officer, one Indian officer, and
four Indian oiher ranks killed and five woi~ndecl. Nine rifles
a n d a Hotchkiss gun were also lost.
During October the tribesmen showed a, tendency to collect
i n largc numbera and on fo11-r separate
Actions near ' W h i t
O ~ ~ a , ~aic~t in~ gn sof 1ilore than minor iinOctober 1919.
portnnce were fought.
The beg-inning of t11.e month was marked by serious reverses.
t o our arms. O n the 5th three troops of the Bhopal Imperial
Service Lancers nnd a plat001111150th Infantry under Capt,ain
C. E. Brouglitol~~t,artedfrom Manjhi post a t 8-20 A.M. as an.
escort to B telephone const'ruction party. On arriving some 5,
or G miles froin Maiijlli the telepholle wire was repaired and the
post informed that t,he party nrould hegin its ~vit>hdrawal
at,
I

The column proceeded witl~outfurther investigation a n d
with an ii~a~decjuate
flaillr p r d . At 3-50 F.M. while movilig
across country inucll brolren and intersected by nalas containing clninps of high standing grass the rear-guard was
.snclclenly attacked and the rear platoon of the 109th Infantry
taking up EL position on a sand dune was overpo~veredand
ai~nihilateci. The aupportiin platoon' also suffered heavy
casualties, and was reinforce by a platoon of the 3rd Guides.
Xennwhile the cavalry was ordered to cover the withdrawal
of the remainder of the conlpaliy of the Guides which had
been instructed to push on into nlore open country. Unfortunately the ca~ralryfailed to peGform its mission and left
the inEantry isolated. The tribesmen numbering about three
hundred now closed in. Sharp fighting ensued i n which
,Captain Ferguson coinmanding the company of the Guides
was killed, but ill spite of Inally gallant stands the infantry
Mjaa lorced to withdraw, each man fighting for his life, nntil
the open country was roached.*

d
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* In this nctjon we lost three officers, Captains Ferguson, Guidos, and Mottram, 109th
~llfnntl'ysc~ndLloutouent Bhagavan, I.M.S., end eighty Indian othor ranks.
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The reverses suffered on these two days are attributable
to a great extent to the inexperience of the officers in command
a n d the consequent relaxation of precautions while there was.
even a remote possibility of encountering the enerny. The
protective detachments too failed to perform their duties
efficiently.
As a reprisal for tho attacks of the 5tsh and 6th the 52nd'
Wing, now 1st (Indian) Wing, Royal Air
Air raid On
Force, carried out 011 the 9th a bolnbing
plain.
raid with sixteen aeroplanes on villages:
near Wana to which the 1asliice.r~belonged.
As the small villages on the Wana.plain.do nbt offer favour-,
able targets, the moral effect of the air raid was considerably
greater than the material, wliile the' fact that the aeroplanes.
used incendiary bombs created a considerable sensation among.
t h e tribesmen.
Emboldened by their successes, a further large lashkar
collected in the vic.inity of lfortazn post on the 17th and cut
t h e water channel which provides the water-supply of that
p!ace, Jatta, and 1Cau-r Bridge. This necessitated the dispersal
o-f: part of the moveable column of the Line of Com~nunication.
Defences which was then assembling at the last-named place.
After sufferkg a t least twenty casnalties at the hnnds of
t h e garrison of Murtaza Post which itself suffered none, this.
gang moved to the vicinity of Girni on the night of tlze 20th
October.
On the following day a column of three companies with a
Athaoh on o o ~ ~ ~ o ysection
s
of mountain artillery proceeded to
near Girni and Khajuri, Girni from Manzai t o withdraw one hundred
21st October.
men of the Labour Corlss from the post.
O n the c o l ~ ~ n beginning
ln
its retirement about two hundred.
a n d =fifty,tribesmen left the hills, and pressed closely on the
c.olumn. A well-timed counter-attack put the enemy completely to rout and they fled to the hills with a loss of about)
seventy casualties. Om: losses on this occasion were six
Indian other ranks killed and sixteen wounded. As a result.
of this action the lashkar wjthdrew from Girili and dispersed.
On the same day a convoy was attacked near Khajnri by a,
body of about three hundred Wazirs who had also piqueted.
Shinki in such a way as t o prevent the. garrison of that post.
from rendering any assistance. The situation was undoubtedlycritical until the arrival by motor vans of reinforcements of

.

the 43rd Brigade from Idak, when our superiority was established slid the convoy proceeded."
The coiicl~~sion
of the peace negotiations with Afghanistan
on the 8th August did not affect the sii;uation in Waziristan.
I n fact, a t this time the hostility of the Wazirs and Mahsuds
tomarcls us was iucreased by a widespread belief t h a t the
British Government had agreed to transfer Waziristan to the
Amir six months after the peace had been signed.
The tribesmen n~hohad depended on General Nadir Khan'a
.oft-repeated promises that the peace terms would include a
general amnesty for those tribes that had supported t h e Afghan
arms, now called on that official to redeem his pledge, or at
least to occupy parts of Waziristan wi.th detachments similar
to that a t Wana.
~ o n s e ~ u e i i t layt the beginnink of October General Nadir
I<han suinlnoned the leading Wazirs and
Maliks visit Kabul.
i\'Iahsucls to Matun, where the more important heaclmen were selected to accompany him t o Kabul
-*tobe -presented to the Amir.
On their arrival at the capital the maliks were received by
the Amir in person with every mark of honour and col~ducted
t o a snrni which had been reserved especially for their use.
.
Later a t a durbar the Amir announced that peace had
been concluded with the British and thanked the maliks for
their services in his cause and that of Islam. He flattered .
the Wazirs on their success in driving the militias from Wana,
the Gomal, ancl from the Upper Tochi. He also twittea the
Mahsuds on their failure to make the most of their opportunities. X~~bseqnently
the Amir issued rewards and presented
medals to the maliks. The latter were similar to those issucd
t o his own troops for the recent operations against the British.
Of the officers who liad deserted from the militias each received
.a special award of Rs. 300 and the sepoys Rs. 100. E e concluded his speech by advising the tribesmen to come t o an
.agreement wit11 the British. Subsequently the maliks were
interviewed by General Nadir Khan and other officials, and
t h e qnaliks returned to Waziristan a t the beginning of

i
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*Our casualties in this action wore (a) Captain Andrews, I.M.S., and two Indian
other ranks kiIled, and one British officer, one British ohher rank, ten Indian other r a d s
.and six followers wounded.
The enemy losees were estilnetecl a t about fifty.
(a) Captain Andrews was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for exceptional
try and devotion to duty in atta~dlng wounded under heavy fire in
exposed
position until he himself was killed.
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November, convinced t h a t hostilities between the Amir and
t h e British would soon be resumed.
The tribesmen though deprived of their main hope of
assistance still maintained their contumacious attitude and
continued conimitting outrages.
A brief sumnary of cffences committed by the Mahsuds
Summary of offences and Wazirs from the beginning of the
by Wazirs and Mnhsuds, third Afghan War to the beginning of
tONOvemberalg.
November 1919 is given below, inany of
which are described in detail in this, and the preceding chapters.
Tochi Wazirs.-Fifty raids and offences of various natr~res,resulting in our losing~approximately thirty-five killed, sixty
wounded and five iisslng, and in the carrying off of an enormous amount of loot in the way ol cattle, stores, and mopey.
J4ahsucls.-Over a hundred raids and offences of various
natures, in which we lost approximately ose hundred and
thirty-five killed, one hundrcd and tea wounded, and thirtyeight missing. Some four hundred and forty-eight camels,
o n e thousand six hundred and seventy-four cattle ancl property
valued a t about Rs. 35,000 were lootecl.
Warna Wazirs.-Thirty-two raids and offences of various
natrtres, resulting in our losing fifty-five killed, one hundred
a n d six wounded, and eighty-three missing. A very la,rge
amount of property was looted including a number of camels
a n d cattle.'
The casualties sustained by the S'Vaziristan Porce during
the period from the conclusion of the Afghan War t o 2nd
November, 1919 mereKilled
.
,
139
Wounded ,
1Ei9
T h e proporti011 of killed to mounded is very remarkable and
is attributable to the close fighting ancl t o the possession by
t h e tribesmen of high-velocity rifles.
The recnaitulation of tkis list of wanton outrages em~hasises
the conclusion that punitive ieasuies c o i d
Necoesity f or punitiv~
operations.
not be avoided.
The defection of the Mahsuds and Wazirs was not due to
any partic~dargrievance ; they were merely acting under
the stimulus of a feeling, deeply rooted in the psychology of
t h e borderland, that every true Muhaminadan must rise and
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fight for Islam whenever there is an opportunity of striking
a blow a t the unbeliever, and this feehng was turned to fu1L
account by Afghan adventurers in Wazlristan. It inust be
remembered t h a t these tribesmen are fanatical in thc extrcirte,
and easily excited to hosti1il;y against us a t the mere whi111 of
their religious leaders.
The defection of the tribal Militias had also had a disturbing
effect on the tribesmen. It led to some two thousand six
hundred modern rifles and a t least eight hundred thousand
rounds of amn~ullitioufalling into their hands, and this measure
of success tended greatly to embolden them.
The question of our attitude towards Waziristaa and of
the punishment to be meted out to the
Factors governing
to berdoptad.
tribesuen had how to .be taken up. There
seemed t o be two courses open, which may
be conveniently described as the maximum and the m i r i i m ~ ~ n ~
policy. The former was to take oTTer and administer t11c
whole country up to the Durand Line, and t o crush and disarm
the tzibesmen. This drastic measure, which of course, involved
the complete and permanent occupation of Waziristan, was.
that generally favoured by the Government of India, but it
preselited
certain serious diffic~dtiea.
Prom a military point of view, the troops were everywhere in need of leave which hacl been denied them for five
years ; demobilisa,tion of British troops was in rapid progress.
and units were being relieved by young kroops horn l3ngland
wlio mere not acclimatised ; the Indian Army was furnishing
large garrisons overseas as well as troops for jllternal security
.in India, with the result t l ~ a many
t
units with frontier experience were not available and lastly preparations liad to be
made to meet the possibility of further operlztions agairlst
Afghanistan. From a financial point of view the adoption
of the nlaximum policy of total occupstidn would involve
large additional expendit~lre.
I n spite of these obvious drawbaclrs the political effects
of inaction on our part had to be borne in mincl, coupled with
the fact that Afghan adventurers were still intriguiig among
the tribeslnen and sparing no effort t o misrepresent our intentions and lower our prestige. Moreover, the measure of
success which the tribesmen had secured tended to embolden,
them, and compelled US to win security for our harassed border
population and convince the whole frontcer of our strength.
After such flagrant offences immi~llityof the tribesmen would
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make o w position very difficult, particularIy in the event of
further trouble with Afghanistau.
I n the light of recent eve.nts it seemed possible that the
Governrn.ent would be foGced shortly to rePolioy decided on.
examine the whole basis of its aolicv
I
towards Waziristsn, and to consider whether in the long run
permanent occupatioll anrl administration of the country up to
the Durand Line would not be advisable. But; as this would
necessitate much discussion' and extended oper,ztions, it was
decided to adopt the minimum policy and to summon and
communicate the following terms to the Wazirs and Mahsucls.
Pilast.--There was no foulldstioll for the report of tlze
.?imir having secured a11 amnesty for the
Wneirs and
tribesmen, and that there was no question
Mehsuds.
of their country being made over to the
Amir.
Seco?zd.---Such reparation and' compensation as might be
fixed for damage done would be demanded.
T1~ird.-The tribesmen were to he inf0rme.d of our illtelltion
t o make roads and locate troops in any part of the so-called
" protected areas " mhicl~we niight consider necessary.
Regarding the third term the proposal tvas to locate mixed
brigades in Northern and Southern Waziristan, respectively,
probably in Miranshah and Sarwekai, and to undertake if
finslices permitted the construction of the following roads
for lllechanical transport :(1) Thal to Idak.
(2) Khirgi t o Sarwekai.
(3) Sarwekai to Tanai and Khajuri Teach.
(4) Murtaza to R h a j ~ ~Kach,
ri
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with extensions in the early 'future to lid{ Tanai with Wana
a n d Khajwi ICach with the Zhob.
Punitive operations against the tribeenlen in Waziristarl
Moclsuree ' taken on having been sanctioned, the following measanotion of punitive sures mere talcen :operatiam.

(a)

Toclzi Wnzirs.-A Jirga mas sunlnloned to be held a8t
Miranshah on the 9th November to hear GovernThe troops would advance to Datta
m e n t ? tenns.
~
IChel anti the tribe's reply be received there on
17th November. Should the terms be reiu~ed,
C
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intensive aerial bombardment and punitive measures
by troops would take place to enforce acceptance
of our terms.
(b) Mahsuds.-A jirga was summoned to attend at Ichirgi
on 3rd November, when our terms would be
announced, and the Mahsuds' reply was t o be given
by the 11th November. If the answer was unfavourable the whole of Mahsud country would be
subjected to intensive aerial bombardment followed.
by punitive ineasures by laad.
(c) TlTa~taWazi~s.- term^ were to be announced later as*
it m7as.thought that, in case of an unfavourable
reply being received, a lengthy period ~ h o u l dnot
intervene before condign punishment coulld be:
meted out.
The terms announced a t the Durbars held a t Miranshah!
and Khirgi will be found in Appendix " E."
In ills event of the t e ~ m snot being accepted the plan mas.
first to deal with the Tochi Wazirs and then with the Mahsuds..
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OPERATIONSOF

TOCHICOLUMN.
The operations of the Waziristan Force from 3rd November
1919 fall under two heads,-namely, the advance to Datta
Khel in the Tochi Wazir country, and the operatiolls of the
Derajat Column against the Mahsuds.
In the advance, two infantry brigades, the 43rd Brigade
under Brigadikr-General Gwyn-Thomas,
Distribution of troops,
C.M.G., D.S.O., and the 67th Brigade under
November 1919.
Brigadier-General Lncas, C.B., D.S.O., with
attached tl-oops were under the command of Major-General A.
Skeen, C.i'.G., and forrnecl the striking force, which was
designated the Tochi Column. See Appendix " F."
The remainder of the Waziristan Porce was employed in
guarding the Lines of Comn~unication. Railheads were a t
Bannu in the north and Derya Khan and Tank i n the ~011th.
From Dar ra Khan supplies and stores were tnlren across the
Indns to &era Ismail IChan and thence by Decauville railway
to Tank. The value of this line which was laid along the
side of the main road was spin clearly c1emolutral;ed. Resides
removing wear and tear of the road by transport carts, its
carrying capa,city was 200 tons of stores daily, or the equivalent
01one thousand camel loads.
The Porce was not only responsible for the defence of cominunications west of the Bannu and Tank, but also for the whole
area between these places and the Indus as far as ICahbagh
on the north, some sixty miles east of Bannu, and the borders
of the Dera Ghtlzi Khan district on the south. This necessitated
the protection ol about 350 miles oil coinm~mications.
As regards the 52nd Wing, now 1st (Indian) Wing, Royal
Air Porce i;he total machines available were :-At I'dianwali
east of the I n d ~ ~as ,detachnient of 3 D. H. 10's and a flight of
9 D.H.9 A's and a t Bannu and Tank a squadron of 18 Bristol
Pighters.
The Tochi Column was concentrated at
Concentration of
Tochi Column Sth Nov- Miranshah by the 8th November, with a
embor.
strength 01THE

Officerd and other rzalcs .
Follomerv
Horses and equipment animals

,

.

( 8 8 )

,
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8,444
6,464
1,382
a2

The transport collsisted of 2,288 mules and 5,087 camele.
Tents weye carried.
On the 12th No~rerliber the Colnmn
Advanca
began
the advance to Datta Ichel in three
Khel, 12th November.
echelcne.
The first ccllelon, which comprised the b~ullll;of the force,
fornled the main coluinn. The sccond echelon conlposecl of
two b:tttalioiis, including Pioneers, n field conlpsny Sappers
and Millers, and an armnured motor battery, was lorrned for
the purpose of i.rliproving. the lulmetalled road d-urjng the
adv:~ncefor the use of Ford v m convoys. 'I'he third echelon,
which collsisted of an infantry brigade with attached troops,
mas detailed to guard the road and expedite the collectjon of
supplies a t Datta lchel.
The advance encountered no opposition. On the 14th
Novcinber the first echelon reached Datta Ichel, the second
Degan and third Boya. Permanent piquets for the protection
of tlie road between R'liransh,zh and Datta Ichel were established without incident. A ten da,ys' reserve of supplies,
ammullition, and. stores for the ~vholecolu~mn.was moved
from Dardolii to Datta Ichel, in readiness to ca,rry out punitive
operations if our terms were reIused.
I n the meantime notices had been dropped froni aeroplanes
in Tochi Waxir country warning all the tribesmen t h a t
aon-a~cceptanceof ow terms would be followed by immediate
air operations. They were nlso warned that if they declined
t o accept our term;, their women and children should b e
iiioved to places of safety.
Major-General Climo reached Datta Khel on the 17th
Tochi Wazirs accept November, and met the jirgn on the same
OW
tam^, 17th NOV- day.
The jirga ~vhichwas fully represenember.
tative except for the Madda Ichel and two
minor sub-tribes in the ICaitu valley accepted our terms.
The ICszha Madda Ichel inhabit a valley north west of D a t t ~ ,
IChel, and as these in a false sense of their security had not
s ~ ~ b m i t t eby
d the 18th they were bombed the next day b y
seventeen aeroplanes. This had the desired result. All their
representatives made complete submission the same evening.
The two minor sub-tribes-the Titti Madda Khel and t h e
I-Isssan Ichel-live in the I<ait;u valley 20 niilcs north-east of
Miranshah.
They were not dealt with until the middle of Decen~ber
when they were effectively bombed froni the air, and in consequcnce made a verbal snbniission.
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In view of the decision not to re-occupy tlle Upper Tochi
posts it had been proposed in event of the tribesmen accepting
our terms that the column should mabe a march by way- of rt
demonstration through the Maddn, Ichel country which had
not been visited by regular troops since 1897. Besides teaching
the Wazirs that their country was not inaccessible it was
anticipated that the young and inexperienced troops of which
the colnmn was composed moulcl gain valuable training in
mountain warfare and be well fitted to
Maliauderejeot tel'mBp encounter the Mahsuds wllosc jirga on the
11th November.
11th November had assembled a t Rhirgi
and rejected our terms in toto. .
The political authorities, however, deprecated the march
as lilcely to excite the tribestnen to acts of hostility, niid to
delay the fulfilment of our terms. It was also urged that
the recalcitrant Mahsuds should be dealt with as soon as.
possible in order t h a t the operations against the Wana Weiir
should not be delayed until the late spring. Orders were
the'refore issued for the withdrawal of the
of Toohi
~ o l u m n t o Dardonf, column to Dardoni. This was carried out
26th November.
in echelons similar to those forined for the
advance, and the whole colnmn was back a t Dardoni by the
evening of the 26th November.
On the morning of the 27th November the Tochi Column
to was broken up and re-named the Derajat
DertLjat and Derajat
Column on the same date and began its
Column formed.
march from Dardoni to the Derajat vi2
Bannu and thence by road vici Pezu to Tank. The niarch
of 140 miles was carried out in nine groups each of approximately two battalions with additional transport. The concentration of the Derajat Column on the line T a b - Jandala
was completed by the 13th December, its composition and
location on that date being as shown in Appendix " G."

CHAPTER VIII.
C)~ERATIONS OF THE

DERAJATCOLUMN-FIR.STPHASE.

lt wouId have eiltnilecl the crossing of the Razinals: Naraififteoll miles south-east of Datta IShel-which. in minter is a
sllorl--couereci pass, soille 7,000 feet above sea level,--and the
const,suctioi~of a camel road over difficult country. Besides,
t,llera were no suitable intermediate camping grounds for a
force of t,lie size of tlie stril<ing column, and there was a great
scnrcity of water. It would also have entailed the protectioll
of n b o ~ 95
~ t1~1ile.sof Lines of Coinln~illicatioafrom the railhead
a t B a n n ~ ~ P~rtller,
.
it was hoped that the concentration of
our striking fo~cein the vicinity of Jandola followiq on very
illt,ensive n u operatioas, mould cause the Malzsuds t o accept
our t,eril~sand so make ail advance into the heart of their
country tulnecessary and admit of the operations against t h e
Warm Wnzirs beginning forthwith.
T'be lilethods adopted in 1.901-02 of einployiilg sm.cl,lI converging columns lno~ringon bivouac scale'had to be rejected
for several rcasons, the chief of which was the possession
117tlle t~ibesmeaof large numbers of high velocity rifles thus
e;~clnn~eriin~
the safety of a small colulnll temporarily isolated,
0.1transport for the carriage of the ~vinter
also tire vast a,ino~~nt
scale of baggage and the impediments which public opinion
now denlellils shall accompany OLU unseasoned t ~ o o p si n the
field. Owing t o the conditions which obtained on other parts
of the frontier, the available transport was just sufficient
for the needs of the Derajat Column an$ the Lines of Coinmunicatioil beyond railhead.

From the point of view of operations the single line fully
justified its adoption, and lproduced the situations and opportuilities it was intended to bring about.
(
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Namely i t left the tribeslllen i11 no doubt as to which line
to defend and conseqnently they were encouraged to collect
in the greatest available strength and to stand their ground
more stoutly than they would have done had they been looking over their shoulder anxious as to how the defenders of
other approaches into their country were faring : the latter
is the effect produced by converging columns and generally
results in inanceuvring the tribesmen out of their positions
without inflicting punishment.
The casualties sustained by the Mahsuds and Wazirs (when
the latter joined the former in the field) have never been approsc'llell in any previous campaign, and never before have
t h e dead of ally tribe been left on tlie ground in such numbers ;
it is justifiable therefore to assume that a single line of advance
by encouraging n vast display of tribal force and inducing a
sense of security from other points, enables our Io~cesto bring
the tribesmen to battle and to inflict casualties which in every
action of importance were considerably heavier than our own.
Rinderpest, and foot-and-mouth disease greatly reduced
the amount of transport, and it was only the arrival of six
Ford Van Companies anrl the construction of the Decauville
railway from Dera, Ismail Khan to Tank which enabled the
Lines of Colnmunicntion t o keep the Force i11 advanc:e of
Ta,nli:fullv supplied with all requirements.
In orcler that the narrative of suibseqnenii operations mag
bo he understood i t is necessary t o explain
seourc L. of c.-west of shortly the measures which were adopted
IChirgi.
to secure the Lines of Communicatioll west
ol: Ichirgi.
Under normal conditions, t o hnaintain a column of the
size of the striking force, daily convoys of pack animals liad
t o he clespatched along the Linee of Communication, and tlieir
protection was rendered moTe difficult owing to the abundance
of inodern rifles in the liands of the tribesmen. Tlze large
nuniber of tJroops required to ensure adequate protectio~iby
means of escorts prohibited their use. A system was (;here:
fore introduced of establishing permanent piquets a t fairly
close intervals on the most commanding ground on each side
of the route used. Theae sangared posts were strongly built
for all round defence, provided with traverses and protected
with thick barbed wire entanglements. Their con~truction
led to the majority of the actions which took place during
iihese operations. The full strength of the Derajat Column

bad, on occasions to be employed to drive the enemy off the
ground selected for the various piquets and then to cover
and support the working parties whilst the defensive work4
were being constructed. Several days were often required
t o make the locality selected thoroughly strong against, attack
and, until its defences mere colupleted, all the troops had t o
withdraw t o ca,rnp each afternoon.
As convoys sometimes amounted to over 4,000 pack
a.nimnls, it was necessary to i.mprove and provide several
traclcs in the river bed along which the advance was t o take
place, in order that the anin~a,lscotlld march on a broad front.
Otherwise, they had to move in single file, which so increased
the length of the column, that i t would have made the completion of a stage dnring daylight i.mpossible.
For this reason, on the 11th December, to prepare for the
advance, a force of two battalions and one
Preliminary preperations for advanoe over section of mountain guns made good the
spinkai Raghza 11th- Spi1llra.i Raghza, 1+miles north of Jandola
13th December.
camp and work on the road and of i t s
defenc.e was begun, During the day the enemy snipers mere
busy and when the .troops withdrew on the same afternoon;
the rearguard became actively engaged with bodies of tribesmen estimated as one hundred. These advanced down t h e
deep n.alas which intersected the Spinkai Raghza and attacked:
fiercely any small parties crossing these depressionrs.
Our ca.snalties' during the day were SecondiLieutenanti
Douglas of the 3rd Guides, one Indian officer, a,nd two Indian
other ra,nks killed, and one Indian Officer and eighteen Indian:
other' ra'lllrs wounded. The enemy casualties are not known
b u t were probably not heavy. On the 12th and 13th December
the work was continued. During these three days we sustained
46 casualties, chiefly from enemy snipers.
During the past month all available aeroplanes had been
carrying out a programme of intensive air
Air operations.
activity including night raids, against the
Mahsud villages until i t mas ascertained that these had been
vacated. Damage was done t o material and personnel, and
throughout the country the greater proportion of the inhabitants left their homes and took to caves and to the hills. To
enable the harassing of the tribesmen to be methodically
carried out the Mahsncl country was divided into three subareas, each of which was allotted to one squadron, a t least
one machine being over each area all day. This proved
effective, and much damage was done to flocks and personnel,
,

An interesting outcome of this prograinme wa.s that cattle
and slzeep were distributed in small herds to iliinilllise targeta.
This entailed ,a large increase in shepherds and watchers,
hinderjng the assembly of any lashkar or large raiding parties.
Between the 25th-29th November three more Bristo
Bighter aeroplanes were lent to the Force and a specially
intensive programme of. aerial bombardment was made, a
daily average of over 10,000 lbs. of bombs was dropped but
in spite ol these endeavours at no time did i t appear possible
that the Mahsuds mould submit from the effectof air operations.
alone.
As the employment of aeroplaiies on the frontier had not
been carried out on a large scale prior to thesc operations,
the'experiences gained 2re of much interest. It is not intended
to go fully into the technical side of the question here ; let
i t suffice to record the fact that aeroplanes had dealt successfullv with the recalcitrant tribes in the Tochi. and that although considerable moral effect and. a cerkin amount of
damage to personnel and property had been obtained against
the Mahsuds it had not been sufficient to. bring them to terms,
and i t was therefore necessary for the land forces t o take to.
the field to bring them to submission.
9 noticeable feature of the air operatioils was the readinesuof the inhabitants sheltering in the viciility to re-enter their
villages after a raid. This app1.ied to the smaller villages as.
the bigger ones having received so many visitations were
pra,ctically deserted. A possible solution for ,this is the pro-vision of bombs with delay action fuzes of various lengths.
Judging from the results seen later a t Icaniguram a,nd.
Marobi which were frequently bombed, it ~ o u l dappear that.
the heaviest bombs only are effective against these frontier
villages, and that the effect is not really worth the explosive
used. Even the damage done by the biggest bornbs is very
little assthe mud roofs and walls localize explosions to a grea,t
extent. Borne form of incendiary bomb mould thereforeprobably be more effective than thoee employed during these.
operations which have done little harm eicept Do dry fodder
and similar inflammable materials. The'total weight of bombs
dropped on I<aniguram, a perfect target for aerial boinl2ardment, was about 16 tons, which was out of all proportion to.
the material dimage done.
The ability to fly a t low a ltitudes depends greatly on the
employment of sufficient mac.hines, the dispersion of targets.

.and consequently of fire. The rate of flight of low flying
machines at close quarters and the feeling of danger induced
by t h e noise they make militate against accurate fire on t h e
pa,rt of the tribesmen. These points were exemplilied in EL
marked degree during the air raids in the Kazha valley o n
19th November 1919 where our inachines were handled with
.a singular boldness and escaped unscathed.
Before beginning the narrative of .the operations against
the Mahsuds, n few points regarding the
Equipment of Doraequipinent of the Derajat Columi~will be
.jat Column.
of interest.
The h l u m n illarched on winter scale with t e n t s a n d i n
.addition were carried :-one extra blanket per man,
one extra pair boots,
one extra pair socks,
two sandbags on the man.
Each battalion mas supplied with sixteen Lewis guns and
sixteen rifle grenade discharge cups.
A large ninount of barbed wire, stakes, and explosives
accomlx~inedthe Column, also 01 aivlnunition and supplies.
The Strilring Colun~nnormally consisted of :two monntaia batteries,
one conipany Xappers aiid Miners,
one rSignal compaily,
one battalion of Pioneers,
six battalions Infantry,
accompanied by
one Indian E'ield Ambulance,
one cornlined E'ield Ambdance,
one Bearer Unit,
with a supply column carrying four days' supplies.
Although camels carried six rnaunds each, t h e transpo~i;
for the striking force alone aggregated 2,800 camels and 1,400
mules.
A t the begillning of December it was estimated t h a t
~ t r o n g t i land arma- the eneiny forces available to oppose the
:mont of opposing forces. Deraj a t Column were :Mahsud s (including Urmars of Kaniguram) . .
.
Wana Wazirs .

fighting men. Modern rifles.

16,000
7,000 .

8,000
3,000

PLATE NO. 2.

b u t that no laslikar of more the11 3,500 tribeslnen was lilrelv
t o talre tahe field, owing to difficulties of obtaining suppli&
locally.
At no time in their history had the Mahsuds and 1Tazi1:s
been so well armed as a t this juncture, since in addition to
.their ilormal arnlament considerable quantities of government
rifles and ammunition had fallen recently into tlieir hands.
To supplement their st'oclrs the tribesmen had received large
supplies of am-ulunition through the agency of anti-British
officials in Hh.oat. These tribesmen have long been remailrnble
for their courage, activity, and Izardihood, and when the
mo~mtainousand difficult nature of their country is considered,
together with the fact thab their ,numbers illcluded about
1,800 deserters and others highly trained in our tactics and
methods of figl~ting,it will be realized that they constituted
.a formidable enemy.
It is interesting to note that although the Mahsuds and
Wazirs were in possession 01 large numbers (approximately
10,000) of Martini and other large bore breech loading riflcs,
tlieir use was forbidden in the field except at night ; Generiil
Sheen, who was present, in evcry engagement in the Takki
Zam, states he saw only two blaclr powder discharges by day
during the four months campai8n. The number of emall bore
rifles owned by t h e Mczhsuds dld not exceed 3,500, and this,
together with supply difficulties, made this number (vix., 3,500)
the usual strength of t h e lashlrar opposed to us. Large contingents armed otherwise were usually in close attendance to
replace casualties and bring up food and water. It is estjmated that not less than 8,000 Mahsuds and Wazirs collected
in the neighbourhood of Marobi on the 7th Pebruary 1920 to
dispute our advance on that village. This was the largest
number assembled by them up to date and was encouraged
by the presence of Shah Daula's guns. High hopes were
built on 1;he results these guns were to achieve. Their abject
failure accounts for t h e rneltiag away oi the tribesmen and
the feeble resistance made to our advance.
The moral of the BIaheuds at this time btood a t a high
level. This was due t o the lailure of aircraft to force their
submission, t o their successes in several ellcourlters with our
txoops during the summer, to their still fervent hope that
the Amir mould compel Government to discontinue punitive
measures, and to the belief that, as in the past they would
.succeed in gaining a reductioil if not an abrogation oi Govern-
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ment's terms by ado ting a threatening attitude. Added t o
this was their belie that the Great War had reduced our
army so greatly both in numbers and training that the Mahsuds
could defeat any force which we could bring against them.
The Wava Wazirs, who had not yet received the terms
that Government intended to i~llpose,were hand in glove
with the Mallsuds and ready to assist them in opposing our
aclvance. The Tochi Wazirs had accepted our terms, but
were unable to prevent the hot-headu of their sections, of
whom there were a considerable n ~ ~ m b e from
r,
joining the
Ma hs~zds.
011 the 17th December the Headquarters oE the Derajat
Ilesdqnarters
of Column ~vit-h
the 67th Brigade and attached
Dcrajat Column moves troops marched without incident from
to Jnndoh.
Khirgi to Jaildola along the bed of the
Taulr Zaril which had been secured by the establishment of
seven permanent piquets.
On the same day, as several representatives of the tribesmen
professed to be desirous of submitting, Major-General Skeen
interviewed then1 and ascertained that their only object
appeared to be to secure immunity for their own property.
While these men rere still ill camp, mzmbers of Mahsuds were
observed on the northern portion of the Spinkai Raghza,
and on the Sarlrai ridge vhence they were moving eastward.
At this time the construction of the camp protection piquets.
on the left bank of the Tank Zam opposite Jandola post was
being pushed on as rapidly as possible.
Suddenlv a t 3-30 P.M. a determined. attack was made on
these picruets and their covering parties.
Attack on piquets at
Jandola,
December, The easternmost piquet was overwhelmed,
after the covering party had been driven
in. Although the attack was made-i; the face of the close
fire of mountain and machine guns froill the vicinity of the
post and of the fire of the covering troops, it was pressed home
with the utmost gallantry, the leaders shouting and waving.
their swords high in the air, and dashing in among the troops.
After some hand-to-hand fightins the Jlahsuds wlthdrcw with
a loss of eight killed and twelve wound3d.*
There can be little doubt that this incident was due to
the ignorance of the troops of the psychology of Pathans and
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Our casualties were thirty-four killed and wounded.
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to the false sense of sscu~ityinto which they had been lnlled
by the presence in camp of Mahsnds ostensibly sueing for
peace, and for a siinilar reason the significai~ceof the lilahsucls'
movement across tdhe Spinlrai Raghza to gain a covered line
a t its correct
of approach for their attack was not a~l2~ecisted
value.
Information was received on the uight of the 17th December
and confirmed the follo~vingmorning, that, a Mahslzd lashkar
about 2,000 strong was a t Maarlanna ICach and that about
1,000 Wana Wazirs were in the Shahur on their may to join
in opposing t.he adva,nce of the Derajat Colnmn.
The presence of these tribal gatherings in strength so near
Jandola both on the Shahur and the Tar& %am gave gome
hope that a decision might be forced a t our very doors, if the
fl
tribesmen stood their ground.
At the time the l$ahsuds were under the impression that
we only req~u.redthe Shahur for the passage of troops to
Sarwekai and. Waaa, and to this reason was ascribed the
assembly of the laslzlcurs a t Do Talc a t the junchion of the
Shahur with the Tnnlr Zam.
Major-Gene~alSkeen decided to advance across tho Spinkai
Raghza, but detailed the 68th Brigade (less
Adva'lce to
1-$battalions) with two sections of grins,
18th December.
under Brigadier-General J. L. R. G,ordon, .
C.B., to make good the riveryoute to Do Tak in caRe it should
be required by the transport. This wae accolnplished without
difficulty and the brigade returned to Jandola that afternoon.
The main column which consisted ofColumn headquarters,
1squadroil (less 1troop) 21st Cavalry,
No. 6 British and No. 27 Indian, Mountain Batteries,
55th Field Company flappers and Miners,
67th Infantry .l3rigade,
2119th Punjabis (from 68th Brigade),
3134th Sikh Pioneers with attached troops
advanced a t 8 A.M. to clear the Sa~lraiRidge and fhcn to
secwe the Spiakai Ghash in order to cover thc qccupatioli
of a camp ,011 the Palosina Plain, three n~.ilesnorfh-northmest of Jandola camp.
The 11103rd Mahratta Light Infantry advancing steadily
cleared the north-eastern portion of the
6ee panorama No. 1.
Sarkai Ridge and the broken gi:ound where

.

the Sagar Algad trends south from Sandar-band. Here t h e
smoke of fires had disclosed already t,he presence of parties
of the enemy, and the contact aeroplanes were iufornled
accordingly.
On the left the 1155th Rifles having secured the dominating
point of the ridge continued their' advance against the steep
Spinkai Ghash with the 2J112th Infailtry oil their right moving
against the ridge to the east oi t h e Spinlcai Ghash, which
by 1-30 P.M. was in our possession. The Mahsuds retired
mainly ilp tho Tank Znrn pursued by our aeroplanes. By
4-30 P.M. the transport which consisted of 2,330 mules and
2,750 camels had reached the camp without incident. During
the day our casualties srnou~lteclto 78, including 7 killed.
Those of the enemy were reported to have been thirteen killed
and wounded but this was probably a n under-estimate.
There seems no d o ~ ~ tbhta t up t o the actual moment of'
an advance the Mahsuds expect,ed 11s t o advance by the Shahur.
The discovery of their mistake probably accountecl for the
alight resistance which they p u t up.
As the column was obliged t o remain in camp a t Palosina.
for some time, and several minor engage-.
Doscription of country round Palosin&,
see lnents book place in the immediate vicinity,'
s k ~ t o h map No. 1 a t a short description of the grourld will be
PW
of interest and will enable the dificul'iies.
of the. operations of t'he ens~i.ngdays t o Be followed and understood.
The right bank of the Ta,nlr Zam, opposite the Palosina
cam.p rises in steep cliffs to a sinall plateau, sorne 200 feet
above the river bed. The north end of 'this plateau terminatesin. .a rocky bluff, called Manda,nna 1311 overlooking Mandann.a
Kach and the river to tlie north. The platean, ~vhichis about
300 yards broad, is bounded on the west by a steep-sided.
ravine. This ravine starts from a tangled mass of' broken
ground known as '' Broken Hill,'' 600 'yard3 south-west of
Mancla,rlna IXiU, and runs for about 2,000 yards in. a soisth-easterly direction until it joins the Tank Zam.
On the west of th.e ravine: is a ridge which forms the main'
feature in t,he vicinity. The southern end of this ridge consists.
of two features known as " Black and White Hill. " hnd " Biaclc
and White Breasts." Going north along the ridge there are
fonr decided features ; a group of rocks which runs east and
west and was know11 as " Red Roclcs " ; " Sanclbng Hill " a
rough and commanding point some 700 yards west of " Recl

Rocks " ; and " Comb Rocks " 200 yards north of " Sandbag
1
The intervening space between " Sandbag Hill " and
" Comb Rocks " comprises a steep drop of 150 feet, then an
exposed strip of flat ground up to the foot of the latter. The
fourth feature on the ridge is ki~ownas " Broken Hill," and
covers Mandanna Hill from the south-west.
North of " Broken Rill " the ridge ends in an abrupt
drop to " Pink Bowl " on the right banli of the Tank Znm.
The slopes of Tsappar Ghar, 3 to 4 miles west of Mandanna
Icach overlook the whole neighbourhood.
On the 19th Deceinber a permanent piquet was established
near Man- on Sarkai Ridge witlloui; opposition. The
d a m s Hill, 19th Dec- Same day a force, n~hichconsisted of two
ember.
battalions of the 67th Brigade, crossed the
Tank Zanl from Palosina Camp ivith the object of:establishing
a permanent piquet on Manclawl~aHill to cover the advance
up the Tanlr Zarn. The ravine immediately west of the
plateau was cleared by shell fire from three sectioils in action
on the camp perinieter, and the 11103rd Mahrattcz Light Infantry
rapidly seized " Red Rocks " and " Sandbag Hill," and a t
the same time a cotnpany of the 1155th Bifies occupied the
lower slopes of " Sandl~agHill " and " Broken Bouldera."
The remaining three companjcs of the 1/55th Rifles .were in
position on the leIt of ifhe1/103rd Mallratta Light Infantry.
Although a certain amount 01 movoment down the Tank
Zarn and in the viciiiity 01 " Broken Boulders " aacl. " Sandbag
Hill " had been seen there was nothirig to indicate that any
large r~umbersof the enemy were holding " Comb Roclrs."
The original plan was to rush the ridge from " Sandbag Hill "
2nd " Broken Boulders," but i t was discovered that the broken
nature of the ground inacle this impossible. The M a h s ~ ~ c l ~
in force were now in position on " Comb Roclts " and " Broken
Hill " from wlxich they were bringing a heavy and effective
fire to bear on the attacking troops. Por nearly an hour
the. 1/103rd Mahra,tta Light Infantry reinforced from Red
Rocks made several gallant but mlsuccess1~xl attempts to
resume their advance on " Comb Rocks " despite the intense
and accurate gun and howitzer fire which was directed on
the objective. The battslliorl had now suffered heavy casualties including the commanding ofices and two British officers
killed and two ~vonnded. Under cover of the deadly fire from
" Comb Roclrs"
some Mahsuds moving up the depression
between " Sa,ndbag Hill " and " Comb Rocks " delivered a.

,

most detern~ined attack on the troops holdimlg the fornler
enlinence. The batta,lioil was forcedto withilrnw. I11 a few
wornerit.~considerable numbe~sof Mahsuds emerging from
. '" Comb Rocks " seized " Sa,ndbag Rill," and poured ill a
heavy fire 011 the retiring troopi. .As the 1/103rcZ Mahratta
Light Infar~tsyhad eshanstcd iDs supports in reiilIorciilg the
.att,acks on " Comb Rocks " there was no definite line on
.which the battalion could fall hnclr. The cornpallies on the
right and left bei.ng outflaidcecl were coinpellcd also t o
withdraw. Pa.rties nttenipted in. vain to seize " Red Roclrs "
and the vicinity to cover l;he geneid retirement which was no.w
-inprogress. Meanwhile the enemy who had developed great
;strength estimated a t 900 riflemen, pressed the whole line hack
to the riser, and forced our troops to re-cross to the east
"baiik. 0~1rcasualties were heavjr and included 95 killed and
140 wonnded while our loss in material totalled 1.31 rifles and
10 Lewis guns. The 3T.ahs1tds admitted a loss of 13 killed
:and 40 mounded which is probably a fair estimate. ,
The reverse was due to several causes the chief of which
was the neglect, to observe the principle of distribution in
+depth. There mas no reserve of troops and the small local
s ~ ~ p p o rmere
t s insufficient t o restore the situation when the
retiremeut became general. The hehavionr of the troops
showed that the Inen mere not masters of their weapons, and
they did not know what to do when their officers had become
.casualties.
It was uom necessary to re-establish confidence by 13epeating
Operations to ecitub- the day's operation and by using every
ilishpiquet onMandannu available means t o ensure success. Accord20th December.
ingly on t-he20th December the attack was
resuined b-y tho follomiilg troops under Brigadier-General
Lucas :2jlSth Punjabis,
1155th Rifles,
109th Infantry,
21112th Infantry,
2 sectiogs 55th Co~npanySappers and Millers
and two companies 01the 3134th Sikh Pioneers.
Tlie line of advance was practically the same as that taken
.on the previous day.
Shortly after the attack began, the 211 12th Infantry secured
the outlying featmes known aE " Black and White" hill.
By 10 A.N. the troops were in l?osse~sionof " Red Rock8 "
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and the northern end of the plateau and half a.nihour later
the 1155th Rifles had established themselves an the eastern
end of " Comb Rocks " and in the vicinity of " Broken Rill."
The &lccess of the operation was largely due to the precision and thoroughiless with which the Royal Air Force cooperated with the attacking infantry. The accurate bombing
.a,admachine gunning of the reverse slopes of " Comb Rocks "
'combined with the fire of the guns and liowitze~son " Sandbag
Bill " and Mandanna Hill, greatly lightened the task of the
infantry and intlst have saved many casualties. Iudeed 113
to this point our cas~~al.ties
were only 3 killed and 15 woutlded
while the enemy's were believed to have been heavier than
,on the previous day.
Considerable ilulnhers of Mahsnds could be seen retiring
up the Ta,nlc Zam and many rnore were observed advanciag
from I<otlcai. These latter, h.owever, halted on seeing the
heavy bombardment th.at was taking place. Worl; to put
Mandalma Hill ini,o a state of defence for t'he permanent
piquet was begun a t once. 'By the afte~:noonit was decided
y
that the defences: though incomplete, were s ~ ~ c i e n t lfar
advanced to establish a piquet there for the night, amid100
rifles under n British officer were accord,ingly posted. The
piquet was exposed to enfilade fire from " Co~ilbRoclts " and
" Brolten Hill " a t ranges from three to six hundred yarcls but
,no suitable traverses had been built.
The tfoops which had covered the coi~structionof the
piquet were then withdrawn covered by the fire of guns ancl
a,eroplane co-operatioil, and by 4-30 P.M. they were back in
cninp without having sustained a single ca,sualty.
At 4-45 P.M. Captain Cuthbert, 2119th Pu;lzjabis, commanding
Manda,nna Piquet reported tribesmen collecting a t a distanoe
north and west of his position, and a t the s ~ m ,time
e
about
thirty tribesmen some of wholli were unarmed, mere seen
froin Bpinkai Ghash running across the Ta;i~l<Zam to the foot
of Mandanna bluff.
Attempts were made immediately to warn the piquet
.commander of the presence of this party but without snccess,
a.s the telephone suddenly failed.
I t appears that a t this time the majority of the garsison
having deposited their rifles and equipment in the piquet were
e1nployed in carrying up their blankets, water, and reserve
ammunition which had been dumped some di3ban.ce froin the
piquet. Suddenly fire from enemy snipers on ' T o m b Rocks. "
H

,%

and " Broken Hill " forced this morlcii~gparty t o seelc shelter
aillong the rocks. Under cover of this accurate fire the abovementioned party of Mahsuds swarmed up the hillside and
reached some dead ground within a few y&de of the northern
end of the pique$ ; a t the s:iine time another small party
delivered a determined attack on the piquet from t h e west.
Captain Cuthbert and some of llis Inen charged these tribesmell
but he and his party were all lcilled, On seeing this the
remainder of the garrison becaine disorgailised and, leaving
the piqtret, retired acrass the river into camp nlaily of thein
having their arms and equipillent wenched from them by t h e
Mahsuds who showed great boldne(ss in the pursuit. Heavygull and rifle fire mas at once brought t o bear on the tribesmen
looting the piquet.
It is difficu~ltto arrive st the true story of this incident,
but it *appears from subsequent reports that the Mahsud
attack on the piquet mas not prearranged, and t h a t the
tribesinen wllo approached the positioli fro111 the river thinking
that the troops here had delayed their withdsawal t o camp
too long, hoped only to achieve some sinall success.*
It mas now more than ever necessary that the confidence
Oporntions t o cstab- of the troops i n themselves should be
lisll picpat on ~ 1 e c k restored, so an operatioil was arranged for
I3f1, 'lst December.
the following day t o establish a permanent
piquet on the feature k11ow11 as " Black Hill " or Tarakai,
n i,~unbledinass of ridges running west of Sagarzai peak a n d
conlmanding the callip a t a range of 1,700 yards.
The area surrqundkg Black Hill is difficult a n d rocky
affording excellent cover for an advance
See pnnoramn No. 2.
froin Sagarzai, b u t about 120 yards to the
north of the piquet is a low ridge which commands most
of the ground in which bodies of the eneiny could collect ancl
over which they must debouch. The steep rise to the piquet
and the flanking ridge and the formation. thence towards,
camp, made i t eady t o cover a withdrawal or organise a n d
cover an attack. The distance of the ridge from camp,i.e.,
2,100 yards from the river banlc, made support b y gunfire an
easy matter.
By 10-30 A.M. " Black Hill " and the neighbouring ridges
were occupied without opposition b y the 82nd Punjabis a n d

*

Our cnsualhies for the 19th and 20th December amounted t o 113 killed including
6 British offioer~,and 200 wounded.
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109th Infantry with the co-operation of aeroplal~es,aud ~vork
on the picluet was begun in spite of some long range slliping
fire. When . tile construction oS the post was half finished
and the w:re c~ltanglemelltalmost completed, soillo enemy
were seen massing a t a point halfway between " Black 14ill "
a n d the Sagarzai peak. Prior to this considerable n~11nI)ersof
tribesmen had been observed crossing the Tanlr Zsil~from the
direction of " Pink Bowl." These coilcentrated a t Ibrahiill
GII~and subsequently advanced against Taralrai 1311. Shortly
after 1-30 P.M. snipii~gfroin close range increasecl ancl ~vas
followed almost a t once by n rush, ofi tribesmen from three
directioiis which caused the troops covering the right of the
piquet to recoil, ullcovering those i11 the centre who withdrew
f olloived a t once by those on the left. hleailwl~ile the officer
in command of t h e working party of the 3134th Sikh Pioneers
took all his Inell into the half-finished post wherc they were
inmediately attacked fiercely at close range by the n l a h ~ ~ ~ d ~
i n front and on both flanks. Pour attacl~swere beaten
off and the fifth had developed when the officer in command
finding that ammunition and grenades were runniug short,
withdrew down the hill towards camp. At this time it was
estimated that the Mahsuds on the ridge were about 800
strong. These were ilow engaged by the fire of guns and
howitzers, that of the latter being especially effective, niici.
being responsible for the heavy losses suffered by the enemy.
The covering troops, who had been reorganised and reinforced on the ridge half way to camp, launched a couaterattack which reached the foot of the steep rlse to 'the picluet,
b u t failed to make further progress owing to the fire of wellconcealed riflemen, and, accordingly, a t 4 P.M. our troops
mere mithdrawil under orders, to the camp on Palosina plain.
The redeeming feature of this engagement was the behaviow
of the worl<ing party of the 3134th Sikh Pioneers and 1st
Bappers and Miners and of the stretcher-bearers-of the Field
Ambulances and Be&~erUnit. The gallant staunchness of
the former showed t h a t the old fightiag'spirit of the Indian
soldier still existed, and a splendid example was set by the
devotion of the latter who traversed the bullet-swept slopes
with cool courage and recovered inany a wounded man who
had been left behind.
The inability of our troops on this occasion to repel the
advance of the tribesmen and the failure in the counter-attack
t o recover the lost ground muat be ascribed once again to the
inadequate individual training of the soldier especially in the
H2

*

.

effective use of his rifle. A tour of the ground on the following
day disclosed the fact that the position occupied by the covering troops in the vicinity of the piquetdid not afford a good
field of fire or view.
The snlzgars collstructed b y these troops were of the most
perflunctory nature, and besiclcs being ill-suited as firing rests
they were not proof against the lnodern bullet. I-Iad our
troops beell able to recapture alld hold their position i t is
possible that the Mahsnds wonlcl have. sustained a reverse
svllich would have much accelerntecl the elld of the campaign.
Their losses were severe, and were reported lates a t 250 killed
and 300 seriously wounded. These were much in excess to
our o~vn,which amountecl to 66 killed or missing and 256
wounded, but undoubtedly the llloral victory remained with
the enemy.
The hlahslld attaclc 011 Blaclr .Hill is one of the best examples of conlbillation of fire and shock action. The organization of their fire power was perfect. At ranges up to 1,500
yards, and from positions on which our artillery fire could be
brought to bear, their riflen~endeveloped a vol~urneof aimed
fire under which their smordsnleil scaled the l d l unseen and
unscathed.
By this date, the 21st Decelnber, five battalions had been
heavily engaged with the enemy, and although severe losses
had been inflicted on the lIalzsuds, three of these battalions
were bacily in need of rest. It was therefore decided t h a t
they should bereplaced in the column by other troops. Accordingly the 2/19tll Punjabis, the Band Punjabis, and the 2/11 2th
I~lfantrywere withdrawn into the Lines of Communication,
and the 4/39th Garhmal Rifles, 2/76th Punjabis and the 21152nd
Punjabis from the 43rd Brigacle took their place.
On the following day " Blaclr Hi11 " was reoccupied withPonnanent
piqnot O L I ~ much oppcsition and from t h a t date
estnblisl~ed on Blaolr was held perlnailently by a piquet. Fifty
22nd
dead &!ahsuds and many rifles were fonnd
011 the hill and in its vicinity, and during the clqy many burials
were seen to take place near ICotlcni four lnlles away, ancl
reports were received that many dead and woullcled haci been
carried of3 by their relatives t o their homes.
No operations were undertalren on the two following days
as omiiig t o low clonds and rain close
Negotiations
for co-operaZion wi tll aeroplanes was in~possible.
settlement.
Intimation was now received from the
Uilll
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Mahsud maliks t h a t they were prepared to visit Jandola with
the object of effecting a settlement and they asked that the
operatio~smight be suspended pending the res~lltof thc
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The real object of the maliks seemed obvious. The lashkars
which had been in the field since the middle of the inonth
were notv dispersing owing to casualties and lack of sul~plies,
while the inhabitants of the ICotltai area were hurriedly removing their families and cattIe to distant valleys. The maliks
with .a view to recovering their standing anlong the tribesmen
and with Government hoped t o effect a settlement wllich
would ensure a t least the immediate withclramal of the troops
t o Jandola. This sanguine expectation was probably based
on a similar concession gained by the Mahsuds during the
operations in 1917.
I n spite however, of being told that our advance would
not be stopped pending the outcome of
Jirga a t Jclndola, 29th
the meeting, 'the maliks arrived a t Jandole
December.
during the 28th and on the 29th December
Major-General Climo held a jirga. Representative inaliks
were present from nearly all the tribes and s~~b-tribes
; the,
only notable exception were\ the Abdullai, who inhabit the
country in the neighbotlrhood of Rlalsiii.
I n view of t h e opposition that had been encountered the
severity of our original terins was increased.
Original terms enhanced.
These additional terms demanded the
surrender of one hundred inore rifles wllicli
would be confiscated permanently. I n addition the representatives were told that our advance would coiltillue until the
I
Sublnission of MaliIrs. sincerity of their subnlission xTas proved
by the payment of the fine and the surrender
of the tribal rifles. I n spite of these terms colqlete sull~mission of the Mahsuds was made, and was signed and sealed
by those present.
I n the meantime the worlc 011 R'laiidanna Hill was coiltinued
on the 25th. N - ~ m b e r sof tribesinen were seen nem: ICotltai
and 011, the slopes of Tsappar C4har. These were colltinuously
harassed by aeroplanes and probably for that reason did not
interfere in any way with the operatioas. 111the evening
all the troops returned to camp. The following day the work
was completed without opposition and the piqnet occt11)ied.
The periocl from the 17th to 28th Decelnber forined the
first phase in t h e operations against the Mahsuds.

-
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The losses which they had sustailied 011 the 21st December
caused most of the lnshkur to disperse to
End of first phase.
their hoines, and without doubt their
heavy casualties made them for a time at least, desist from
pursuing the rushing tactics which had up to this time proved
no guccessful in their encounters with our troops. This breathing space enabled our troops not only t o establish several
important permanent piquets without opposition, but also
made them realize that the losses of the tribesmen had been
heavier than our own.
It must be emphasised that the tribesmen had fought in
a way they had never done before, and this was due to their
high state of moral and knowledge thaf our battalions were
cornposed of inexperienced solcliers. Their attacks were well
organized, and their combination of fire and shock tactics,
the latter carried out with remarkable recklessness, mas
excellent. This, undoubtedly was dlle to the presence in
their ranks of many ex-lnilitia and retired regular soldiers.

PLATE NO. 7.

CHAPTER IX.
O F THE DEBAJBT C O L U M N - ~ ~ S O
PHASK,
~~
OPERATIONS
I n accordance with' the decision comni~~nicat~d
to the
jirga
on
the
29th
December
a
t
Jandola
a
Advrmcc t o Kotliai,
colulnn consisting of Column Headqnarters
20th December.
with the 43rd Brigade and atthched troops
left Palosina calllp and advanced with little opposition to
Icotkai, a distance of four miles, a third of which
covered
b y permanent piqucts established during the operations round
Maiidanna Kach. The remainder of the strilring force halted
at Palosina to adniit of supplies bejng acc~unulateda t ICotlcai
camp. .
The col%mn eren~dned a t Kotkai till the 7th Jnll~lwy.
D u r i n g this period perlnczllent piquets were est~blished at
various points between the l a t e r place and Jandola, in orcler
t o complete the defence of the road and give adequate protection to the convoys. Permanent piquets were also occupied
n o r t h of Icotlcai in preparation for the next advance. These
operations. were carried out with little
'i0tlr8i~
opposition from the. tribesmen except ou
2nd January.
. the 2nd Jalinary, during the construction
o f a permanent piquet on Scrub Hill about 2,500 yards northw e s t ol Kotlrai camp situated on the Kalwa Raghza.
The 4/39th Garhwal Rifles who were detailed t o form the
covering troops reached their positions on
SGG panororno, No. 2.
Spin Ghara, ridge without nluch opposi-b;ion. But between 11 A.M. and 3 P.M. sniping was coiltin u o u s and three determined attacks were made on tlieir
r i g h t conipany. Each of these attacks was pushed home
i n a most resolute manner and the enemy who had got to
within stone throwing distance were only driven off after
s e v e r e fighting. Difficulties in tKe rer~ovalof the wounded
d o w n a very steep slope necessitated some delay in the withd r a w a l to camp, which began a t 3-15 P.M. U ~ ~ d e& r heavy
covmiug fire froiii the peaks to the north and west, a body of
,NIahs~~d-s
s~zcceededin establishing itself ilnlnecliately below
&be forward crest of the position held by the covering kroops.
T h e latter made several attempts with bombs ancl stones to
dislodge this party, but without success owing t o the accu(
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racy of the Mahsud covering fire which had already caused
several casualties. When the r e a r m o ~ party
t
of the Garhwal
Rifles began it6 withdrawal, the above mentioned body of
Mahsuds rushed forward in close pursuit. Seeing thia
Lieutenant I<eniiy* with about ten men turned and counterattacked the tribesmen with the object of gaining sufficient
time lor the remainder of the Covering Party to get away.
This gallant party fighting to the last was annihilated, but
its object was achieved, for the Mahsuds fell back and being
snbsequently shelled effectively by the supporting guns were
prevented from following L T ~the withdrawal. The enemy
casualties were estimated a t 77 killed and wounded whilst
the 4139th Garhwal Rifles lost 35 killed (including two British
officers) and 43 wounded. The battalion displayed in this
action great endurance and gallantry and taught the tribesmen a wholesome lesson.
It was now reported that a fresh lashkar had.collected i n
the vicinity of the Ahnai Tangi, and t h a t tEe Jalal Khel and
Haibat I<hel whose homesteads were within striking distance
of thc column had decided to co-operate from the direction
ol the Shuza valley where their families hacl taken refuge.
On the 5th the 43rcl Brigade moved out to cover the re-construction of Scrub Hill and Whitechapel piquets, the walls of
which had been demolished by tlle tribesmen. These piquets
had not been occupied on the day of ,their codstruction
as Whitechapel was uncompleted and it was not intended
t o hold Scrubb Hill.
These mistakes, whjcli were too frequent a t the o ~ ~ t s e t
of the operations were due t o the inexpe~ience of the
junior officcss, British *and Indian, and their inability to
recognise tlie important part that time plays in mountain
warfare. Operations such as these must be carried out with
the utmost despatch and according to a pre-arranged prograinine
in order that the advantages gained by s~vpriseshould not be
lost. Thc piquets were occupied and the troops returned to
ca~lip,the rearguard on the r white chapel side being followed up
closely. Our casualties were eight killed alldl forty wounded,
attributable to t-he fact that the eneiny was 13repared this
day for the repetition of the operation. On the 6th Jannary
the 67th Brigade reached I<otkni camp fro111 Palosina camp.

'
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*This officer was awarded a post~lmouaVictoria Cross for his extreme gallantry
nnd clovotion on this ~ccesion.
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PLATE NO. 8.

TRANSPORT PARKED PREPARATORY TO ADVANCE THROUGH AHNAl TANGI,

Plloto, by So. 4 Photo. Rcc. 2nd Salilwrs and Miners.

The next task before the Coluum was the capture of the
Prdiminary
opera- Ahnai Tsngi. The latter is about four
tions tor capture of the miles from ICotlcai Camp. The actual gorge
Ahnni Tangi.
is about eighty 'yards in length and only
thirty yards wide. The sides are precipitous and rise t o :I
height of 150 feet above the river bed.
A description of the country traversed h ilppronchi~?gthe
Tangi will enable the progress o l the
BCO panoralna NO. 3.
fighting t o be more easily followecl. The
Spill Ghara range, a series of promineilt hills rising t o n
height of 700 feet above the river, runs in n south-westerly
direction from the Tangi and c o ~ ~ ~ ~ i mall
n c ltlle
s approaclies
from the south and south-west. Between the railgo a i d tho
river, the Tangi collsists of a plateau iiltersected by numorc~us
deep ravines which can oilly be crossed a t a few points by
troops moving .in single file. Opposite tlie platean, on the
left bank of the Tanlr Zam, the IConr range, n illass of crngs
rising t o a height of 1.,200 feet above tlie bed 01 tlic river,
coinmands all approaches froin the east.
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It was decided t o make the innin attacli across the plateau
ancl seize the west flank of the Ahilai 'fallgi pl+otecf8i~lg
the
right of the attack by occul3yiug tliu country on the east bnnl;
of the river with another body of troops. Accordingly oli,the
7th January, the 43rd Brigade iliade good Glle east balll; for a
distance of some 1;hree miles froin the ca.1111~theyeby protecting
the advance of the 67th Brigade, which a t dawn llloved across
the plateau ancl by 11 A.M. was in a position t o attack the
west Ra,nli of the Tangi. By this time, Iiowever, the eiiciiiy
had massed on the lower slopes of the I<ollr range, south of
the Tungi, where the coiiioriilatio~lof the gronild gave hiin
every advantage and where his line of retreat up the Tank
Zam or the Shuza was secure. It then becaille evicleiit that,,
before t l ~ eTungi could be secured and a caiill) iorined foTwvard
of Ghurlaina IKach, it would be necessary to occupy the heiglits
on the left bank. Tlie short period of dayligllt 1 - 1 0left
~
iiinde
i t iml3ossible to carry out this ope~atioiiso tlie troops \\-ere
ordered a t 1 P.M. t o mithdraw to Rotlcai camp. D~wiiigthe
mitlldrawal a party of the elleliiy roshcd a sillall omeriiig
party of our trooys but coining tlieinselres m~derc170ssfirc
lost about tllirty l&d.
Except for this illcideiit tlierc \17RS
110 serious action by the eneilly. ' 0 ~ casualties
1~
on {he left
ban]: of the river were
liillecl and eighteel1 ivouullcled?
sncl the relnaillder two killed and sixteen monlldecl.
\

j

Although the eneiny's tactics of n~assingon the left bank
enjade it appear desirable to launch the main attack on that
-side of the river, yet the ground was so difficult and so suitable
for defence by a few well-posted men that any idea of attack
in that direction hacl to be abandoned. Accordingly, it was
decided the adhere to the original plan and
Unsuccessful attempts
to satablish strong point to make a turning movement against the
s. E. of zeri.rvaml 9th western flank of the Ahnai Tangi. But to
.end 10th January.
ensure success, orders were issued to estab.lish as a preparatory operation, a strong point south-east of
.Zeriwam in order to protect the flanlc of the subsequent main
movement, and at the same time to establish the 67th Brigade
-in a camp to the north of ICotlcai in order to make the approach
march towards the Tangi as short, as possible.
With this object in view, the 67th Brigade left Kotkai
.Camp a t 8 A.M. on the 9th Januaiy and formed a camp two
miles upstream. Meanwhile the 43rd Brigade began the
.col~structionof the permanent piquet south east of Zeriwnm.
'The work proceecied rapidly and the garrison with its stores
moved up towards i t by 11 A.M. Hostile rifle fire, which ha,d
been desultory all the morning against the covering troops in
position on the main ridge of the Konr range, about this time
became intense, and the troops on the right flank were attacked
and driven back with loss. Assistance was sent up by the
47th Brigade from Ghurlama Kach but as the defences of
the piquet had not been completed the 43rd Brigade mas
withdrawn at 3 P.M. The tribesmen, who immediately rushed
into the half finished work in search of loot were shelled with
great effect by our artillery from ICotlrai plateau, they also
.suffered heavily in some close fighting with the 4139th Garhwal
Rifles on the norther6 slopes of ICaiir Luta."
Another attempt to establish the piquet was made on the
following day but was ag& unsuccessful. The enemy advancing again horn the direction of the Shuza attacked the
covering troops on the main ridge with great determination,
and eventually overbore their resistance by heavy and acc~uate
sniping. The advanced troops having fallen back on the
piquet, and as there mas no time to organis"e an attack on
the rocky ridge from which the coveri~lgtroops had been
driven, the Brigade was orderecl to withdraw to camp which
was reached a t 5 P.M. OLWlosses on this day mere twenty-

* O L I ~casuallies i n this action were oighteeli killed, inolucling one British officer
slid forty-two wounded, including four British Officers,
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five killed and eighty-four wounded. The enemy casualties
were estimated a t forty-seven killed and wounded. The
919th Gurkha Rifles arrived a t Icotkai from Jandola on this
,day, and two companies of the battalion were employed to
cover the withdrawal of the 43rd Brigade, to camp.
Although the establishment of the permanent piquet ~ o u t h east of Zeriwain had not been achieved,
Capture of Ahnei
Major-General
Skeen decided that i t mas
'Tangi, 1lth January.
not advisable to delay any longer the
capture of the Ahnai Tangi. Without the necessary protection on the right flank the advance of khe column to the Tal~gi
would be a difficult ant1 hazardous operation. The moon,
however, was in her last quarter and as this favoured a night
march General Skeen decided to make use of this advantage to
.s~~rprise
the enemy and secure the difficult ground before the
tribesmen had time to organise an attack.
The 43rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Gwyn-Thomas
which consisted of4139th Garhwal Rifles,
109th Infantry,
2 Companies 21150th Infantry (joined the Column on
29th December),
2/152nd Punjabis
.was .therefore ordered to move from Kotkai a t 5 A.M. on the
11th January so as to be in position at dawn, abont 7-15 A.M.
ready to develop an attack against two prominent featnres of
the Konr Range overlooking the eastern flank of the Alznai
gorge but a t some distance from it.
The 67th Brigade, under Brigadier-General Lucns, composed
of1155th Coke's Rifles,
57th Wilde's Rifles,
2176th Punjabis,
215th Gurkha Rifles (joined the Col~linnon 4th Janua1.y)
was a t the same time ordered to occupy d ~ ~ r i nthe
g night the
Spin Ghara range and t o be ready t o attack a t dawn, the
western side of the Ahnai Tnngi in conjunction with the attack
of the 43rcl Brigade.
The 69th'Brigade mas clear of its camp by 3 A . M , the
operation proved entirely s~~ccessful,
and tho enemy, beiilg
coinpletely' s~wprisecl,sought safety in flight. By 10 AX.
the west bank of the Ahnai Tangi was in our possession and by
7

11-15 A.M. the occupation 01 the east bank was suocessfully

accomplished. Piquets were quickly established to hold t h e
Tangi. Rain had begun to fall a t 1P.M. and visibility became
very bad, but the withdrawal of the covering troops including
that of the 43rd Brigade to ICotBai Camp was carried out
without a casualty. The 67th Brigade formed a new camp
west of Zeriwam afterwards ltnown a s Ahilai Camp. Our,
casualties on this day amounted to five ltilled and twentyeight wounded. Bearing in mind t h e great difficulties of
t h e terrain over, which our troops had t o operate the success
of this ilnportant operation at so small a cost reflects great
credit on both leaders and troops, and also on the Royal Air
Force whose co-operation with t h e troops b y means of D. H.
9 A.'s and Bristol Fighters was excellent.
Reports were now received to the effect t h a t the determined
opposition shown by the Mahsuds on the 9 t h and 10th was
due to a rumour that had reached t h e tribesinen that the
Derajat Column was about to raid t h e Shuza valley. The
Eushlcar which dnring the week had been joined by Wszirs
from Wsna and Tochi had now split up, some being a t Shillnanzai Icach a n d in its vicinity and others in the Shuza.
The 12th January was occupied i11 the construction of
several roads t o the river bed and the relief of piquet garrisons
so as to allow t h e 67th Brigade t o lzlove forward complcte in
t h e next advance. On the loll ow in^ dav Colnllln headquarters and Colu%m &oops joined t h e
sketch
m'
p
67th
Brigade at Ahnai Calnp where final
a t page 113,
preparations, had been made for the
adva,nce through ihe- ~ h a a ~
i a a ~ During
i .
the afteriiooii
a hostile attack which cost us three killed and three
wounded, was made on an observation post detached from
the Ahnai left bank piquet.
.
The advance through the Ahnai Tanei took nlace on t h e
1 4 t c January, and a i h o r t d~scriptionof
Advnnce
tlirough the country will help t o inalre clear the
,Tanunry.
accoylzt of the next day's fighting. Run-.
pnllornllla
3,
ning i~osthfrom t h e Tangi, on the east
baillr of the Tank 'Zam is a lolig narrow
spur culil~inatingin a flat topped hill, some 160 yards in length
called " Blathead Left." The latter over 900 feet above the
Tanlr Zaln coillpletely doillinates the bed and the sight bank
of f he river. Any further advance upstream froin " Plathead
Loft " is threatened froill a inass of cliffs l r n o ~ ~a s~ "
n Marble
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Arch " and, more to the east, by a hill which is separated
from " Flathead Left " by a steep and precipitous iiala.
This second hill was known as " Flathead Right."
A reconnaissance from the high ground in the vicinity of
the Tangi sho$ved that the country beyond was very difficult,
and that thc most important tactical feature in the area was
the ridge on the left bank culminating in " Flathead Left "
and that it was necessary to hold this point to secure the
passage of the Column towards Sorarogha.
I n accordance with orders, a strong advanced guard consisting of 1155th Rifles, two coinpanies of
Operations at A~ls
IZl~an,14th Januclry.
215th Gurlrha' Rifles &lid two guns of
No. 27 Mountain Bahtery advanced up the
bed of the river on the morning of the 14th January. Meanwhile the re~rlaincler of t'he 215th Gurlrha Riflifs under Lt.Colonel Crowdy, D.S.O., starting Iroln Ahrlai Lefi; Bank a t
7-30 A.M. moved al.osg the spnr 'to secure ."Flathead Left I'
where it was proposed t o establish a permanent piquet.
The main body was under Major-General Skeen and consisted of1 troop of Cavalry,
4 guns,
3 battalions,
1 Field Comp'any Sappers and Miners,
and attached 'troop's.
Brigadier-General Lucas wit,h four guns and two battalions
was detailed t o protect the route from the camp to Ahuai
Tangi and f;o escort the transport which numbired,, 1,480
mules ancl 2,800 camels. The detail of troops engaged is
shown in Appendix " H."
The advanced guard ~ ~ ~ ~~ieuteuant-colonel
clcr
Herdon,
1155th Rifles, met with opposition on reaching the cultivation
near Asa Khan and shortly afterwards its progress mas retarded
by accurate rifle fire from the " Dlarble Arch" cliffs and
Flathead Right." On the special ilanlcing detachment
reaching " Flathead Left " a t about 8-30 A.M. it enconntered
considerable opposit,iorz fronz the direction of "Flathead
Rigkt." At the same tiiiie the advanced guard pushed for~~rarcl
to establish a piquet on n steep spur running down froni
" Marble rlrch.?' Imniediately afterwards some forty tribesmen eiiierging from a nala on the left bank rushed this piquet-.ing detachment and threw the vanguard, moving in the riverbed, ir~tosome confusion. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued
'"
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but eventually the enemy was driven of? with heavy loss and,
tlialllrs to the guns with the advanced guard, gave little more
trouble=in this p j r t of the field. It was now seen $hat to
ensure the safe passage of the coluinn it was in~perativeto
hold " Flathead Right " and orders were therefore issued t o
the flankillg detachmellt t o occupy this dominating f e a t ~ ~ r e .
But this detachment had for some time been heavily engaged,
and was uom calliug for reillforcen~elltsand ammunition.
A company of the 2176th Pnnjabis was colzsequeutly sent
up buf before its arrivaI the Gurlrha detachment having run
out of ainmullitionhad driven back the enemy with the bayonet,
but in doing so had lost their Commanding Officer,.Lt.-Colonel Crowdy, D.S.O., who was killed. On the situation being
lrnown the rernaiilder of the 2176th Punjabis was sent up
from the river ,bed a t 11-30 A.M. under Lieutenant-Colonel
Charnljerlayne under orders to restore the situation apd make
good " Plathead Right " so as to facilitate the capture of
" Marble Arch," ~vliichmenaced the whole of the area in
which the Force was now concentrating. I n addition to the
above troops a company of the 219th Gurkha Rifles had also
been sent to " flathead Left " by Brigadier-General Lucas
froin Ahnai Tangi. The steep ascent of over 900 feet was
scaled rapidly and the reinforcenleuts arrived in time to
eusure the retention oE " Flathead Left." The attack on
" Plathead Right " was resumed but the hostile fire proved
too heavy and accurate. Several gallant efforts were made
to advance bnt these mere of no avail, and orders were
therefore issued to consolidate the ground gained,
As it was then 1-30 P.M. and as the transport was through
the Tailgi and well closed up in the river bed it was too late
to return to Ahilai Camp. A further advance was impossible
as " Marble Arch" had uot been captured. Major-General
Slreen too was reluctant to surrender important ground gained
a t the price of severe casualties and decided to form a camp.
where the force then lay, although the locality was most
unsuitable. The camp, afterwards known as Asa Khan Camp,.
was in the bed of the Tank Zam and was not only closely
surrounded by hills, the loss of any of which might have
created a critical situation, but was a l s ~cramped and con-.
fined.
During the afternoon the enemy was reported massing:
in a ravine to the west of the camp. On Dazzle Hill, an
important height about a mile from czcmp two Colnpailies of

I

PLATE NO. 10.

the 109th Infantry, the only troops in hand, JITeresellt to.
dllive them off. Too weak t o carry out their mission, thpy,
sustained heavy losses but held t.o ground gained, a ~ l dby so
doing enabled t i e camp defences in that clirectioll t o be corn-.
~ l e t e d ,and secured *he camp froin attack fro111 the xvest.
Meanwllile the position ou " Plathead Left " had becolllc
m.ore critical. The tribesmen made four more deter-nilled
attaclss supported by powerful and accurate covcrillg fire,
a n d it was only with difficulty that our troops maintained
their hold on this vital point. Another cornlmny of the 2/9th
Gurkha Rifles originally destinecl .£or picrjnet gari~ison11ad
j ~ ~ arrived
st
a t " Flathead Lellt " in tillie to turn the tide. in
our favo~zrand helped to beat oil a last detcrnliued nssanlt
in ~vhichbayonets, stones, knives, aucl grenades were freely
used. After this the enemy pressure died donrn and n u
further attaclrs were made. Our troops on the ridgc sl~ent
the whole night iu consolidating their positions.
This action proved to be the most stubbornly fought of
t h e whole canipaign. Our casualties ailiounted t o nine Hri~ish
oEcers killed and six wounded, two Iudiau officers, aiicl three
huadred and sixty-five Iudian other ranks Billed or wouaded.
Owing to the necessity of escorting the transport nucl
sec~zriagthe road on1 a few units were available for the
actual fjghting, but t e heavy casnalties that tllose uuits
suffered, especially in British officers, in uo way sl1ook their
moral. The enemy's losses were reported later at about four
hundred killed or seriously wounded. Forty to fifty ellenly
dead were found in front of our lines, and a large number of
our own and tribal rifles were recovered as late as txvo days
after the action.
The Mabsuds fought with their usual reclrless gallantry.
They took full advantage of the difficulties of the ground and
b y adcurate &re covered the concentration and assault of their
braver spirits. Many of these assaults were pushed boine,
b u t in the hind-t 0-hand fighting that ensued our t r ~ o p proved
s
theinselves superior t o the enemy.
The co-operation of the Royal Air Force was most effective
and relldered material assistance towarch
Co-oporbti0n
O*
the success of the day's action. The offenAir Forco.
sive spirit of the pilots who recoguised the
, fierce nature of the fighting had a remarkable effect on the
enemy as is exemplified by the following episode. Two
aeroplanes, +finding good targets finished their bombs and.

T,

.ammunition some time belore their reliefs were due to arrive.
The eueiny was then harassing our troops and the aviators
bnev that the cleparture of the aeroplanes would be the.signa1
for t h e renewal of the attack. They therefore remained and
diving low a t the enemy succeeded in pinning
by contill~~ally
hi111 t o the ground thus preventing the developnlent of any
offcilsive movement against our hard pressed troops. Unfortullately two of our aeroplanss were shot down by the
enelny but the occupants, though slightly wounded, succeeded
in reaching our lines. On this day too a illachiile had to
mad;e a forced lancling in the Shuza within Bhittanni limits,
The occupants~veretalien in safety to I<llirgiby three Mahsuds,
who were in our einploy as intelligence agents.
During the next three days Coluilln Headquarters, with
colnmn troops and the 67th Brigade remained a t Asa Khan
. Calzip, xvhilst tile mounded were evacuated, snpplies collected
and preparatio~ismade for a further advance.
The action of the A1111ai Tangi is a good esarrple of the
, In~portancoof tmin- desperate nature ol: the fighting t h a t had
ing as sllurnn by so taken place up to this stage of the operaIZllan's operations.
tions, and which would have hied highly
trained units, even the pre-war Frontier Force or similar
re@melits mith long experience and training on the frontier.
It is very essential for US, evert those who fouglit on the
frontier aslate as 1917 and 1918, to realise to what extent
conditions have been altered with the great inlproveinent in
the armsment of the- tribesmen. Tlzeir tactical knowledge
ancl training have greatly improved. The presence of a large
body of Militia deserters forms a xtroilg n~~cleus
of well trained
inen on which to build their tribal gatherings. We rnust
appreciate the stanclard of individual training t h a t is required for illfantry in the conditions that prevail on the
frontier to-clay. The standard of training that we had perforce t o be collteut with in France in the later years of the
Great War, although i t enabled us to gain a final victory,
does 11ot snfice on the frontier bo-day, nor are the tactical
inetliocls that we adopted suitable in many respects, though
t h e ~rinciplesuuderlying tliese tactics apply equally. Tac tin t , where
cal methods and trainmg are i n t e r ~ l e ~ ~ n d eand
large bodies oC men can-be employed the actual iluizlbers
alone give the inore timorous a , sense of safety and power.
Is a n action such as has been described however, masses
cannot be used snd a man's fighting value and his own safety
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depend on his own efforts and on his ability to use his
weapons. The paremount importance of sound musketry .
training and all that pertains t o it is well exemplified in this
particular action.
Prom reports received later it appeared that the very 1ar.e
numbers of tribesmen, (said to have been a t least 4,000),
sheltering in the numerous caves near Sarwekunda and in the
Shilmanzai I h c h area had appreciated the tactical value of
" Flathead Left " a n d anticipating that a permanent piquet
would be established on it, alld they made their prepar at'lons
~ccordiliglyto dispute t h e possession of this important feature.
Consequently on the 14th when shortply after 7-30 A.M. the
Mahsuds heard the c o a t i n n o ~ ~"sprecautiouary " fire of the
Lewis guns and rifles of the 215th Gurkhas clearing the spur
for the advance of the special flanking detachnent, consiclerable numbers of tribesmen hurried to their selected positions
and prepared to put u p a stout resistance. Within an hour
in the desperate fighting that ensued the detachment had run
out of ammunition, a n d but for the bayonet charge carried
out under the personal leadership of their gallant commanding
officer, the wholc detachment must have been overwhelmed.
As is usual after a n important action such as that of the
Ahnai Tangi the lashkars 01 both Wana
Disposal of Lashkar.
Waairs and Mc~hsildsbegan to return to
their homes with their dead and wounded, ancl the former
too expressed a n intentioa of not returning. At this time
too peace overtures were made to the Borce Commander
tlxough the Political Officer who was then a t Jandola. The
genuineness of these offers was suspected iit the time, and
later intelligence proved that the overtures were insincere,
anil that their object was to s'tay our advance. The period
of the halt a t Asa Khan Cenip was employed in establishing
permanent piquets in advance of cemp, including one on
" Marble Arch,?' which on this occasion was not held by the
enemy. Except for a few minor brushes with the enemy,
little real opposition was encountered as most of the Iccshkurs
had dispersed, b u t our daily casualties averaged about four
killed and ten wounded.
On the 18th January the Striking Force, with the addition
of t h e 3rd Guides, who had joined the
~dvanoet o Sorerogha, Column from the 68th Brigade, left Asa
18th Jnnuery.
Khan Camp and moved forward some
four miles to t h e Sorarogha plateau. The enemy offered but
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little resistance to the advance. Several good camel tracks
leading from the Sagar Algad to the plateau having been
rapidly constructed by the Pioneers, 1,500 mules and 2,800
camels were soon passed through to camp. Later' in t h e
evening the enemy attacked the two most advanced camp
p.jquets, interfering seriously with their construction and,
i n the case of the piquet on the left bank of the Taillc Zaln
preventing its occupatioll that evening. The work was completed during the night and the piquet occupied. Our
casualties this day were eight killed and fourteen wounded.
The 'Sorarogha plateau, some three hundxed feet above
the river, formed an excellent open camping
Aerodrome
formed
at Soraroghla.
ground. The diaadvsntage of having to
bring up water to the plateau was more
than compensated for by the ease of protection, the ample
space and the good surface of the whole area. The space was
sufficient to inolude an aerodrome which was of the greatest
value in the subsequent operations, especially as it permitted
pilots who had flown from Bannu or Tank to learn before
beginning operations the position of our troops and the state
of the situation. The striking force halted at Sorarogha Camp
until the 27th January.
This long hklt wns necessary to collect ten days' reserve
of supplies, ammunition, and stores for the striking force.
It had originally been decided to advance by stages of from
ten to twelve miles,and not to embark on a new stage until
ten days' maintenance for the striking force had been accumulated a t the head of the old stage. This was a necessary
precaution t o take, as, although every pdssible arrangement
hadbeen made to ensure the protection of the Lines of Comrnunication, they were always liable t o temporary interruption
by weather or the enemy. But, fortunately for us, the latter's
strategical knowledge had,not inyreased with his improvement
in tactics and no serious attacks on t h e Lines of Communication
took pIace.
The period, 29th December 1919 to 20th January 1920,
formed the second phase of the operations
End of second pbaee.
against the Mahsuds. It was a ~ h a s eof
steady progress a d hard fighting which broke d i v n the
resistance of the enemy.
During these thirty days there had-been twenty actions
in nearly all of which more than one Brigade had been
employed. Although this had naturally imposed a great

'

P L A T E NO. 12.

F

%

s t r a i ~on battalions already depleted in numbers, it was a
period of practical training for all ranks a ~ many
d
lessons
were learnt. The initial phases of five of the larger opera,tions had been successfully carried out in tlie dark, during
the early hours of the morning and over difficult country.
'This alone was a high test of discipline and efficiency.
These mmerous and successful actions inspired the troops
with confidence and made the Column a really formidable
force, ready t o undertake with determination the most difficult
operation.

I'I(otu, by Nu. 8 P l ~ u t uSectlull.
,
2nd. Balll1cl.s 41sd Mincrs.

SOUTHERN ENTRANCE T O BARARI TANGI.

CHAPTER X.

OPERATIONS OP

THE

DERAJAT COLUDIN-THE AJ!,VANCE TO
PIAZHA
RAGBZA
.

In Bpite of repeated appeals, sometimes accompanied with
threats from the Wazirs and I\Iahsnds, Shah
Afghan intrigues.
Daula the commauder of the Af han irregular force a t Wana had steadfastly declined to len his guns
to the tribesmen for use against the Derajat Column. Be
had occasionally distributed small amounts of rifle ,ammurlit'ioll to the Wazirs but up to this period thab was all
the material help he was able to give the tribesinen and
all they now expected of him. As a result of the severe
reverses they had suffered, the Mahsuds sent several
messengers to Khost to report their plight and to ascertain
what hope there was of help or intervention from that
quarter, bnt these men returned with empty messages of
sympathy and good-will from the officials of that district.
Finding, however, that the Mahsuds were weakening several
prominent individ~a~lswith anti-British leanings now
appeared in Mahsud country from Khost with large amounts
of rifle ammunition and promises of reidorcements in the
form of lnslzkars accompanied by artillery. Among these.
emissaries were the fanatical BIullah Lala Pir and Haji Abdur.
Raznk, once Court Mullah a t Kabul but now a prominent
agitator. Letters from Khosi; also rea,ched Shah Daula who
immediately busied himself with the collecttion of a Wana
Wazir lashka~,which he promised to supply with ammunitian
aud to accompany with his two mountain guns.
.About one and a quarter miles north of Sorarogha Camp,
the Tank Zam cuts through the Sarkai
Dcsoription of Bsrari
Ghar ridge forming a gorge called the
Tunei.
Sco sL-ctch
No. 3 Barari Tangi. The latter is soine three
a t pago 122.
hundred yards in length and sixty yards
wide, with sides which rise precipitously to an average height
~f 100 feet, The bed of the river here turns almost due west
and is joined b y the Barari Algad from a north-easterly direct+ioi~.After p a s s i ~ gthrough the Tangi there are three important features which colnmand any advance up the Tank Zam.
These are " Barari Centre " and " The Barrier " between
the Bnrari Algad aud the Tank: Zarn and " Gibraltar " opposite-
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the latter on t h e right bank of the river. The l a ~ t - ~ ~ ~ ~ d
feature is a rocky a n d bushy bluff, whom existence was llot
discovered during the preliminary reconnaissances fronl 3
r 01'8rogha Camp. Before attacking " Barari Centre " it was necessary to secure the Sarkai Ghar ridge on both sides
the river. The part of the ridge on the right banlr, though
the lnost formidable, was higher and less exposed to dangers
tlla~lthe part o n t h e left bank and gave observation over the
la bier a n d its intricate surroundings.
%$
On the 20th t h e Mahsud lashkars which had retired t o
Ahnlad~varnand Sarwek numbered about two hundred in each
place, but since t h a t date these had beell reinforced by slnall
parties of tribesmen including some Wazirs
Preparations for tho
advanaothrough 13arari from Shakai. Active operations preparaTan& 23rd and 25th tive to bhe lurther advance began on tlle
January.
23rd January when Brigadier-General
Lucas with the1165th Rifles,
i
215th ~ u r ha
k Rifles,
;I
219th Gurkha ~ i f f e s ;
moving out a t 5-30 A.M. traversed the intricate nalas and
bush that lay n o r t h of the Sorarogha plateau and, ascending
the precipitous slopes of Sarkai in the
Soo pnnoramo, No. 5
dark, established himsell without loss in
at ond of book.
positions covering the site selected for the
constructioa of -a permanent piquet which mas rlal~ledsubsethe " Bluff Piquet." Meanwhile two companies of
quent!
the 31. Guides were disposed to protect the.left flank against
the small lashkar previously reported in the Sarwek valley.
Shortly after daybreak the 219th Gurkha Rifles, who were
coveriu from above the construction of the piquet, became
engage! with t h e enemy who had appeared from the di~ection of Ahmadwarn. Compelled to occupy a ridge to the
north-west of t h e Bluff Piquet to cover the ridges in rear,
the advanced company of this battalion soon began to sustain
losses from hostile fire from 'the northern slopes of Sarkai
Ghar. These casualties continued until the piquet was finished,
equipped, and occupied. The withdrawal began a t 1-45 P.M.
The Mahsuds then attacked the advanced company with
determination undeterred by shell fire, bombs, or Lewis gun
.fire from the aeroplanes. The company, howevor, was skilfully handled and completed its withdrawal with the loss of
its British officer and seven Gurkha othcr ranlrs killed. The
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remainder of the withdrawal was carried out over the most
precipitous. and brolrcn ground, but the fire of the supporting
artillery especially that of the 2-75 guns was most effective
in keeping the tribesmen under cover. Our losses on this
day were ten killed and twenty-one wounded. During t h e
operation the assistance rendered by the aeroplanes was of
the greatest value and was undoubtedly responsible for the
conlparatively small losses sustained. They used the new
aeroclrome at Soraroglla for the firs-1;time, and the pilots were
thus enabled to maintain the closest touch with the troops
with whom they were co-operating. Heavy rain accompanied
by snow on the night of the 23rd January precl~tdedoperations on the following day as low clouds and bad visibility
prevented co-operation from the air.
On the following day a permanent piquet on the Karkanai
ridge was established a t a cost of five killed and fifteen
wounded. The majority of these casualties were incurred
during an attack a t 11-30 A.M. by about two hundred
Mahsuds from the Shuza who drove in the advanced troops
of the 67th Rifles, but with the assistance of the artillery
$he situation was restored, and the covering troops reoccupied their position. The enemy who had apparently
suffered casualties failed t o follotv ~ t the
p withdrawal in spite
of the nature of the terrain which was admirably suited t o his
tactics.
A hold on both flanks of the Barari Tangi having t h u s
been secured the.construction of three camel tracks to t h e
river bed in preparation for the next advance was undertaken.
This was com leted on the 26th January e t h o u t opposition.
On the same ay the 43rd Brigade arrived a t Sorarogha from
Kotkai having been relieved by t h e 67th Brigade from.
Jandola, the latter forming No. 2 Section, Tank Line of
Communication Defences.
During the stay of our troops a t Sorarogha several attempts
were made by the Mahsud malik~to oped up negotiations
with a view to effectiiig a cessation of hostilities. The mali7cs
aleo hoped that the presence of Afghan emissaries in their
country might induce Government to forego or modify its
terms t o the Mahsnd~. These overtures, however, met with
no response as i t was evident that the tribesmen were entirely
out of control of their nzalils and had no intentions of fulfilling
the conditions t o which the maliles had already agreed a t
Jandola. Major-General Climo, therefore, ordered thai puni-
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tive measures involving the destruction of property should
be carried out when the force advanced from Sorarogha.
This decision had~beendelayed as long as reasonable hope of a
settlement had remained.
In consequence of the propaganda of the Afghan adventurers, and the energies of the Mahsud leaders, Mullah Fazl
Din and Muss Khan, a lashlcar composed chiefly of Shabi
IChel and Abdullai and amounting to about 1,200 rifles was
concentrated at this time in the vicinity of the Bs~raciTangi.
The.hope was therefore entertained that the Zashkar would
make a stand and give the column an opportunity of illtlicting
on these recalcitrant sections the punishment they so richly.
des3rved.
The possession of the Sarkai ridges paved the way for a
further advance and covered trhe approaches to " Barari '
Centre." The capture of the latter feature was an essential
prelude to an attack on " The Barrier " which threatened.
to be a formidable obstacle and a likely position for the enemy
to hold. The crest of the ridge was owh hero more than a
few feet wide with natural cover in the rocks and an easy
slope falling away on the far side providing easy lines of retreat.
The southern approach t o the crest of " The Barrier " was
difficult, especially the last part which involved a precipitous
climb. . It was estimated that an attack on this position
would cost a t least one hundred casualties so Major-General
Skeen decided to seize " Barari Centre " a t daybreak and
push the attack against " The Barrier " before the enemy
could concentrate for its defence,
Accordingly Brigadier-General Lucas with the followillg
troops who had become accustomed to
Oapture of
night operations in this area moved from
Tmgi, 28th January.
Sorarogha Camp a t 5-30 A.M. on the 28th
January1155th Rifles,
216th Gurkha Rifies,
109th Infantry,
2 companies 3rd Guides.
By daybreak " Barari Centre " was in our possession, and
Brigadier-General Lucas'was in a position to cover the attack
on "The Barrier." At daybreak, about 7 A.M., the advance
guard of the main c o l ~ m n ,consisting of the 57th Rilles and:
21150th Infantry under
-Brigadier-General Gwyn-Thomas ,

entered the Tailgi and pushed on towards
and " Gibraltar."

':The Barrier

"

Immediitely behind the advanced guard came the special
flankillg detachment composed of the 4139th Garhmxal Rifles
and two coinpallies of the 219th Gurkha Rilles detailed for
the captr~reof " The Barrier." As the advanced guard cleared
the Tangi the special cletacl~mentswung t o the right on t o its
objective. The foriner met with opposition in the Tangi, but,
after dispersing about fifty tribesmen composing an enemy's
piquet, pushed forward as directed. The tribesmen had beell
talcell by surprise, and by 10 A.M., with practically no opposition, " The Barrier was in our possession, and our position
there was rapidly consolidated. - Meanwhile the vanguard
had got well past " Gibraltar " and was approaching Bangimala, when rz detachnzent from the 57th Rifles despatched to
piquet the former feature was held up by accurate sniping
from a netwodc of nalas and wooded plateaux some 6001,000 yards t o the south and north-west. Reinforcements were .
sent up without .avail, and finally two companies of the 219th
Gurkha Rifles were e ~ ~ ~ p l o y eSbilfully
d.
handled these two
weak cornpanics passing through under close artillery support,
drove back the enemy and a t 1 P.M. captured " Gibraltar."
Owing to persistent hostile rifle fire consolidation was not
conlpleted until after dark.- The column camped a t Ahmad- Camp a t Ahmadwnm. warn, just north of Barari Tangi, except
the br111c of the tranlsport which, owing
to t l ~ e limited extent oE the camp, had t o return t o
Sorarogha Camp. Our losses were seven killed and sixtytwo wounded, and the enemy's casualties were reported as
t~veutykilled and sixteen wounded. In the ineantimc the
67th Brigade having established the permanent piquet on
" Barari Centre " returned to Sorarogha Camp.
Duriner the 29th Januai-v t l ~ econstruction of uosts on
the localities selected far permane& ~ i q r ~ e t s
Enemy guns in action
against our troops.
was completed. Considerable numbers of
the enemy were seen during $he day up
the Tank: Zam and confirma&on was obtainedvof the rluort's
previously received that a Wana Wazir lashkar accompinied
by the local Afghan conlrnander Shah Daula with his two
mountain guns had joined the Mahsud lashkar. These two
sis-pounder guns firing fixed ammunition came into action
a t Shin Konr against us for the first time, but did no harm
. to our troops. They had a range of about 2,000 yards and
)'
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On the 31s.t; Junllary all preparations for the advance
were complete, %he109th Inlantry having taken over all the
permanent piquets in this area.
Orders were issued for the advance to continue on the
following day. Collsiderable opposition

amounting t o some 4,500 armed and unarmed men, was
distributed between Dwa Toi and Bnngiwda.
The character of the country north of the Barari Tangi
(changes, the hills are thickly covered with scrub and bush
which afford gooil conccal~llentfor hostile snipers and prevent
accurate observnt,ion fro111 aeroplanes. The area too is much
intersected by deep, 1)recipitous ravines affording covered
mays for ally cncnly movement against tlle Bank 01 an advancing columnn. Furtfier it alq)carecl that the main body of the
lte:jh7~~r
was a t Slii~lIioni,, and that the villages between that
place and Ahm:lrimanl rclbeoccl~picctby srnall boclies of the
enemy. For llicsc rc:lsons nlid to :ivoid severe casualties
Major-Gcncral S l i c c ~ lcict:iclc?c'l.t o curry out the first stage of
the advance unclcr cover of r1:~rknesu.
011 the 1st Iqul)rlz;t~-y
ail :~tlv:~nced
Iorce 01 t;hree battalions
wi1;h a l~roportionof I'ioneere nild Salq~crsand Miners under
Brigadier-Gencl,;ll IC~~y~l-'l'l~c~~n:~.q
illovccl out horn camp at
3-1 5 A,M. just ; ~ f t c l ltlic
'
ultron h:1tl at, and advancing ill ~ 0 1 ~ m l l
of-route up the river bccl lz~ldcrclose cover of the right bank
occupimd the cliiticul~(:ou~lt~y
ovc~loolcingthe latter. Thus
two nlilev of g~*ound
l i d beell secured without the enemy '
s~spcctingthe lJTcSeJl(;Cof troops, and by daylight the piquets
on this side werc l~ri~ctically
comnpletecl. Another force of
one-and-a-half battslionb and one scc%ionof No. 27 Mountain
Battery moved out n t 1-16 n.11. to piquet the left bank of the
past " Slug 13ill " to the ground coverriver fro111 Bangi~val:~

ing Aka Khel from the north and west. Just before dawn a
small party of the enemy occupying Alca Khel village discovered this force and opening a wild and ineffective fire
fled npstream. The troops pushed on rapidly and gained
their positions without casualties. By daybreak all objectives had been secnred and were being rapidly strengthened,
thus affording especially on the right bank, a series of successive strong points against which it was hoped the enemy
would concentrate and offer good targets. This unfortunately,
did not happen, the enemy being apparently discouraged by
the loss of the strongest tactical features in the area and by
the obvious failure of Shah Daula's guns, which opening
shortly after daybreak from a position in front of a cave a t
Shin Iconr were silenced by a couple of shells from a section
of 2.75 guns in action on the Aka Ichel plateau.
The lloyal Air Borce during the clay reported the presence
of large bidies of tribesmen close to our advanced troops and
these were dealt with by the Howitzers and the 2.75 guns,
the latter using half charges with good res~~lts.The Royal
Air Force too played an important part in harassing these
hostile parties and preventing their concerted action, though
snipers continued to prove troublesome throughout the day.
This action was an excellent example of a successful surprise and of the great demoralizing effect it has on un-organized tribesmen. The approaches to the piquet positions
which were traversed in the dark were most difficult and
the success which attended the night movements shows the.
high standard of discipline and moral to which the troops
had now attained.*
During the followi~gday six permanent piqueis were
constructed and occupied preparatory to the renewal of the
advance on the 3rd February. The country waEc even more
difficult than that already traversed and Major-General
Skeen was obliged to decide on another night operation of a
more hazardous and intricate nature than the former; the
performahce of his troops, however, on the 1st February
making him confident of success.
Reports received showed that the tribesmen who had
retired towards Dwa Toi were dispersing t o their homes..
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The one~uy'soasualties in the dey'a operations more ~ll~bsorluelitly
roportod as seventy
ohiefly due to fire from the aoroplanos. Oar oasualties tvero ten lrillod including a British
offiaor and ninoteen woundecl inoluding nn Observer offioor of the R o y d Air Force.
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The considerable number of Mahsuds who had collected at;.
Shin Konr only t o witness the complete failure of the Afghan
guns and their inability to stay the advance'of the Derajat
Column, were much disheartened a.nd realised that their
hopes had been buoyed up with the false promises made them\
by their prominent mullahs and by the minor officials in
the neighbonriag Afghan districts. It appeared that the
majority of the Mahsuds had been led to believe too that
I'iaji Abdur Raziq was an accredited agent of the Amir and
that he had come empowered to effect a settlement for them
with the British, also that it was in order to give the Haji an
ollicial. status t h a t the Afghan guns had been brought from.
Wana.
It was evident from reconnaissances~)m'd intelligence
reports that although the main body of the tribesmen had
withdrawn bodies of them were still in the vicinity of Shin
Iconr village. At midnight of the 2nd/3rd February the 3rd
Guides occupied Cliff End village and
Advance t o Janjel,
tower,
followed by the 215th Gurkha Rifles,
3rd and 6th Bobruary.
who left camp a t 1 A.M. to secure Cloud
End over a mile distant. The& battalions were to be supported later by a force leaving camp a t 5 A.M. Shortly
after 1 A.M. sleet began to fall. This was accompanied
by a biting wind. By 4-30 A.M. it was apparent that,
apart from the cold, visibility and movement would be
so affected by the weather condition~ias to make operations.
impracticable. The Guides were ordered to consolidate
their positions bnt the 215th Gurkha Rifles were recalled
as they were uizdesirably far from camp although the
battalion had reached its objective with only one casualty.
These two battalions s~rfleredconsiderably from the severity
of thc cold, and all the troops unclerwent much discomfort
during the day froin tllc sn.ow and mucl. Bad weather continuccl to prevent operations from being resumed until the
5th Pcl,ruiry. On that day the advailced troops moved
out a t 1 A.M. the lnnin column leaving camp a t 5-30 A.&I.
The hcnvy rain nud show had ceased b ~ z tthe cold was very
severe ; ~ n dthe night maroll ranks as a very fine fea,t of endurance oil the part of all ranks. Not only was the temperature
25 degrccs below freezing poillt but a, stroilg bitter wind added
to their discomfort. The Tank Zarn had to bc forded many
times, and ea,ch time t,he troops emerged fro111 the river their
boots aild puttics v7ere encased iilunediately in ice. Ic'iclea
formed on the cables mhere t,hey crossed a.nd were q t r ~ ~ c k

by t h e stream, and all channels of the Tank Zam, except for
at very narrow strip of the main stream, were thickly crusted
with ice. The men working in the dark on the construction
of defences on t h e high ground had first to wrench up the
atones which Tvere frozen fast to the ground and then handle
this icy material without respite or ineans of warming themselves. In spite of the hardships so bravely endured by
the troops the operation proved a most signal success and
.ao thoroughly disheartened the enemy that he offered no
*combined opposition.
i Prominent features dominating the route were promptly
&cured by the advanced troops and the column proceeded
rapidly, concentrating a t Janjal by 5 P.M. with the loss of
:only one oasuilty during the day. On the following day a
.c,zmp was formed on a good site, on a plateau west of the
Piazha Algad and on the 7th daily staging between the latter
place and Sorarogha, a distance of nine miles, began.
The column remained a t Piazha Raghza Camp until the
14th Februarv. in order to collect a reserve
Camp a t Piazha,
of supplies dnd improve the roads to the
Saghen.
river bed. Permanent piquets were established with a loss of seven casualties u s i o ADwa Toi where
Punitive operations the Dara Toi and ~ a d d a Toi
r streams join.
.and proprations for Considerable
punitive destruction was
aclvanco to Makin.
carried out eapecially'in the villages of the
Shabi 1<hLl, much firewood being collected from t h e villages
as they were destroyed. The mueather continued very cEld
with much snow and rain and the accumulation of the reserve
of supplies was only conlpleted with considerable difficulty.
Sniping into this camp occurred almost nightly, and
occasionally into the permanent picjtret,~but for short periods
,only and with little effect. Up to this period there had been
very little sniping by night into camp and this was attributed to the fact that the tribes men realised tlzat unaimefl
lire is a waste of ammnr~nition,and that what had becn
suitable and comparatively effective with inferior weapons
is unsuitable with modern weapons when a much better
result with equal safety to the firer can be obtained by aimed
snipi~lg. Day sniping in conseqrtence had increased qnd was
redponsible for many cas~~alties,
especially during the first two
days' halt a t Palosina Camp.
On the 13th Pebrr~arynews reached the Column of the
by a piquet,
collapse a t Icotkai of a village tower occ~~pied
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which lost filteen killed and seven injured." On the following
day the 67th Brigade moved from Sorarogha to Piazha leaving
,z battalion of the 43rd Brigade at florarogha. Preparations.
for the advance on Makin were now compIete.

* Tho nccidenl was due t o excess of sandbags on a roof already wcnkened by rain.
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CHAPTER XI.

While the colunlll was ,at Piazha the tribesmen were inliorn~eclthat, as their attitude continued to be unsatisfactory,
tho original terms handed to them and all amendments thereto
were no1y uull and void, and that negotiations lor peace would
not be re-opened. until the stipulated nu~nberof tribal rifles
llacl been handed in and all fines paid in full. Further, t h a t
Makin and ICsniguram wo~zldbe destroyed unlcss a specified
number of governlllent rifles were surrendered in addition
+I)efore o w arrival in those areas. Thilis was fixed at two
h~zndreclfor Makin and two hundred for Kaniguram. During
our advance every possible facility had been given t o t h e
AIaheucls to coinply with our terms, but nothing we could do,
.and no steps we could take, would convince the tribesmen of
ttlze re:dity of our intentions.
The intense cold still continued and the troops were issued
with leather jerkins which greatly added to
Advanao t o Merobi,
(15thFobruery.
their comfort. Leaving t h e 43rd Brigade,
with its base a t Piazha Raghza to become
No. 3 Section, Lines of Commuilication Defences, the colu&n
lconsisting of :qolumn Headqnar ters.
I-Ieadquarters 67th Brigade.
2/5th Gurkha Rifles.
2)9 th Gulrkha Rifles.
4/3rd Gurkha Rifles (joined the column on 12th E'ebru"TY).

1/55th Coke's Riff es.
3rd Guides.
3/34th Sikh Pioneers.
No. 6 Mountain Battery.
No. 27 Indian Mountain Battery.
55th Field Company Sappers and Miners.
Medical and Supply and Transport Units.
commenced its advance towards Makin on t h e 15th February.
In order t o combine the protection of the left flank during
-this movenlent with the establishment of permanent piquets
protecting the route where most exposed t o attack from
IMaidan, Brigadier-General Gwyn-Thomas w i t h a force of
(
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two-and-a-half battalions and some Sappers and Miners n l o ~ ~ e d
out a t 5 A.M. and prepared and occupied permanent piquets
on the ridges, known ae " Dwa Toi E a s t " - a n d " Oxford
Circus," without opposition.
The main C O ~ I ~ Imoved
I
off ak 6 A.M. the advanced guarci
under Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Watt, D.S.O., 215th Gurkha
Rifles, moving into the narrow Dwa Toi deEle a t 7-30 A.M.
Opposition from snipers commenced a t once. These though
quickly driven back, continued t o harass the advance until
Marobi was reached and piquets had beeu established well
ahead of that place. The piquetine; troops having been uaed
u p about a mile from Dwa Toi, the main body under BrigadierGeneral Lucas, took up the task of making good the route,
and camp was formed on the Marobi spur and in two lcach
areas south-east of it, all troops and transport reaching carnp
before 4 P.M. though the operation of establishing camp piquets
was not complete till 6 P.M.*
Seven -permanent road piquets had been established on
the 15th*'i;stant ; these were completed,
Advance t o T a u d ~
garrisoned, and fully equipped under cover
16thFebruaT.
of the rearguard of the main column on
the following day during t h c advance t o Tauda China, a
distance of one and three auarter miles. The move cornrnenced a t 8 A.M. and was cordpleted by 5 P.M.
The 3/11t h Gurkha Rifles from India joined the column at
9-30 A.M. and were sent forward t o assist in securing camp.
Opposition t o the advance and t o t h e establi~hmentof camp
piquets was encountered, which resulked in casualties amounting
t o one killed and twelve wounded. The enerny,.were reported
t o have lost three killed and eight wounded. The. force
encamped on a Rag7am a few hundred yards east of the Tanda
China stream, and about two mile$ from Makin town and
less than that distance from the other villages in the area
and the cultivatio~lwhich occupied most of the extensive
valley.
0 n the 17th Februa~yadditional permanent piquets were
established and empty transport animals returned to Piazha
RagBza, At 2 P.M. about 50 Mahsuds attacked a detachment of the 4/3rd Gurkha Rifles covering parhies collecting
firewood from a dernolislied village t o the southwest of camp.
,

* Our casnnltios for {;his notion were three killed, and twenty wounded. Enemy
casualties aro stated t o have b e ~ neight killed and woundud.
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The enemy was driven off b u t a dozen of thein took r e f a g e
in a village where they put np a stout resistance-ilecessitatillg
the enlployluent of the whole battalion. The village mas
carried without many casualties but these could not be removed
owing to the accurate fire of snipers ensconced in the vicinityEvelltually it was found necessal-y t o await dusk before carrying out the withdrawal which was effected without further
incident, our casualties totalling ten killecl and thirty-seven
wounded.
As the recalcitrant tribesmen of this area had made no
P,mitive measuroein attempt to hand in the number of rifles
bhInldu area, 19th-28th demanded b y Government to be surrendered
Fobruery.
a t Makin, punitive measures began on the
19th February. hfalcin is the name given t o the whole of this
valley area up-stream of the camp a dlstance of about two-anda-half miles. This alea contains extensive cultivation consisting of well-terraced fields above which lie the town 01Malrin
and the large villages of Umar Khel, Band Ichel, and 1Nauznliai.
As a prelude t o the major operations i t was necessary
to occ~upythe prominent features of " Tree Hill " and " Split
Kill " north-west and south-west of camp respectively a n d
this was clone under cover of darkness. The success of the
ope]-ation effecting the occupation of " Tree Hill " w a s
deln ed for a while by the failure of a detachrnent of the
4/3r Gurkha Rifles to secure its objective and begin the.
~constructioaof its piquet belore daylight. Dawn found this.
detachment on a feature several hundred yards t o the east of
its objective.
This was the first and last occasion during these operations
on which a unit taking part in n i ~ h tmovements missed its
objective, and the mistake on this occasion is attributed t o
the fact that there had been no opportunity t o reconnoitre
the diilicult ravines which la,y between camp and the objective.
Th.e remainder of the force left camp a t 6 A.M. while it
was still dark and under cover of " Tree Hill " piquet aimed a t
penetrating Mnkin trusting, t o t h e enemy being unable
to concentrate in sufficient force t o take advantage of the
confined nature of the country. By 7-15 A.M. the advanced
troops were approaching the vicinity of " Tree Hill," b u t
the ground in advance of this hill proved much more difficult
than had been anticipated. To the north-west in a valley
lay fallow fields flanked on both sides by wooded spurs which
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were dominated by t h e e villages and several towers which
Were occupied by the tribesmeii.
T o clear the spurs of the enemy took time, but by 10 A.M.
t h e 3-1 l t h Gurkha Rifles were in possession of the most imp o r t a n t position and were preparing for an attack on the
easterly end of Makin. Shortly after this the enemy attacked
t h e GurkLas but were driven off with loss. As the 3111th
G u r k h a Rifles mere concentrating t o resume the attack their
f r o n t l i n e came under the fire of our howitzers which were in
action in camp. This unfortunate accident caused casualties
a n d obliged the leading companies to recoil. The evacuated
positions were seized promptly by the enemy who by heavy
fire also compelled the 219th Gurkha Rifles on the right to
fall back. A considerable time elapsed in removing our
casualties, and it mas decided that no further operations)
should b e undertalcen. Four towers were ' demolished,
several hamlets burnt, and " Hill Tree " piquet established,
a n d the troops were withdrawn to camp, which mas reached
a t a b o u t 3 P.M.:': During the following night a party of
Mahsuds bombed " Tree Hill " piquet causing four casualties,
but they themselves lost heavily from the fire of the piquet.
The operations for the 20th were intended to deal with the
villages south-west of the Dara Toi and west of the Makiu
gorge, a n d to cover the constructioll of a permanent piquet
o n " S p l i t Hill."" A force consisting oil the 1-55th Rifles and
pa c o m p a n y of Pioneers with a section of Sappers and Miners
left c a m p at 2-30 A.M. and occupied without opposition " Split
Hill " a n d a number of points covering the southern fla&
of the projected operations. Work on the " Split Hill"
piquet was progressing well when at 6-45 A. M,,while it was.
still dark, the Mahsuds attacked the covering troops. The
enemy, however, was driven off, and the piquet was established
withouf; further incident.
The main column under Brigadier-General Lucas gained
its objective by 9-40 A.M. and the work of destruction coatinued until 12-30 P.M. The advanced troops again experienced considerable hostile rifle fire from the cover of houses
alld cul-t;ivation walls which caused several casualties. The
withdrawal however, was completed by 3-30 P.M. The des-

I
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* Our cesualties for this aetion were thirty-four killed and twenty-eight woundod
Soverol p r b i e s of the enomy carno under our shell fire during the day and the tribeslnon
acknowledged a total loss of sixteen killod and thirty-eight wounded.

I

tructive work on this day included seventeen towers, one
hundred and sixty houses and a large number of retaining
walls in the fields.* The heavy losses suffered by our troops
during these two days showed clearly that
Losses from snipers.
the destruction of a frontier village is a
much more dangerous operation than it used to be in frontier
expditions. A very much larger number of troops must be
employed t o keep the tribesmen a t a distance from the scene
of destruction. The villages are generally situated in open
spaces surrounded by high roclzty hills thickly covered with
undergrowth affording ideal cover for snipers whose accurate
fire a t known ranges is concentrated on the troops working in
t h e villages and takes a steady toll.
Tinle therefore is a most important factor in this type of
operation. Towers should be demolished as soon as prepared
and any attempt t o obtain a spectacular effect should be
repressed, b u t no house should be fired without express orders
as the dense smoke emitted is liable to interrupt communicationBnd mutual support of bodies of troops, and also to hinder
t h e essential artillery support during the withdrawal. Should
it appear likely that the retirement will be pressed, signals
by Very lights denoting periiission t o begin firing the village
can be employed with good effect.
On the 21st Pebruary the Umar IChel sectionof the BahlolSotLlcmont by Umar zai living on the right bank of the Dara
Khel section t o save Toi sent in a deputation which offered to,
thoir proporty.
surrender immediately twelve Government
rifles on condition their property was spared from further
destruction. The deputation also promised that no sniping
would take place from their area. This offer was accepted
by Major-General Climo who was visiting the column.
PartIy t o test the value of the Umar Khel undertaking,
and partly t o cover the re-victualling of the piquets, two-anda-half battalions and two howitzers proceeded on the 21st to
Split Hill " to destory some prominent towers in the Makin
gorge by shell fire. At t h e same time a small party covered
the re-victualling of " Tree Hill " piquet. There were no
casualties and the Umar Khel fulfilled their agreement. On
this day Marobi, t h e villageof the recalciDestruction Of Marobi, trant Mullah Pazl Din and of his notorious
21st Bebruary.
. father Mullah Powindah was razed to the

* Our casuaItics were twenty-seven killed and aixty-three wounded, The onemg
:l ossou were aeknowIedged a5 six killed and ten sevorely wounded.

t h e mosque only being spared. This was the village
so many plots involving the murder of British officials
in
had been hatched, and i t was hoped that the destruction of
would break permanently the temporal power of a
the
relentless enemy to Government.
On t h e 23rd February operations were resumed against
tile Makin villages OD the left bank of the Dara Toi. The
Ulnar I(hel villages and fields held no snipers, and within two
hours all preparation for the withdrawal having been made
t h e villages were set on fire. The withdrawal was carried
o u t without untoward incident, our casualties amounting to
five killed. a n d seven wounded. The two following days were
also employed in carrying on the work of destruction with
small loss t o o~zrselves.
On t h e 27th an imposing tower known as " Eddystone "
standing o n a prominent and imposing bluff at the very junc&ionof the Upper Darn Toi and the Dashkai Algad, was destroyed b y howitzer fire a t a range of 4,700 yards with an
expenditure of t e n shells only.
On t h e following day all remaining towers in sight except
those belonging to the Umar Rhel were levelled to the ground
by gunfire, t h u s bringing the total destruction in this area up
t o 51 towers a u d about 450 important houses. The villages
i11 the Makin gorge were not visited by the column. The
steep crags a n d slopes in the gorge overlook every move in
t h e advance t o this area, and the troops operating in the
villages .mould have been exposed to snipers at ranges of
f r o m three hundred yards upwards, and judging by previous
experiences i t was decided that the results to be obtained
would not justify the heavy losses the operation mould entail.
During t h e first f ew days our troops sustained over two hundred
casualties b u t after that opposition decreased to such an
e x t e n t t h a t we only had some twenty casualties during the
l a s t two days.
It was decided to evacuate Makin area on the 1st March
and to advance on Kaniguxam, which we had told the tribesm e n we intended to do in the event of their not complying
w i t h our terms. On the 29th February the preliminary
arrangements for the withdrawal f~ornthe Malrin area were
s e t in motion.
The 3111th Gurkha Rifles.
3134th Sikh Pioneers.
1 section 27th Mountain Battery
K '1

proceeded t o Marobi to pass up camel transport required f o r
the column to return the surplus stores to Piasha, a n d to
arrange for the rednction of the stores in permanent p i q u e t s
near Marobi. Similar steps were taken at Tanda China camp.
Several permanent piquets had been established well
forward to facilitate the daily operations against MaBill and
the withdrawal of these piquets, especially " Tree Hill " and
" Split Hill " was a difficult problem. It was undesirable t o
disclose our intention to withdraw by
Evacuation of Makin.
removing the piquets previously, and a
withdrawal by daylight on the 1st March would have added
t ~ miles
~ o t o a withdrawal which it was anticipated, w o u l d
be followed up close1 by aD exasperated enemy. M a j o r
General Slceen decideB that these forward piquets s h o u l d
withdraw after the moon had set, about 2 A.M., trusting t o
darkness for immunity. Shortly before nightfall o n t h e
29th February the " Tree Hill" piquet reported one man
killed hnd another wounded by snipers between the p i q u e t
andthe camp, and later signalled that it expected difficulty
in withdrawing to camp. It was too late to despatch a party
to evacuate the casualties. " Split Hill " piquet; also reported
enemy in the vicinity of its proposed line of retreat. Portunately the piquet comnianders had studied the g r o u n d
carefully andwere able to effectthe withdrawal of their p i q u e t s
a t t h e appointed hour and without casualty. These y o u n g
British officers in command and their men showed great courage
and skill in carrying out a movement fraught with grave risk
and in a situation in which every condition was against t h e m .
In the meantime a t 5-50 A.M. two detachments of o n e
battalion each, moved off t o take up positions covering t h e
flanks of t h e route to Dwa Toi, the advanced guard following
a t 6-15 A.M. with artillery to take up successive positions t o
cover the withdrawal from the camp. All transport was
loaded in the dark and using all roads was clear of canip by
daylight. The infantry had by this tiine'occupied a series
of positions and the withdrawal of the camp piquets began.
Some Mahsuds were seen to enter " Split Hill " piquet, w h e r e
a " booby " trap was reported later t o have accounted f o r
four.
The withdrawal which had provcd a great surprise t o t h e >
tribesmen was not pressed except during the evacuation of a
caiup piquet on the right badc of t h e stream, where t h e e n e m y
succeeded in working down t h e river bed and firing a t c l o s e
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range on the piquet during its withdrawal. The troops
sllpporting the wibhdrawal of this pi.quet were too far out of
rnilge to afford this patty any nseful assistance. The piquet
lost 2 killed and six prisoners ; the latter, Punj abi Mussnlmans
were released eventually by the lKahsnds a.nd rejoined their
unit a t Dwa Toi.'!:
The enemy followed UP the withdrawal to within a mile
of AIarobi frequently coming under the fire of guns and aeroplanes.
The Column encamped i n the afternoon on cultivation at
Dwa Toi and the empty animals of the second line transport
were sent to Piazha.
Our casualties on this day were four killed and one wounded.
'The enemy losses were reported subsequently as twenty-eight
killed and a number severely wounded, chiefly due to gun
nncl aeroplane fire while searching for food and loot on the
dcserted camping ground.
This action by t h e eslemy had been anticipated, and several
" booby " traps were arranged, the principal being a sham
grave co~tainjnga charge of fifty pounds of guncotton. This
trap caused eight cas~zaltiesof whom seven were blown to
pieces.
To supiort the withd~*awal
of the column from Makin the
43rd Brigade under Brigadier-General
Propnmtions for adGwyn-Thomas had moved out from Piazha
+vnnooon liiznigurnm.
a n d constructed and occupied two perrnanent p i q ~ ~ eon
t s the right and left baak of the Baddar Toi,
upstreani of Dwa Toi camp. The next few days were
employed in the construction of piquets up the valley of
t h e Baddar Toi as a preliminary step to the advance of
the column to Kaniguram. These picpets were not completed without casualties from enemy snipers concealed 011
the hillsides, which a r e comp arativcly thickly covered with
vsmall trees affording excellent opportunities, as the cover
i s sufficient to protect the snipers from view, while insuffi.cient to lllvit their range of vision. The most effectual
method of dealipg with enemy snipers was to detail especially intelligent men to stalk or fire a t likely places.
Although enemy snipers may not have been killed in this
3nanner they were certainly driven off. The use of rifle
*These mon were court-martiallad and sentenced to death for oowardice, but the
ocntonccs were commutod t o one of throe years' imprisonment.

'
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grenades too proved very useful in clearing wooded c o u n t r y
of snipers.
On the 29th February while the column was a t
China camp, some Mahsud representatives
Surrender of rifles t o signified their intention of surrendering t b s
snvo ICsniguram.
rifles demanded to ensure the ilnmullity of
IZanigurzlm from destruction. The total handed in however,
amounted t o 103 Govermlicnt rifles, 113 tribal rifles and:
about Rs. 2,400. Some iiity cl t'Lc Government rifles w e r e
without bolts, and many without magazines. As the numbers
were below the specified number, the waliks were informed
they might withdrhw the rifles and that the march t o Kaniglzram would begin. The headmen however, referred t o
leave them in our possession and promised to renew their
efforts to collect the balance. On the 2nd inlormation was
received that the ?'"ahsuds had given up hope of effecting,
the surrender of t1.e necessary rifles and had dispersed t o t h e i r
homes.
The difficulties that beset the maliks in
Dificullioq of Malilts
j n collecting rifles.
their efforts to collect the rifles were(a) In many cases an individual was in possession of 3
or 4 government rifles and although willing tosurrender one wished to keep the remainder or be
paid compensation for them.
(b) in many cases a rifle was held conjointly by some
ten men, some of these belonging to the peace a n d
others t o the war party.
(c) many rifles had been buried and their possession
cencealed. In addition to this there was the f e a r
of the tribesman that the full numbers not being,
forthcoming l i s individual sacrifice might be' in,
vain.
The advance towards Iianig~ra~11.1began a t 5-30 A.M.
on the 3rd March, the advanced guard*
to
consisting of two battalions and a . section
3rd &Inroh.
of guns with a proportion of Pioneers a n d
Sappers and Miners. These technical troops were to assist.
in the construction of the five permallent piquets which reconnaissance had shown to be necessary.
Shortly before dawn the enemy hiddan in the roolcy a n d
bush-covered slopes on the right bank
See panorama NO. G.
opened a heavy b e on the leading trbops,
who however steadily pushed on up the nala bed a n d
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secured " The Dam ", a spur from the Maidan plateau projecting between the Baddar Toi and the Maidan Algad.
The able handling of the advanced guard secured for the
column the series of rocky bluffs commandiilg the roube at
short range wlich on account of their ruggedness and steep
bush-oovered slopes made this portion of the route the most
d~fficultof the whole series of the tangis traversed by the
column since leaving Jandola.
Heavy hostile fire from the right bad1 continued to enfilade
the troops occupying " The Dam " to which position a section
of guns had been ordered. Fortunately a t this time the
howitzers came into action in the river under cover, and'
searched the wooded hills very thoroughly with their fire.
Under cover of this fire the section was enabled to get into
action without a casualty, and as soon as the detachments
were established belind their shields in action the hillsides
were sprayed with shrapnel. The enemy having been thus
driven off the advance was resumed. The column encamped
on the cultivation below Ladha, and nearly all the camel.
transport was passed back t o Piazha to bring up supplies the
next day.*
It was evident that the heart had gone out of the Mahsuds
and that it was now most unlikely that any large Zashka~
would again take the field. Haji Abdur Raziq and Shah
Daula had moved to Shakai and had taken with them the
Afghan guns. All that could be anticipated from the tribesmen was occasional sniping in the defence of particular
i.
villages or localities.
:
,
-

As a precaution against interruption by the weather or the
enemy, and to control the upper exit of the defiles near the
Dam, a strong point was constructed on the site of the present
Ladha Camp. On the 4th and 5th March the troops were
employed in constructing two camel tracks to avoid the impassable tangi near Paiozar village, three quarters of a
mile upstream. The permanent piquets named " Prospect "
and " Clubhouse" were also established.
The 3rd Guides having takcn over the Ladha Strong point
alld the permauent piquets in thls area
Column arrives ICanith"e column resumed the advance to Kanigurem, 6th Maroh.
guram on the 6th March. Permanelit

* Our oasulties on this day were, one killed end nine wounded.

I
.

piquets were established egz mute and the column encamped
about 800 yards east of Icauiguram. Little opposition was
cencountered but accurate sniping caused us a loss of
thirteen men while establishing piquets in the area north-west
'of the town.
Icanigurarn is, properly speaking, the only town in Mahsud
country. Although the inhabitants are principally Urmars
i t is regarded as the capital of the country. The town is
built i n terraces on the south side of a steep spur about a mile
in length flanking the left banlr of the Baddar Toi, and consists of about one thousand Houses and five towers. I t is
t h e chief commercial centre of the country and contains a fairly large bazaar, seve~alrifle and knife factories. Here all
importaut Mahsnd national assemblies take place at the
,expense of the Urlnars who, traditioil demands, shoulcl
provide free entertaiument for their hungry guests.
On the following dap a deputation of prominent Urmars
visited the camp ancl annouacecl that the
ALLitudo of &Iahsuds.
Mahsuds had failed to collect tho rifles
necessary t o save Icaniguram aud that they did not inteiid
t o take ally further action in the matter. This obduracy of
the tribesnlelz is a t first sight difficultt o expl ain. Our demands
were not excessive and the Mahsnds had had ample time to
demanded, il: they had wished
collect double the n~~inbers
to do so. It can only be concluded therefore that the situation was dne t o the results of former policies when terms were
a matter of mutual co~cessio~is
and anything in the nature
of insistence or full compliance with original terms was unlrnown. The childish subterfuges of trying to pass unserviceable rifles or parts of rifles and of producing half the numbers
demanded shoved that the tribe had been educated for so long
in the art of mutual concessions that it was unable to realize
the fact that Government was determined on this occasion
t o obtain a complete submission.
The Mahsuds had suffered heavy casualties and much
destruction of their property had taken place, but these
punishments failed t o coerce the tribe into accepting o w
terms, and no destruction could colvpensate adequately for
this failure. It appeared, therefore, that this coercion could
110e be attained witlzout a prolonged sthy in the country as
it was impossible t o force this tribe of umudy and obdurate
ind~viduals,recognizing ao responsible leaders and no form
of organized government, t o make any engagements, or t o
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keep such promises if made, once the troops had leit the .
country. Under these new conditions the destruction of th2
amenities or of the resources of the country seemed inadvisable
.as they might be required for ourselves. The opportuiiity
was therefore taken t o give the tribesmen a further extension
of time in which to comply with our demands.
During the stay of the Column a t Icaniguram the Mahsuds
gave little trouble, and much useful survey worlr was
complgted. The weather however, was most unsettled and
heavy snow falling on the 12th and the 13th caused
interruption to convoys a n d great discomfort to the troops
and animals. On the 18th during a terrific thunderstorm
two sentries were struclr b y lightning, and severely injured.
Most of the tribes n o v began t o make genuine efforts to
collect and pay in their shares of the fine and their proportion of tribal and Government rifles, but certain sections,
especially those farther removed from our line of advance,
made little or no effort. The worst oflenders were the inhabitants of the upper valleys of the Baddar Toi who
believed themselves out of reach of our troops.
These people were well known recalcitrants and, as no
troops had ~ e n e t r a t e dinto their country
Punitive operations
z ~ pBaddar Toi,~th-8th for many years i t was decided t o punish
April.
them. kccordingly a force. composed of
detachments from all units numbering 6 guns and 2,620 riflei
with 2,000 transport animals moved from the new camp
near Earon on thc 6th April and advanced up the Baddar
'Toi. No opposition was encountered during the march but
on forming camp at Sine Tizha about 4 P.M., sniping began,
causing tmo casualties. The day's operations included the
destruction of two towers a t Meao Tsilai and the villages
and towers of Sine Tizha.
On the following day the Column continued its advance
to Giga Khel with the object of carrying
See .panorema Nos. 7
out punitive measures aqainst the vi1Jarr;es
L 8 at end of book.
and property of the Abdur Rahman Rhel
in that area. The towers were demolishedin spite of.opposition
and the troops began t o withdraw. The retirement was
followed LIP by some three hundred tribesmen who met with
little success except against a small party of the 4131-dGurkha
Rifles which descending into a ravine, found itself delayed by
a waterfall, and was overwhelmed. This incident besides
showing a lack of previous reconnaissance and the danger

*
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of using a nala as a line of retirement dernoilstrates the
fact that ravines are more dangerous than ever since the
tribesman possibly to avoid gunfire, uses thein to cover his
pursuit of a retiring piquet. The troops were all in camp by
4 P.M., our casualties during the clay being tcn killed a i d
twenty-nine mounded. The enemy principally Wazirs from
Shakai lost approximateiy the same number.
The withdrawal t o I<aniguram began at 6-45 A.M. on the
8th April and mas Iollowcd up by about one hundred' oI the
enemy. These a t first contented themselves with long range
sniping but later a determillecl attack was pressed down the
Baddar Toi and caused a few 'casualties to the rear parties.
The Coluinll was back in Icaniguram at 5 F.M. losing this day
five killed and fourteen wc~mded.
The operations in the Baddar Toi valley closed the active
work of the Deraiat Column. After a
Activo
oporationa
sixteen-foot road graded to suit Mechaniconso, 7th May.
cal Transport had been constructed from
Kaniguram to Ladha, the wkole column concelltrated a t the
latter place and begailn then the construction of a permanent
camp.
As all resistance 'had prackically ceased and our troops
were unmolested, it was decided to reduce the garrison at
Ladha t o one Infantry Brigade with a battery of artillery, a
field company of Sappers and Miners and a Pioneer battalion.
Similarly a reduction was effected in the garrisons of permanent piquets ; thus affording opportunities of better training
and permitting the larger posts t o send out strong patrols,
and assume the spirit of aggression. The ambushes and
offensive measures adopted by the posts on the Lines of Communication were meeting with success, and there was a
genecal feeling of apprehension and uneasiness among the
tribesmen. Alarms, generally ill-founded, were constantly
raised among them of projected night incursions by our troops
in various directions.
The Headquarters oi the Derajat Column were dispersed
on the 7th May and their dispersal brought the operations
to an end. Thus ended a Frontier campaign of unparalleled
hard fighting and severity. The enemy fought with a determination and courage which has rarely, if ever, been encountered by our troops in similar operations. The character of
,
with trying and arduous climatic condithe t e ~ r a i n combined
tions, alone presented difficulties before which the most

PLATE NO. 28,
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seasoned troops might well have hesitated. The resistance
oi the enemy was broken, and the difficulties successfully
overconie by a force colnposed almost entirely of young Indian.
t~oops. No British tioops except for the Royal Air Force,
and a British Battery of bIountain Artillery were employed.
This f a c t has without doubt, considerably raised the prestige
of the Indian Army on the Frontier and increased the esprit.
de-corps of the troops engaged.

in
CHAPTER XII.

The chief lesson of the cainpaign of 1919-1920 is that
:although a force may be equipped with the most modern
weapons and appliances it cannot command success unless
its men are well trained and its officerslead them in accordance
v i t h the time-hoao~~red
and proved principles of war as record.ed in our regulations. Powerful modern weapons clemand a
higher standard of iatelliger~cein their employment and a
al
higher staudard of technical efficiency in their a c t ~ ~ use
than OLX troops had been trained up to before their introd~~ction. P ~ ~ r t h eitr must
,
be recognized that the rifle and bayonet
are the sheet anchor of the infailtrymap and t h a t all other
weaponsare merely ansilliary to these two. Partially, or
badly, trailled troops are apt to place undue reliance on these
subsidiary weapons, even tliough they are far from expert
in their use, t o the detriment, i n time of emergency, of the
proper
handling of their maill weapon-the rifle.
- I11 the initiil stages of the campaign the training of the
infantry left m ~ ~ ctoh be desired. The special faults which
led to ineffective operations and undue casualties are not
new or peculiar to these operations. First and forenlost tbere
was a lack of confidence in the rifle, and pover to use it efficieiitly. Although there mere many instances of hand-tohand fighting examples of the proper nse of the bayonet mere
few and far between. The fire discipline was bad, resulting
in poor fire effect and a waste of ammunition. The use of
agro~~nd
and preparation of cover was not properly understood and in many cases neither officers nor men were sufli,ciently trained in this important respect. I n time however,
these difficulties mere overcome, and the infantry were trained
t o be keen and alert, ready t o apply effective fire to any
-target which presented itself. As had been noted in many
former campaigns the chief requirements for an eEcient "
irzlaiitryrnan are physical and mental fitness, keen eyesight,
supreme confidence in his rifle and bayonet, and ability to
.obtain cover quickly, i.e., sangar making.
I11 operations against mobile and energetic tribesmen
.especially, t h e following very important principle enunciated
in " Ilifantry Training " m ~ ~bes tobserved :
( 146
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" The early opening of fire discoufits surprise and, whether
in attack or defence, often indicates the position of troops
which would otherwise be unnoticed by the enemy." Rapid
fire in Frontier Warfare should be the exception rather than
the rule. The rifleman should depend on deliberate aimed
fire, determined to place bullets very close to %he spot he
wishes t o hit. Trained observers are indispensable not only
to watch the effect of fire but to keep all ground under continuous 'observation, so that the slightest indication of the
presence of a hostile marksman shall not be missed. For
volume of fire and covering and surl~risefire we should depend chiefly on machine and Lewis Guns.
It cannot be impressed too strongly on young units and
young soldiers that wild firing by day or night is one of the.
indications whereby the tribesmen gauge the moral, physical
and professional standard of our troops. It is against units
with indifferent day and night fire discipline that they pre-pare their more elaborate surprises.
Training in loading and h i n g with a minimum of exposure
and a maximum of accuracy uphill and down hill, round and
over cover, and from among rocks and boulders are some of
the chief essentials for the preparation of riflemen for fighting
among mountains.
Two tactical modifications of previous practice were introduced with great success-Night advances and permanent
piquets. Night advances were adopted in order to avoid.
the casualties which must have been i.ncurred during daylight
in gaining unusually difficult ground commanclecl by wellarmed tribes-men, and also to use to the best advantage the
short hours of daylight. Prior to these operations movement
of troops by night was deprecated because i t gave away ouradvantage of armament and discipline. The enemy's armament a s regards t h e rifle being equal, and his use in it superior
t o t h a t of our troops these advantages passed away from us.
The advantages we gained therefore by night movement
were :(a) the enemy was denied the full value from his rifle,
and he disclosed his numbers and positions if he.
used it before daylight.
(b) the bewildering effect. 011 an unorganized enemy,
whose lack of discipline prevented adequate piquets
to watch our movements especially a t night and.
.during cold.

+

(c) th6 enemy was frequently forestalled in the occupation

of important tactical points.
.The system of protecting t h e Lines of Communication by
-permanent piquets had the most gratifying r e s ~ ~ l and
t s it is
interesting to record that throughout the operations losses by
enemy action i n convoys did not exceed 26 animals. This
is a remarkable result in view of the length of the Lines of
Cornln~~nication
and of the very diEcult country through
which they passed.
The system has justified its institution by giving us the
following advantages :(a) its avoidance of daily encounters t o secure the march
of t h e daily convoy ; encounters which are eertain
t o be costly with an enemy armed with a highvelocity rifle.
(b) it avoids fatigue to t h e troops in scaling difficult
heights.
(c) if well organized this systeni is lcss expensive in the
employment of troops than the daily establishment
of both inner and outer lines of protection.
(d) these p i q ~ ~ e t scommand the main route which
usually passes through the richest part of the
country, and thus form a n effective and constant
threat to the inhabitants.
(e) it prevents all communication between separated
portions of the country except during the hours
of clarkness, and even this can be made dangerous
by the use of ambushes or offensive patrols from
the larger p i q ~ ~ e t s .
The dangers of the system are obvious and should be
avercome by careful instruction and supervision t o prevent
the occurrence of regrettable incidents.
It may be possible in the fi~tureagainst a less enterprising
and less courageous tribe than the Mahsuds t o revert to
longer daily advances protected by temporary day piquets.
I n the campaign herein described short marches and the
ts
our losses t o an extent
presence of permanent p i q ~ ~ ecurtailed
difficult t o estimate. In connection with permanent piquets
the earliest s%eps should be talcen t o reduce the original
strength t o the lowcst limits ; this becomes feasible by the
.artificial strengthening of the position occupied by every means
. -possible.
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The principle of daily and nightly variation in the systelll
of protection of camps, routes, etc., cannot
Tuctics to lnyatify
be
known too widely : by its adoption
cnomy.
troops are economised, longer periods of
rest enswed and the tribesmen kept in a state of u~icertainty.
In the case of a camp t h e principle is attained by providing eight inlying piquets one night, four the next night,
six'the third night, 3 or 4 the following night and so on, patrols
round the inside of the perimeter being employed on the
night when less than the maximum protection is provided.
I n the case of a Mechanical Transport road, the first clay
xnay consist of maximum protection by piquets, arinoured
cars and Lewis Guns and Pord vans, the second day p~rties
of Cavalry a n d Ford Vans, t h e third day armourecl cars and
Bord Vans and so on.
It is well known that the tribesmen, before carrying out :i
r o a d raid, study the conditions for some days, and-if there is
110 variation i n the protection they very sooil determine where
t h e weak point or points are. Daily change of protection
leaves the tribesnlen guessing and. that is the state of rliind
w e desire t o induce.
Until the last two months of t)e campaign the conntry
occupied belonged t o us by day, but after
~mbush~s.
dark the tribesmen were at libel-ty t o roam
at their will. This has been the history of all occ~lpationsof
fkontier territory. I n March both in the Tochi and in the
T a k k i Zam commanders of defence troops on the Lines of
Communication were encouraged to lay ambuscades at night
b o t h on a large and small scale, Eventually there ensued a
f a i r degree of friendly rivalry between adjacent camps. The
results wcre. very gratifying and were much beyond expectation. The tribesmen became apprehensive of night incursions
a n d moved with much less freedom than heretofore, It is
n o t too much t o state that he became the raided instead of
t h e raider.
To demonstrate the iin~~ossiblc
situations which arise during
transition
from
peace t o mar, the followiug
Command and staff.
examples are given. The General Officer
Commanding Bannu Brigade a t Dardoni, with his cornnl~~nications cut except for wireless, was constantly beiiig appedcd
t o by the Civil Authorities and referred to by the Bnrnlu
Military Authorities t o deal with incursions of tribesman in
t h e back areas. Similarly t h e General Officer Con~rna~lcling

Derajat Brigade at Ichirgi mas endeavourillg to control t h e
area in his rear which is roughly 60 iniles in width and 100
uules in length. Both of these commanders were deeply
engrossed with the situation in their immediate neighbourhood and should have been free t o attend to thcsc matters only.
This condition of affairs can be obviated by suitable cornmand
and staff arrangements in peace time : the institution of admiilistrative commandants at Dera Ismail Khan and Barinu,
ill touch with local conditions and requiremendis, would serve
the purpose. On the necessity arising for the General Offreer
Comizlallding and- his staff to take the field, the Adminis-.
trative, Commandant is ready on the spot to deal with administrative and defence questions on the Lines of C ~ m i ~ u n i c s t i o ~ ,
while the General Officer Commanding on moving forward
has the satisfaction of knowing he has left these matters i n
colupetent hands.
Por the first time in the history of the North-West Frontier,
aeroplanes were employed extensively against the tribes.
The aeroplanes used were Bristol Fighters, D. 3-1.9. A's a n d
D. E, lo's. It is impossible to overestimate the value of
aircraft in tactical co-operation with other arms. Their
presence alone greatly raised the moral of our troops while
correspondingly decreasing that of the enemy. In order t o
obtain the full value of this important factor it is very
necessary t h a t the officers of the Royal Air Force should
be well acquainted with the principles of Infantry tactics,
and of land formations especially those employed in
Mountain warfare. Communication between ground and t h e *
aeroplalles in the air is essential if the fullest co-operation
is to be gained. The Popham panel was found to have
little value for the purpose. The positions of our troops
were indicated by ground strips, b u t these sometimes fell
into the hands of the enemy. Aeroplanes, when thus employed in tactical co-operation did considerable damage
and helped in no small measare towards the success of many
of the actions.
The information obtained from air photographs both
vertical and oblique was of great tactical and topographical
value, a,nd officers of the land forces would find their la,bobr
Plates NOS. 30 and 31.
well repaid if they undertook the study of
this important auxiliary to the art of tactics. The study should however, be supplemented by training in observation from the air. On the other hand t h e
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results from bombing and tactical reconnaissance did not
fulfil expectations. This was largely due to the nature of
the country and the skill with whch the tribesmen concealed

themselves.
The new 3.7-inch howitzer was used with considerable.
effect b u t the special conditions of Brontier warfare show that,
t o obtain its uihxiinuin usefulness it must be associated with a.
direct quick-firing weapon. This may be a mountain gun
or the Vicliers machine gun. The latter, however, was not,
available mrit,h the Force. The Lewis gun. was used in its
place o n occnsion but it cannot be maintained that this is
the proper role af this weapon. The Lewis gun is essentially
a short-range weapon, whereas, what is required is accurate.
fire effect a t inediunl and long rifle range.
Throughout the whole Force special attention was paid to.
the 11roblenlof sanit,at,ioaand the nzaintenailce of a pure water.
supply. T o the effort,s of the medical officers and the hearty
co-ol~erat~ic~i~
of all raillis is due the remarlcable results achieved
and t,hc inlnltulity of the Force from the disorders that caused
the heavy casua.lties illcurred during the operations of 1917.

APPENDIX A.
ORDER OF BATTLE.

SOUTHWAZIRISTAN
BIELDFORCE
1917.
Conzmander :-Major

General W. G. L. Beynon, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.

1
1I
1.'
11
So
2-1

Divisional Headquai%ers.
Headquarters Section, No. 38 Divisional Signal Company.
1 Pack Wireless Set No. 3 (Wireless) Signal Squadron.
1Troop, 11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse).
4 3 BRIGADE.
~ ~
Brigade Section, No. 38 Divisioilal Signal Company.
& Squadron, 11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse).
2 Sections, 30t6 Mountain Battery.
1Section, 1st Mountain Battery.
No. 7 Company, 1st King George's Own Sappers and Miners.
1-25th (County of London) Battalion, the London Regiment.
54th Sikhs (E'roatier Force).
1st Rifles Regiment (Nepalese Coatingent).
Brigade Supply Column.
4 . 5 BRIGADE.
~~
Brigade Section No. 38, Divisioi~alSignal Company.
3 Squadron, 11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse).
23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery (Frontier Force).
No. 11 Company, 2nd Queen Victoria's Own Sappers and Miners.
,2-6th Battalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment.
55th Coke's Rifles (Froi~tierForce).
2-1st Icing George's Own Gurkha Rifles (The Mnlaun Regiment).
Mahindradal Regiment (Nepalese Coatingent).
Brigade Supply Column.
DEFENCES.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
1Wagon Wireless Set, No. 3 (Wireless) Signal Squadron.
1Pack Wireless Set No. 3 (Wireless) Signal Squadron.
1 Squadron, Alwar Lancers.
'21st Punjabis.
46th Punjabis.
1-94th Russell's Infantry.
1-107th Pioneers.

.
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Wiig 1-124th Duchess of Connaught's Own Baluchistan Infantry.
127th Queen Mary's Own Baluch Light Infantry.
Brigade Section, No. 38, Divisional Signal Company.
OUTPOSTS.
1Pack Wireless Set, No. 3 (Wireless Signal Scluadron).
1Seeti011 30th Mountain Battery.
1-4th Gurkha Rifles.
Samakai.
,
11th Rajputs.
South Waziristan Militia.
I
247th Punjabis
8011thWaziristan Militia IKhajusi Each.
W$ 2-67th Punjabis
South Waziristan Militia
South Waziristan Militia, Other Gomal Posts.
2 Sections, No. 154 Indian Bield Ambulance
No. 25 Combined Field Ambulance (less 1 British 43rd B~ignde.
Section).
J
2 Sections No. 2 Amalgamated Field Ambulance
145th Brigade.
1 British Section, No. ,25 Combined Field Ambulance
I

,

3

MEDIOALUNITS.

!
:

1Indian Section No. 12 Combined Field Ambulance
1Section No. 149 Indian Field Ambulance
1 Section No. 2 Amalgamated Field Ambulance
'1 British Section No. 5 Amalgamated Eeld Ambu-

lance.
Lines of Com1Indian Section No. 27 Combined Pield Ambui iance.
I
1British Section, No. 27 Combined Field Ambulance In resprve,
1
1Indian Section, No. 27 Combined Field Ambulance
No. 17 Combined Clearing EIospital, Jandola.
'
1 Section No. 2 Amalgamated Field Ambulance, Samakai.

1

'

1

APPENDIX B.
ORDER OF BATTLE.

DiwisiofzaZ Headquarters.
Divisioilal Headquarters.
' Headquarters Section Divisioilal Sigpd Company.
1Wireless Station.
1Troop, 11th Lancers.

% Squadron, l l t h Lancers.
2 Sectioils 30th Mountain Battery.
1 Section, 1st Mountaii~Battery.
7th Coinpany Sappers.
1-25th Londons.
54th Silrhs.
1st Nepalese.
Brigade Section Divisional Signal Company;.
Brigade Supply Column.

45th Brigade.

4 Squadron l l t h Lancers.

1

23rd Mountain Battery.
l l t h Company, Sappers.
2-6th Sussex.
55th Rifles.
2-1st Gurkhas.
Mahindradal Regiment ( ~ e ~ a l e s e ) .
Brigade Section Divisional Signal Company.
Brigade Supply Colu~ml.

General BaZdwiy's Brigade.
1Squadron Alwar Lancers
94th I ~ ~ f a i ~ t r y
Illdial1 Base DepBt
Tank.
1. Wireless Station
J
Wing 124th Baluchis, Khigi.

i'

(
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Qarrisoned by Frontier Constabulary, Zsm.
46tli Punjabis
Jandola.
107th Pioneers
1Wireless Station
21st Punjabis
Advanced 4. pf C.
127th Baluchis
posts.
Brigade Section Divisional Signal Comp,any
Under DiuisiofiaE Headquarters,Base, Dera Ismail Iihan.
1Plight Royal Flying Corps DepSt, DepBt and Details, Tank.

3

1

Outposts.
456 South Waziristan Militia, Wana.
25 South Waziristan Militia, Tiarza,
25 South Waziristan Militia, Karsb Rot.
-71 South Waziristan Militia, Tanai.
.25 South Waxiristan Militia, Dargai Oba.
.44 South Waziristall Militia, Toi Khulia.
1-4th Gurkhas
1
l l t h Rajputs.
I)8arwalrai.
1 Section, 30th M ~ ~ u n t aBattery
in
1Wireless Station
186 South Waziristan Militia
Wing 2437th Punjabis
IIXhajuri
Each.
q6G South Waziristan Militia
Wing 247th Punjabis
2 Soutb Waziristan Militia ] ~ i l iKach.
56 Sonth Waziristan Militia, Spinkai.
35 South Waziristan Militia, Khuzma.
30 South Waziristan militia, Torrnandu.
2 0 South Waziristan Militia, Madhassan.
80 South Waziristan Militia; Muxtaza.
40 South Waziristan Militia, Jatta.
.66South Waziristan Militia, Girni.
1Troop Alwar Lancers, Rathala.
1 Troop Almar Lancers Potah.
2 Troops, l l t h Lancers, Draband.

1

Medical U d s .
:2Sections No. 154 I. P. A.
.25 C. P. A. (less 1British Section)
1British Section, No. 25 C. B. A.
1Indian Section, No. 12 C. I?. A.
1Section No. 149 I. P:A.
I Section No. 2 A. I?. A.
'1British Section No. 5 A. I?. A.
1Indian Section No, 27 C. 3'. A.

)43rd Brigade. :

1J 4ith

Brigade.ql!

Lines of Communication,

1 British Section No. 27. C. F. A.
1Indian Section No. 27 C. F. A.
No. 17 C. C.E., Jandola.
1 Section No. 2 A. P. A., Sarwalrai.
Base, Dera Ismail B a n .
Suitable cases to be evacuated from the General Hospitals
Rawalpindi as quickly as possible.

tcp

STATEMENT
SHOWING

CASUALTIES F R O M

~ O T H MAY TO 1 5 JULY
~ ~1417,

B Y UNITS.

1

Units.

Wcst Surreys
2-0th sussex
1-25tlllondons
1lthLancers

British
~fimra.

(

Indian
0lfiee~3.

1

n"n's,

.
. .
. .
. .
,

23rd Hountnin Battery
30th Mountain Buttery

. .
. ,
. .
66th Rifles .
2-07thPunjnbls .
.
IlthRnjputs

64th Silrhs

7211dPunjabis
84thInfantry
107thPioaeers
124th Infantry
127thInfantry
1st Ncpalcsc

. .
. .

. .
. .

.
.

.
.

Mntlindradal Regiment.
2-1st Gurlillas
1-4th Gurkhas

. .
. .

S u p l y nnd Transport
Lorps.

A. B. Corps.
Cooly Corps

.
.

..

. 1 ....
aTofe.K. Killed.
W. Wounded.
11. Nissing.
D. Dicd of disenso.
* Accidentnl.
t Ward Orderly.
Includcs 2 grisoncrs.

Pollowers.

APPENDIX D.

Bnmu Area.

BANNU31st D. C. 0. Lancers (less 1 Squadron).
1Sec. 6.3 R. M.L. guns.
1 Section 33rd Indian Mountain Battery.
1-103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
3-6th Gurlrha Rifles.
Nos. 5 & 6 Armonred Motor Batteries.
DARDONI1 Squadron 31st D. C. 0.Lancers.
1Section.
33rd Indian Mountain Battery (less 1section).
55th Eield Compally Sappers and Miners.
2-41sb Dogras.
2-112th Infantry.
K U R R AGARIII-Detachment
~~
3-6th Gufkha Rifles.
NORTHERNWAZIRISTAN
MILITIA and PRONTIER
CONSTABULARY
holding
their usual posts.

Derajat Area.
DERA ISMAIL
RHAN27th Cavalry (less one Squadron).
27th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section). 1-76th Punj abis (less 2&Companys).
2-2nd Gurkha Rifles.
No, 7 Armoured Motor Battery.
TANR1 Squadron 27th Cavalry.
1 Section 27th Mountain Battery.
2 Platoons 1-76th Punjabis.
MANZAI75th Bield Coy. Sappers and Miners.
1 4 6 t h Punjabis,
.
JANDOLA,
KI~IRGI,GIRNI, JATTA-2 COYS. 1-76th Punjabis.
SOUTHERN
WAZIRISTAN
MILITIA PRONTIER
and CONSTABULARY
holding
their usual posts.
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APPENDIX E.
TERMS
ANNOUNCED TO

THE

WAZIRSAND MAHSUDS.

After conciultation between the Secretary of State and the Govern:ment of India it was decided that no pei+rnanentpolicy could be formulated a t that time, and that punitive operations against the tribesmen
.in Waziristan should be undcl-taken without delay. The following
.plan of operatione was decided on :-

'g

L

(a) Tochi TJrt~zirs.-Ternls as hereunder to be announced at a jirga
to be held a t Miranshah on the 9th November 1919. Troops
would advance to Datta Rhel and receive a reply on November
17th, 1919. Should the terms be refused, intensive aerial
bonlbardnient and punitive measures by land force would
be taken to enforce acceptance of our terms.
(b) MuAsz~ds.-Terms as given hereunder to be announced at a
jirga to be held a t Xhirgi on the 3rd November 1919. Reply
to be given by 11th November 1919. Should the terms be
refused, the whole of Rlahsud country would be subjected
to intensive aerial bombardment and if they still refused
to accept terms, punitive operations on land would also
commence, after the Tochi Waeirs had been dealt with,
to enforce acceptance,
(c) TViz?t(~ TTruzirs.--Terns and punitive measures to be held in
abeyance.

1.' Tochi T+t'zz.ir Terms.-The report that an amnesty has been secured
:for yo11 by the Alnir is withont fouiidatioii and there is no question of
your country being handed over to the Amir.
2. The Briticih Government will make roads, station troops and
build posts wherever i t may deem necessary or desirable in any part
,of the Tochi Agency, that is in any places which have been previously
,occupied or ally places on the Bannu-Datta Khel or Thal-Idak roads.
3. The Tochi Wazirr~will not intelfere in any way with the construc.tion of roach within the Tochi Agency. Such roads may be constructed
with any labour the British Government may wish to employ. Should
.tribal labour be employed, normal rates of pay will be given, and the
grant of contracts, if any, will be made on the same principle of normal
rates.
4. The. Tochi ~ a e i r will
s hand back all rifles, ammunition, bombs
.,andother military equipment taken since May lst, 1919.
,
5. The Tochi Wazirfi will not interfere with the movement of troops
.or convoys within the Tochi Agency, and will ,not molest aeroplanes
Lor their ocoupants flying over country East of the Durand Line.
( 159 1 *
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6. The Tochi Wazirs will pay a fine of Rs. 40,000 (Forty thousand)
and t h e Daurs of Tochi will pay a fine of Rs. 10,000 (Ten thousand).
7. Unpaid allomaiices mill be forfeited and allowances will not again
be granted to the Tochi Wazirs till tlie Blitish Government are satisfied
of their good behaviour. The allowances will then be subject to reconsideration as regards both the alnouiit and the distribution:
8. The Tochi IYazirs will deposit as a guarantee of good faith and
for t h e fulfilment of the above terms, 200 (Two hundred) rifles which
will b e retained until such t h e as the British Governinent is satisfied.
as to their bond fides. These rifles are to be either good Pass made
or of higher class. These rifles will be returnable within a period of
twelve months, subject to the continued good behavionr of the Tochi
Wazirs.
9. All sums already received froin t h e Tochi Wazirs by the Political Agents are to b e retained.
10. Sepoys and Sowars who deserted from the Nortliern Waziristan
Militia will not be considered outlaws once their rifles have been handed
in. All officers aiid n o n - c o ~ i s s i o n e dofficers must either hand themselves up for triaI or will remain liable to arrest wheii oppoltullity offers.
1. Ma7isud Terms.-The report that an amnesty has been secured
for you by the h i r is without fo~u~dntion
and there is no question of
your co~uitrybeing handed over to the Amir.
2. The British Government will make roads, station troops and
build posts in ally part of thc "Protected Area " wherever t h e Governnient may deem necessary or desirable. This includes the route from
Jandola to Sarwekai wid the Shahur Valley.
3. Mahsuds mill not interfere in ally way with the construction of
. roads within the " Protected Area." Such roads may be constrncted.
with any Iabonr Government may wish to empIoy. Should tribal
labour be employed normal rates of pap will b e given, and the grant
of contracts, if any, will be made on the same principle of normal rates.
4. The Mahsuds will hand back all rifles, ammunition, bombs and
other military equipment taken since May lst, 1919.
5. The llahsuds will not interfere with the movement of troops or
col~voyswithin the " Protected Area " and will not molest moplanes
or their occupallta flying over the country East of the Durand Line.
6. The Mahsuds will pay to the British Government a fine of Rs. 10,000
(Ten thousand).
7. Unpaid alIowances will be forfeited and aIlowances will not again
be granted t o the Mahsuds till the British Government is satisfied of
their good behaviour. The allowances will then be subject to reconsideration as regards both the amount and distribution.
8. The RIahsuds will deposit, as a guarantee of good faith and for
the fulfilment of t h e above terms, 200 (two hundred) rifles which will
be retained until such time as the British Government is satisfied as
A
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to their bon6 fides. These rifles are to be of not less value than Rs. 2008
(two hundred) each in the opinion of the Political Officers. These
rifles will be returnable within a period of 12 (twelve) months, subject
to the good behaviour of the Mahsuds.
9. The British Government will not admit of any claims 'for owingto payment alleged incorrect measurements of work done on the Bomal
road between October 1918 and June lst, 1919 or for other work done
for .the Military Works Services within the Wana Agency during that.
period.
10. For the purposes of the above terns the expression " Protected
Area " mill colnprise that coulltry lying withill the following bound-.
aries :East.--Rhittani
protected area and Bhittani Independent territory..
North.-From a point one mile North of the confluence of the Tank
Zaln with the Shahur Valley Westwards to Peak one mile South
of Point 4329 on the Tsappar Barh or Nanaghara Ridge. Thence,
Westmards to the confluence of the Sarela Nulla with the Shahur
Valley. Thence along the Ridge to Sureghar. Thence to Point
6822, three miles West-North-West of Sarwekai. Thence to the.
small knoll North of the Pass situated half a mile North of Wizha
Ghundai. Thence North-West to. Point 6150, the summit of
Minchan Baba. Thence Nod11 along the Ridge to Bobai and
Tiarza Po&. Thence West-North-Wost through Point 3551 to,
the boundary of Wazir Protected Territory. Reference on*
mile to the half-iiich map.
-
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APPENDIX F.
TO OM POSITION

THE

THREEECHELONS
O F THE TOCHICOLUMNON 1 3 ~ ~
NOVEMB~R1919.
irr
I '

No. I EchlelowColumn Headquarters-Major-General A. Skeen, C.M.G., Commanding.
No. 40 Divisional Signal Company, H. Q. Section.
No. 16 Pack Wireless Section.
16 Squadrons, 31staD.C. 0. Lancers.
1 Sectioii, 4.5-inch Howitzers, R. 3'. A.
No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery.
56th Eeld Conipany, Sappers and Miners.
2-61st Pioneers.
Northern Waziristan Militia Scouts (Cavalry and Infantry).
.67th Brigade (comprising-1-55th Coke's Rifles, 1-103rd Mahratta.
Light Infantry, 104th Wellesley's Rifles and 2-112th Infantry).
.Survey Section.
Medical Units.
Supply and Transport Units.
Also
2-21st Punjabis, and
2-76th Punjabis (less 2 Companies) both from 47th Brigade.
These troops were used for the defence of the L. of C. The
2-76th Punjabis were later transferred to the 68th Brigade
for the Derajat operations and on 21st December joined 67th
Brigade.

.No. 2 EchclonLieutenant-Colonel C. R, Willcinson, D.S.O., 2-152nd Punjabis,
Commaading.
74th Field Company, ~ a p p e r sand Miners.
3-34th P'loneers.
2-152nd Punjabis.
No. 6 Armoured Motor Battery.
Medical Unit.
Supply and Transport Unit.
X o . 3 Echelon-

Brigadier-General G. Gwyn-Thomas, C.M.G., D.S. O., Commanding.
1 Squadron (less 2 troops), 31st D. C. 9. Lancers.
No. 33 Indian Mountain Battery (less 1Section).
43rd Brigade (less 2-152nd Punjabis) comprising-(4-39th Garhwal
Rifles, 57th Wilde's Rifles, 82nd Punjabis, Medical Units and
Supply and Transport Units).
(
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APPENDIX G.
Commander-&
Major-General S. H. Climo, C.B., D.S.O.
Headquarters, Waziristan PorceDera Ismail Khan.
Atached hoopsRoyal Air Porce.
E2nd Wing, Heaclquarters, Dera Isrnail Khan.
No. 20 Squadron, Tanlr and Bannu.
1 Plight, No. 97 Squadron, Mianwali.
No. 99 Squadron, Mianwali.
DetailsDraught Cablc Section of 38th Divisional Signal Company.
Draught Cable Section of 40th Divisional Signal Section.
2 Mobile Pigeon Lofts.
Headquarters No. 10 Armoured Motor Brigade.
One Survey Section.
.
No. 4 Litho. Section.
Cowzmn?zderMajor-General A. Skeen, C.M.G.
Coltun~zHendquarters.
C'c~calr~y*2 Scluadrons, 31st D. C. 0. Lancers.
tl Squadron (less one troop), 21st P. A. V. 0. Cavalry (for advance
as far as Xotkai only).
Arlillery*011e Section, 4.5-inch I-Iowitzers, R. 3'. A.
?No. li IIountain Battery, R. G. A.
iNo. 27 Indian Mouiltain Battery.
*No. 33 Indian Mountain Battery.
No. 35 Indian Mountaiii Battery (joined 1;. of C. deIences doring
advance of Derajat Column).
Divisional Allllllunitioll Column.
S a ~ l ~ e ntzcZ
r s J$ine~s55th Field Company.
*74th Field Company.
One Survey Section.
?No. 4 Photo. Section.

* Toclli Column only.
t Dorajat Column only.
(
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,Signal

Units-

t38th Divisional Signal Company, H. Q. Section.
*40th Divisional Signal Company, H. Q. Section.
No. 16 Pack Wireless Station.

912fan1rya
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43rd Brigade. (Commander-Brigadier-General
G, OwynThomas, C.M.G., D.S.O.).
Brigade Signal Section.
4-39th Garhmal Rifles.
57th TVilde's Rifles.
82nd Punjabis.
2-152ncl Punjabis.
67tli Brigade. (Commander.-Brigadier-General P. G. Lucas,
C.R., C.S.I., D.S.O.).
Brigade Signal Section.
1-55th Coke's Rifles.
1-103rcl Mahratta LigM Infailtry.
104th Wellesley7s Rifles (relieved by 109th Infailtry from 68th
Urigacle in Desajat Column).
2-112th Infalltry.
Pioneers3-34th Silrh Pioneers.
2-6lst Pio~leers'(remained on L. of 'C. after Derajat Column
reached Xotlrai).

Militia*Northem Waziristan Militia (100 Infantry Scouts and 20 Mounted
Scouts).
tsouthern Waziristan Militia (100 Infantry Scouts).
NOTEThe 2-19th. Punjabis
,, 82nd Pnnjabis
,, 1-103rd Mnhratta Light Infantry
,, 2-112th Infantry
mere transferred to t,he L. of C during the latteY part of
December. They wele, later on i n the operations, replaced
in the force (with the exception of the 2-19th Punjabis who
came from t h e 68th Brigade and were only with the Derajat
Columil for 5 days) by the following battalions who joined
the Columi on the dates shown. 2-5th Gurkha Rifles 5th
January, 2-9th Gurkha Rifles 10th January, 4-3rd Gurkha
Rifles 12th Pebn~aryand 3-11th Gurlrha Rifles 16th Pebruary
1920.
The 3-11th Gurkha Rifles became Column troops, while the 3
remaining Gurlrha Regiments joined the 67th Brigade.

* Tochi Colum~lonly.

t Dorajat Column only.

I~D~I~NISTILATIV
UNITS
E
WITR STRIKINGFORCE.
s141~p?,I/llv~itsNo. 13 Divisional Sl~pplyand Transport Headquarters.
No. 12 Divisional Troops Snpply Section.
.
No. 13 Divisional Supply Column Headqual-ters.
No. 18 Divisioi~alSupply Tsrk.
Nos. 7 and 34 Brigade Supply Sections.
No. 381 Bakery Section.
No. 381 Rntchery Section.
;j No. 71 Bakery Section.
4 No. 71 Eutchery Section.
T,.n~lsl~orl
Lrnils48t11, 49tl1, GGtll, 67th (3 troops) and 71st Pack Mile Cor2s.
3rd Gover~llnentCa~nelCorps.
8th Pntiala Cal~lelCorps.
23iid, 5 3 ~ ~65th
1 , and 57th Silladar Camel Corps.
JletZiccrl UtiitsXos. 3 aricl 4 India11 Field Ambulances.
Mo. 12 Coll~bineciField Ambula~~ce.
KO. 1 Bearer Unit.
5 (!on~'l)incd Staging Sections.
KO.3 Sanitary Section.
Post Ojficcs3 Ficlcl Post Offices.

,
4
I

4

J
1

So. 7 Sc ctic~ji,I ~ ~ I Lines
~ L ~o/I CL' o r ~ ~ ) ~ t t i DeJetzces.
ctio

ArcnJ;rtr~r~;\li;ir~~vi~li-.-~Iit~1;~1~~t~ll
(ir~clusivc)t o Pezu (inclusive) alld
1tl:ik ( r ~ s ~ * l u ~ i v c ~ ) .
.L101tt),~(i4t(1t~r13rig;ldic*r-(~ ' I I C ~T.R It.
~ SI;iclachl~111,
CLb1.G.
lieccilq~rcrrtclrsJt:u,nu.
~C'cirillrg31st 1).t'. 0. L:IIICCM
(less 2 Sqnadrons).

Artiller!jI

One Sectiol~,S o . 33 Indian 3lountain'Battery.
1U-1". X'ost C:urls.
1 Section, 12-pr. Quns, F. C+. A.
1 Section, 6.3-inch R. ;\I. L. Bomitzers, 5'. G. A.

*:!

*

-

Later trenafercrl to S o . 2 Seetion, Tank Lines of Communic&tion.

Machine Gun Corpsgo. 5 Armoured Motor Battery
Post Machiile Guns.

.

Infantry45th Brigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal Section.
2-4th Rajputs.
2-25th Punjabis.
1-150tll Infantry.
2-154th Infantry.
1Company, Northern Waziristan 1Militia.

Arc

Supply UnitsNo. 9 Brigade Supply Section.
Nos. 77 a i d 78 Bakery Sections.,
Nos. 77 and 78 Butchery Sections.

DetailsPost 8tolres Mortars.
1Wireless Station.

No. 2 Section, Bo~znuLines of Communication Detentes.
Area-

From Idak t o Datta Khel (both inclusive). Datta Khel was.
evacuated on 25th ~ o v e m b e r1919.

CommanderBrigadier-General W. C. Welton, C.B., C.M.G.

Cavalry-2 Squadrons, 31st D. C. 0. Lancers.

ArtilleryNo. 33 Indian Mountain Battery (less one Sectiol?).
1 Sectioa, 15-pr. Guns, F. G. 8."'

Sc~ppersand Mine~s74th Field Company.

Infantry47th Brigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal Section.
2-21th Puajabis.
249th Punjabis.
3-151st Punjabi Rifles.
3-152nd Punjabis.
Northern Waziristail Militia (Jess one Company),
Supply Ullds. No. 76 Brigacle Supply Section.
No. 110 Brigade Supply Section.

CO?

I

I

X ~ j : ~ ~ Units-cantd.
l?j

No. 157 Eakery Section.
No. 157 Butchery Section.
Dt in ilsPost Stokes 3101tars.
Post RIachir~eGuns.
One ll'ireless Station.

I

N o . 1 Scclion, T a n k Lines oj Co~lanzz~~bicatio~z
Dejerlces.

Arca.
Daq-a Khan to Hathala (both inclusive), later from Darya Khan
tcqhalf way l~et~vcen
Khirgi and Jzndola.
Covt~rin~iderijrigaclier-General R. R. JVol.ga11, D.S.O.
Btndqr<cc.rtersLkra Isil~ajlXillail (later Tan];).
L'CL7.u 1r!/lBth C'avalry.
2l.t Y. A. V. 0. Cavalry (less 1 Squadron).
27th Light Caval~y.
-4 rtiller!j1 Pection, No. 33 Indian Nountain Battery.
I Section, 15-pr. Guns, B. G 1.
J l n c h i ~ l eIii~q~C'OY~S-Nos. Ci and 7 ,\rmoured Notor Batterie~;.
Tctht Jlachine C+luis.
lwj(wtr!/.ci211d131,igadcHeadquarteis.
J ~ipnde
I
Si6nal Scctio~~.
?-!l(~t'flI'unjabis.
2-!14t11 Illf~llltry,
L1-1(t!11d (+~.cvindicm.
2-1l:ltii Infantry (later nov veil np to Kotkai and juii~eilNo. 2
Fcctiol~.'t'al~lrL. of L'.).
~)~l?St11
Haluchis (later ~novedu p to dorasoghs elid joined 43rd
Hrig:i(l(~).
2-1TrOth 11lf:uity (jcrined 43rd Brigade a t Kotkai o ~29th
i
Uecem1)c.r 1!)19).
Ftn~ti~cnlIYazirjstan Xilitin (less Jetacb!:lent with Strilij:):
( '01l111111).
h'! j4klj l*tti!sKO. 115 Brigade Supply 8ection.
$ Xi,. 393 Uaker!; Section.
I<:,. 3'13 1311tclieryE~cticn.

DetnilsPost Stokes Mortars.
1 Stationary Wireless Plant.
No. 2 Section., Tank Lines o f Commzinicntiosz Detences.
AreaProm Hathala (exclusive) to Murtaza and Jandola (both inclusive),
later took over area from half way between Kllirgi and Jnndola
to Alinai Tangi (inclusive).
C'o~nnznnderBrigadier-General J. L. R. Gordon, C.B.
HeadqztortersMailzai (later Jaudola and Kotkai).
G1cb2-(l
Zyy1troop, 21st P. A. V. 0. Cavalry.
ArtilleryNo. 35 Indian Moui~tainBattery (less one Section).
2 10-pr. Guns (from No. 1 Section, Bannu L. ol C.).
Scvppers and Miners75th Field Company.
Iwfctnlry68th Brigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal Section.
3rd Guides (joined Strilring Column on 18th Januarc 1920).
2-19th Punjabis.
2-76th Punjabis (joined Strilring Column on 21st December 1919
until 28th January 1920).
109th Infantry (transferred to 67th Brigade on 17th December
1920).
SuppZy UnitsNo. 37 Brigade Supply Section.
4 No. 396 Bakery Section.
No. 396 Butchery Section.
DetailsPost Machine Guns.
No. 3 Pack Wirel~ssStation.

+

AD~IINISTRAT~VE
UNITS ON TEE LINES OB COMMUNICB(~ION.
Heudquurters-Inspector General of Communications. Brigadier-General H. C,
Tytler, D.S.O.
Signal h i t s - ;
No. 1 L. of C. Signs1 Section.
L. of C. Signal Company (Indian Telegraph Depnrtment).

I

I
i

I

I

Siynnl Units-contd.
EIeadquarters Pack Cable Section and one Brigade Section of
40th Divisional Signal Company.
1 Brigade Section of 38th Divisional Signal Company,
Tecl~nicrclUnitsAdvanced Engineer Parlrs, Bannu, Tank and Mari-Iadus.
26th Railway Compaiiy, Sappers and Miners.
12211d, 126th (one wing), 127th and 131st Railway Construction
Companies.
Detachment No. 9 Worlrs DepGt.
Detach~neritNo. 12 E. and M. Works DepGt.
11th Military Works Company.
3rd Punjab, 4th Rfadrns and 5th Madras Works Battalion.
Gth United Provinces Works Battalion.
13t11, 1311, lOlst, 103rd and 120th Military Works Labour Corps.
Wth, IlOth, ll2t'll and one wing 118th Labour Corps.
Supply U s ~ i t s No. 21 Porcc Supply and Transport Headquarters.
No. 13 Divisional Supply and Transport Headquarters.
No. 13 Divisional Supply Park.
No. 13 Divisional Troops Supply Sectioa.
Nos. 33, 36, 36, G1, 62 and 63 Brigade Supply Sections.
No. 13 Divisional Area Troops Supply Section.
Nos. 63, 64, 384, 401, 402 and 675 Bakery Sections.
Nos. G3, G4, 383, 384, 401, 402 and 675 Butchery Sections.
Kos. 2 2 , 23 and 24 Supply DepGt Headquarters.
Nos. 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 173, 174, 175, 176, & of
177, BOG, 207, 312, 313 a i d 314 Supply Dep6t Sections.
Kos. 22, 44 and 45 Supply Workshop Sections.
Kos. 7'7, 79, 80, 3 of 82, 135 and 136 Supply Tally Sections.
Cattle DcpGts a t l j a ~ i ~ and
i u Darya Khan.
2'1~cl1ts)~ai.l
Ih~its6-1tl1, (jrjtl~,68th (2 troop), 70th (G troops), 72nd a ~ i d10lst (6
troops) Puck Mule Corps.
1STtli l'nck Sub-Division.
58th ('1 troops), i59tl1, GOth (4 troops), Gand ailcl G9th (4 troops)
L) ri~ught('orps.
"ntl, 311, I;trh,7th and 71st (3 troops) Gover~i~neilt
Canlel Corps.
Kos. 7 , !), 14, 3U, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 49, 50, 54 and 81 Bullock
llillf Troops.
3rcl, .It11 (.4 troops), Gtl~,"ill, 8th, 9th (4 troops), l l t h , 12th, 14th
('4 trocjp"), l'itll, 18th and 19th (4 troops) Bullock Corps.
Slst (I; t~oops),8lnd and 83rd Local Carps.
1 U,jr.-c Tr,iilsport Company.
K o ~ 7,
. 3. !I, IU, 11 and 12 Ford Van Companies.
JIetlioul L')LitsBritish Hospital, Ban1111.

I

Medical Units-contd.
Iiidian General Hospital, Dera Ismail Khan.
Illdial1 General Hospital, Tank.
Illdial1 Geiieral Hospital, Baiinu.
Indian Station Hospital, Dardoni.
Nos. 38, 43 and 49 Indian General Hospitals.
Nos. 7, 27, 38 and 118 Casualty Clearing Stations.
Nos. 16, 25, 27, 43 and 64 Coinbilled Pield Ambulances.
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 41 and 43 British and 55, 59, 60 and 66
Indian Staging Sections.
Nos. 19 and 22 X-Ray Sections.
Nos. 4, 8 nild 36 Sanitary Sections.
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Bleaching Polvder Laboratories.
Nos. 11 and 13 Advanced DepGts, Medical Stores.
No. 3 Motor Ambulance Convoy.
No. 23 Motor Ambulance Convoy (less one Section).
Veterinary UnitsNos. 5, 14 and 21 Pield Veterinary Sections.
Nos. 26 and 27 Tield Veterinary Sections (Camels).
No. 4 Base Depdt Veterinary Stores.
Renzou?zts-

Remount Depdt, Dera Ismail Khan.
Remoui~tDepdt, Bai~ilu.
Reinount Depbt, Tank.
OrdqznnceAdvanced Ordnance DepAt, Bannu.
Advanced Ordnance Depdt, Tank.
Ordilaiice Transit Depdt, lfari-Indus.
No. 34 Ordnance Mobile Workshop, Eannu.
Post Offices3 Dield Post 0ffick6.

APPENDIX H.
DETAILOF TROOPSADVANCING
1
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4 JANUARY
~ ~ 1920.

Advanced GziurdCommander-Lieutenant-Colonel H. Herdon, C.I.E. (1-55t5
Coke's Rifles).
1-52th Coke's Rifles.
2 Companies, 2-5th Gurlrha Rifles.
1 Section, No. 27 Iildian Mountaill Battery.
Advancecl Party, KO. 38 Divisional Signal Company' (H. &.
Section).
Speciul P l c ~ ~ Guc~rdtk
Gurkha Rifles).
2 4 t h Gurkha Rifles (less 2 Companies).
.Jlnin BodyCoiiimander-Major-General A. Skeen, C.M.C.
1Troop, 21st Cavalry.
No. G Mountain Battery (less 1 Section).
No. 27 Indian Mountain Battery (less 2 Sections).
2-76th Punjabis.
2 Companies, 109th Infantry.
3-34th Sikh Pioneers.
55th Pield Company, Sapperu and Miners.
No. 38 Divisional Signal Company H. &. Section (less Advanced
Party).
No. 1 G Pnck Wireless Station.
Survey Section.
Photo. Section, 2nd Pappcrs ancl RIiners.
Rear GtrrirdCommanclcr-IvIajor
A. E. PrIahon, D.S.O. (attached 109th
Infantry).
109th Infantry (less 2 Companies).
Co~-eri?~y
vzoce of Tra~zsporton rocd in rear of C'olu?nnCommander-Brigsdier-General F.C+. Lucas, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O.
2-9th Gurkha Rifles.
57th JVilde's Rifles.
1 Section, No. 6 Mountain Battery, R. Q. A.
1 Section, KO, 27 Indian hlountain Battery.

1

Staternelzt skozuing casualties ilz the Tlrnziriston Force jroljz 2Gth October
1919 to 1st Jlmy 1920.
I

I

Average
Strength
(whole
Force).

ADMISSIONS.

-

Siclr.

-

Wounded.
-

Operalion Areas.
British oficors

. ..

Britjsh other ranks

a

.

. .
.
Indian other ranks .
Indian officers

Non-oombatant rankfl.

1,094

72

41

939

40

1

1,294

55

64

41,843

3,915

1,501

37,870

1,360

83,040

,

1

.,.

540

...

586

Indian other ranks

...

. .

Non.combatant ranks.

TOTAL

.
.

I

...

..

39

5.442

. . .
British other ranks .
.
Indjan officers .
. .

.,.

Wounded

--

Lines oJ Com?nt~?~icatio?z.
Areas.
British officers

1
Sick.

!1

1,646

!

:::14,

16,943

--

1

33,093

'

I

12

14

2

4

G

1

14

8

1

D O

44 1

26

792

346

1,261

1

57

7
G8

Stcl.te~nentshouring casualties i n the Derajat Colwnlz from 11272 December
1919 to 8th April 1920.
--

I

-

Killed.
I --

- -British officer~

. .

Indian officers

.

Indian other rank

,

.

28

,

. .
.
. . . .'

I

I

15

323

Missing.

I Wounded.

ORGANIZ,~TION
AND WORKINC~
O F THE LINES O F COI~IRIUNICAT~ON
O1P
T 3 r ~ z FOROX,
~ ~ ~1919-20.
s ~ ~ ~
I . Plcclz of Operations.
1. Briefly the plan of campaign was to concentrates force of 2 Brigades
at Dardoni early in November 1919 which would move on Datta Khel
aiid nperste in the upper Tochi as eventllalities demanded.
After the co~rclnsionof these operatioils a large portion of the Force
was to move to the Sonther~lLine by road and operate against the
Mahsuds.
2. The followillg reserves were to be laid in :At B a n i l ~26~ days for all troops a t Bannn and beyond.
At Tank 15 days for the garrison.
At Dardoni 15 days for the Tochi Colnn~lland the garrison.
The numbers on which reserves of supplies were to be calculated
were :BannuBritish.
Indianh
Animals
DardoniBritisll.
Indians
Animals

.

.
.
.

.

.
.

.

.
.

.

.

.
.
.

.
.

.

.
.

.

.
.
.

.

. . . . . . . . . .

25,000
43,000
20,000
700
25,000
13,000

Appelildix I shows Reserve of Rations, held on 1 March 1920.
3. On the 15th November the colurni~marched to Datto MheC.
On 17th November, t h e Tochi Ws~zirscoilceded to our terms. On the
25th November the transfer of troops t o the Southern Line was commenced, last Echelon reaching Tank on the 5th December.

2. Lines of C'ommunication.
1. The lines of comm~u~icatiou
for Waziristan Force comprised two)
lines (see map No. 6).
(i)the line from Kalabagh vici 13annu to Dardoni (and later to
Datta Khel) which provided for the requiremeuts of t h e
Forces which operated against the Northern Wazirs, There
was also a post a t Mianwali t o meet the requirements of
the Royal Air Force.
(ii)(a) the line from Kalabagh vid Tank t o Piazha Ragliza which
served the Borce operating against the Mahsuds.
(6) Subsidiary to (ii)(a) was a line from Darya Khan to Tank,
( 174. )

,

(iii) an offshoot of (ii) (b) t o provide for the requirements of the
Force operating a.gainst the Sherannis was organized vid'
Paggu to Draband.
The above liiles were oganizecl with sections as follows :-

Secrio9za rind POP~S.

Administrative Commandants and'
Staff.
<
,.
ICalabagh Secbion.
Administrative Commandant
(graded as D. A. Q. M. G.)
Kalabagh to Lnki Marwat including Mianwali
post
1 Staff Captain.
Bannu Section,
Administrative Cemmanclant
(graded as A. Q. hf. G.)
Laki fifarwat (exclusive) to Saidgi (escl~~sive)
I t also included Latambaf
2 Staff Captains.
Idalc Section.
Administrativo Commandant
(graded as D. A. Q. &I. G,)
Saiclgi (i~lclusive)to Idal; (inclnsivc)
1 Staff Lioutenant.
Darcloni Section.
Administrative Commandant.
(graded as D. A. Q.h1. G.)
Idalt (exclnsive) to Dardoni (inclusive)
2 Staff Captains.
Dutta ICliel Section.*
Administrative Commandant
(graded as D. A. Q. M. G.)
Dordoni (exclusive) to Datta IChel (inclnsive)
1 Stnff Captain.
* Aftor t,llo conclusions of opernhions against the Tochi Wazirs the head of the Line;
of Communication was witlldram to Dardoni.
-

. . . . . . .

. . . .

. .
.

.

.

.

Knlnbagh Section.
As above.
This scction was common to both Northern and
Southern Division.
Darya Klian Seckion.
~dminislratkeCommandant
(graded as D. A. Q.M. G.)
Railliead tolcft bank of the Indus including post
a t Iiarlu and Gtean~orPoint.
2 Staff Captains.
Administrative Comman&nt
D. I. IZhan Sootion.
(graded as D. A. Q. M. G.)
Loft bank of tho Indus (osolusive) including 1 Stnff Captain D. I. K.
posts a t D. I. Khan, Potnh, Hnthala.
1 Staff Captain, Draband.
1 Staff Lieutenant, Saggu.
Saggi~,Drabnnd
Administrative Conimandant
Tnnk Section.
(graded as D. A. Q. M. O.)
Tanlc (inclusive) to Jandob (exclnsive) with. 1 Staff Captain, with an administrativo Commandant,
P O ~ H
a t Tank, ICour Bridge Manzni, Khirgi.
(graded as Staff Captain) and
1 Staff Lientenant a t each
post.
Administrative Commandant
Jandola Section.
(graded as A. Q. M. G.)
J a ~ d o l a(inclusive) to Pianha Raghza (inelusive) 1 Staff Captein. Posts being,
administered as in the Tank
with posts a t Jnndola, Kotkai, Sors Rogha,
Section.
Piazha Raghza.

. . .

. . . . . .

3. The establishment sanctioned for I. 8. C. Headquarters was as
-~ollows:I

. .

OneA.A.andQ,hf.G.,D.A.A.G.
Two D. A. A. and Q. 11. G.
,
,
Two Staff Cept~ins,A. D. 8. and T., A. D. W.,
A.D.R.T.,A.D.Af.8.

.

.

D.A.D.V.S.
A. D. Remounts.

Clerical establishinents mere completed froin civilian clerks. Proyost
and Rest Camp establishnlents mere filled as far ns possible by convalescents.

3. Clznmcte~isticsof the L. of C. in Wazi~istnnRaitwnys.
1. Certain characteristics of the con~illunication by rail and road
in Waziristail lnilitated against simplicity of working. Goods reaching
Mari-Inclus have to be bransferred from broacl to narrow gauge and
ferried across on flats or else transported across the Indus by barge
or boat and loaded into narrow gange t,rucl~son the right bank. One
line of supply had t o be fed at the espense of the other and that side
where active operations mere not in progress was consistently cut down
to a bare minimum. Escept for a period iu Julie and July ~vhenferries
cannot carry cleclr: loacls, the linlitiiig factor as regards carrying capacity
is the I<.B. Railway whose daily average carryiilg capacity is 660 tons.
'The average camying capacity of the ferry except lor a portion of June
and July is approximately 800 tons.
2. Roccds.-The illaiil road to Tanlr: runs froin D. I . Khan, a place
which is not served by the narrow gauge railway at all. Matters here
were alleviated to some extent by laying the Decauville along the D. I.
Khan-Tanlr: Road, thus illcreasing the tolinage a t the expense of the
road. Lateral co~nmullicationsaTe also deficient, in that the Advanced
Bases and railheads of Bannu and Tank are not coil~iected directly
either by road or rail. The necessity for transferring stores from Bannu
to ~ a i i by
k rail wid Lakki Malwat seriously effected the ton~lageavailable
for nlailltaining the forces from Kalabagh.
3. Movements of troops from Rannu to Tanlr on the coilclusioll of
operations in the Tochi were carried out vid Pezu a ~ thence
~ d alongside
the railway to Tank. The going from Pezu to Tank is sandy and heavy
and water difficulties are great. Wheeled transport can~lotuse the road,
but must proceed wid D. I. Khan iiivolviiig a detour of 80 mileg.
4. Kalabagh, the principal railway centre for Waziristan cannot be
reached by road at all.
5. Forward com~nunicationin the Tochi beyond Bail~iuco~lsistsof
a, road for wheeled traffic, as far as Datta Khel, bkyond which place
no operations were undertaken.
The road is illadequate as a military road, aiid there is no alternative
route. A track for pack transport was made clear of the metalled road,
from the Baran river 4 miles out of Bannu, to Dardoni, and later to
Datta Khel.

6. Forward of Tank, there are alternative routes as far as Khirgi,
which consist of a metalled Rl. T. road e;id Raur Bridge to Khirgi in two
stages, and a cross couiltrp camel track wid Chaisail Rach to Khirgi
in one stage. I11 addition the Tank-Kaur railway extensioil has been
successf~~lly
used for the carriage of war material of all sorts.
7. Reyoild Ichirgi there was a double camel track only, which followed
the Tank Zanl for the greater part of its course.
S. Telephonic communication was established throughout the area
with the exception of a trunk line to Kalabagh.
a
"

4. Position of I. G. C., H.9.
1. The Headquarters of the L. of C. was at first located at Ralabagh
but owing to the poor communication by road and rail from Kalabagh,
and the absence of telephonic coinmunication with Borce Headqual%ers,
tlie L. of C. headquarters mas transferred to D. I. Khan 011 8th October.
5. The position of depdts.
1. The base for the Force was at Lahore and the requirements of the
Force were forwarded uid Mari-Indus (where a Base Transit dep6t was
established) Kalabagh and to a nlinor degree oid Darya Khan to advailced DepBta within-the Force as follows :(i)Xzcpp1ies.-Main Supply Dep6ts were located at Bannu for
the Northelx and a t Tank for the Southern Line.
Froill tlie above DepBts Reserves of rations, grain, fodder and
iuel, were stocked at Posts as shown in Appendix I attached.
(ii) Ord~zn?lce.-~4dvanced ordnance dep8ts were established at
Railnu and Tank.
Fronl these, Ordnance Dumps were established at Dardoni,
Ja~ldolaand Sorarogha to meet the requirements of advanced
troops. 111 addition an officers' shop was opened at the
latter place.
~ImmnaitionPnrlts were established at Dardoni and Jandola
\\.it11 anlill~initionrefilling poiilts at Datta Khel and Piazha
Raghza.
(2ii) Enyineer Pield Parks.-Advanced Engineer Tield Parks were
established a t Bannu and Tank and iron1 these, Engineer
Dump. mere located at Dardoni and Datta Khel on the
xol.thera Line and a t Jandola and Sorarogha on the Southern.
[iv) R C I I I . O I L ) L ~ S . - R ~sections
I ~ O U ~were
~
established a t Bannu
allclD. I. Khan with advanced Sections at Tank and Kotltai.
(p.) Aledical Stores.-Medical
Store DepBts were located at Bannu,
D. I. Khan and Khirgi.

.

N.B.-I.

(narrow gaug..).

r

I
Bannu to Idali.

I1-

Id& t o Dardoni.

/

j

Dardoni to Datta Khel.

Kalabagh Bannu
(nirrow gauge).

Xalabagh to Kaur

Rhilnpay

I

1
.

and bullock).

Draft animsl Transport (pony

Darya Khan to Dera Ismail
Iihan.

hl~llock)Tmnsport,.

Dera Islnsil Iihan
to Tank.

i

gauge).

I

'

'

Mecl~snizalTrans- Pack Camel Transport (Ford Vmls).

Khirgi to Piazha
Raghza.

Vans on road and Pack
Aninis1 Transport (mule and
cnmel) on Camel track.

ICanr Bridge to
Kliirgi.

Pock animal Transport (mnle
and camel) on Camel track.

vans) on the rond.

I! D;caurille
Railway
{GO
centimetre

i

I'

I

. Kalabagh Bannu Railmag Draft animzl (mnle, pony and 3feclmnical Transport (Ford Mccllanical Transport (Ford

/
i

Halabagh to Bannu.

2. Camels were usually workecl on a 6-7th Basis and Draft Corps on a 9-10th Basis.
3. Forward of Datta Khel and Piazha Raghza the D G a ~ a ~ ~ o l n operated
mn
with their o m Transport (Pack mule and cmqd).

Draft animal Transport (pony and bullock) and hired pack camels were employed between D e n Ismail Iihan and Drsbsnd.

Southern Line.

Northern Line

Line.

Pornzs of Tma~zsportEmployed.
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(vi) Veterinary Stores.-Base Veterinary St,ores were located first
at Bannu for the Tochi Operations and later at D. I. Khan
for the Derajat Column.
(1:ii) Postal.-Base Post-Offices were located at Bannu and D. I.
Khan.
(viii) ,Stcctionery.-A Stationery Depdt mas established at Kalabagh.
(ix)Red Cross.-Red Cross DepSts were located at Bailnu and
Dera Ismail Khan, with advanced Depdts at Tank and
Jandola.
(2) Lice Stock.-Cattle DepSts were located on the Northern Line
a t Bannu, on Southern Line a t Darya IChail ~vit'ha SubDepdt at Tank. (Two thousand sheep were received at
Darya s h a l l daily by special trains fro111 Rawalpindi and
Lahore.) TheDepSt on the No~thenlLine was filled by
local purchase.
6. Trcmsportntion.
I. Tlie E'orces on both the Northern and Southeni Line were supplied
mainly through Kalabagh through which an average of 600 tons and
200 persoii?ielancl a maximum of 680 tolls and 180 personnel mere transported to Bsnnu and Tank.
O\i,ing to the limited receiving capacity at 14ari-Il1duf;?nly 60 broad
gauge wagons could be discharged daily by direct transhipment or into
the small transit dumps.
Small reserves of supplies (fodder and grain) a i d military wo&s
stores mere maintained but the lack of regular reserve depdts with sidings
caused an uneven flow on the narrow gauge, especially of fodder, and
helice i t was often found that less urgent military works stores were
forwarded to avoid congestion or the narrow gauge ran below its full
capacity.
e
that the Kalabagh-Bannu Railway is not epipped
I t is to l ~ noted
to takc t4ie same anlount of tonnage to Tank as to Bannu, Vacuum stock
IJ~-ingcsscntial ill tlie T a i ~ ksection.
2. Thc Deoauville was able to carry froin Dera Isillail Khan to Tnnh
a daily :lverngc ofl G U tons supplies,
1,tiUU &el).
100 pwsonnel.
3. The daily average delivered by rail to lCaur E d g e was 2S0 tons.
~~iaxiiuum
of 2CIO tons was reached.
4. The average to~lilagedelivered at tlie Head of each Lilie of Conlw;ll!ication was ns follu~vs:Datta Hllel

.

Pjnzlla Raghza

.

.

,

.

.

. .

300 maintensnce and reservc.
100 tone maintenance.

.

,

,

5. On the Southern Line ' going ' in the Tank Zam was particularly
bad for paclr transport and it became llecessary to work camelv on a
2 basis (illstead of the normal $ basis) and to allow 18 per cent, for
cnsualties and lameness.
6. Tile following RI. T. (Ford Van) Companies worked 011 the L.
of C. Bgsirlst each is shown the approximate percentage of valls
were in worlrshops daily :-

. No. 7 h[. T. Conipany
,, 6
,, 9

r,

7,

9,

79

10

3,

t>

1,

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .

.
e
-

.

.
.

2

per cent.
40

1

9
4

G

G

. . . 15
,,
" .
,, 12 ,,
2
2
~ l M.
l T. Cornpanys were worked on a basis of 78 per cent. of fit
cars. Deficiency of persolirlel iu Transport units both in n~ullbersalld
efficiellcy when judged ou pre-war standards increased consider&ly
the strain upon the Trailsport Service.
despite the difficulties nrhich ]lad to be coiltended with this
Transport perforlnecl very valuable service.
1r11

,I

, 7'. Control of Railzficcy tonnage.
The supplies by rail to Mari-Indus and Darya K h a n were regulated
through decade tonnage demailds on the Base Lahore and allotments
by the Base.
8. System of Supply to the Striking Force.
1. As the Striking Borce advanced it laid in a t e a c h place destined
t o be a post on tllc Line of Communication 10 d a y s supply for itself
arid the eventual garrison.
2. When a9 further advance was made, the c o l t ~ m nlifted forward,
the 10 days reserve, leaving at each Post 10 d a y s reserve for the
garrison.
3. After the completion of the above arrangements the Line of
Comlllunicatioll was extelicled to include each post in s~~cccessioii
and
an Administrative comnlaudant was placed in charge.

9. Improve7nellt.s to Comntzw~icationsand EoZZi~zyStock.
1. Rc~i1zcnys.-~ldditional sidings were placed in t h e Dep6ts a t Rlarjc
Inclus, Darya Khan, Bannu and Tanlr.
A Decauville Railway was laid between D. I. K h a n and Tanlr.
Narrow gauge and Decauville truclra were cribbed for fodder.
In additioil a proporti011 of Decauville truclcs were converted for
evacuation of the sick, for carriage of sheep alld alsb for personael.
2. Rands.-The road Darya Khan-D. I. Khan was grassed.

The ~ o a dHathala-Draband was improved so as to take ambulance
motors.
A motor road was constnlcted from Manzai to Ehirgi and later
oxtended to Jandola. The track from Jandola to Piazha Raghza was.
also improved.
10. Reinfo~cements.
1. A claily average of 200 personnel including civilian traffic was,
conveyed by the K. B. Eailway to Bannu and Tank.
The Decauville Railway was capable of carrying 100 personnel i n
addition to supplies and live stoclr thus doing away with the route
march from D. I. Ichan to Tank.
Thus it was fo~zndeasy to forward expeditiously all reinforcements
even at the greatest time of pressure.
2. Advanced Bt~seCainps were situated at Bsnnu, D. I. Khan and
Tank where all deficiencies in clothing and equipment reinforcements
were made good.
Rest, Reinforcement and Convalescent Camps were located as
shown in Sub-Appendix I1 attached.

At all places on the L. of C. suficient arrangenlents were made
for incineratioll and bathing but on account of the great number of
transport animals employed, sanitation was difficult. The difficulty
was partly inet by employing local labour and splitting up Sanitary
Sections to supervise. Early in the year a considerable reillforcement
of sweepers was received froin India and sanitation was placed on a
satisfactory basis.
12. PVc~terS t ~ p p l y .
I t was found necessary in all places to improve the water supply
to enable troops t o obtain pure water. Force pumps, pulsometres and.
engines were installed, tube wells sunk and all water was chloriilated
in masonary or iron tanks provided for the purpose. Where an extensive pipe system was not laid and where it was possible to use water
carts, these were employed t o facilitate a pure supply of clrinlcing water
for the troops. The existing supply of drinlril~gwater for the echelons
a t Shah Baz Xhel and Abizar during their march from Bann~lvi6 Pezu
and Abizar to Tank, was the lllost precarious but this was sul~plemented
b y water being rnn ont in tanlrs from Tanlr along the I<.B. Railway.

1. The~meansof evacuation employed were camel lrajawab, motor
ambulance, ambulance trail1 (both ilarrow and broad gauge) and
Decauville (in specially converted truclrs). Hospital accommodation
proved adequate for the troops whose health as a whole was good.

2. Owing to an epidemic of Influenza, coilgestion did arise, al!d a
T u r t h e ~congestion arose as the echelons marched froin the Tochi to the
Berajat. Cases mere not usually evacuated from the Forces to Rawal
Pindi unless the number of oases increased to such an esteilt as to congest
hospitals. Indian General Hospitals vere never unduly empty but
were kept as full as safety allowed.
p
F~

1. Mol~roCallteelis were located at Msri-Iadus and Kalabagh and
proved of great value.
)
2. At Darya Khan, Bannu, Talk and I h u r Bridge all troops arriving
b y rail mere serves w i t h hot tea before marching to Rest Ca~nps.
3. Branches of Rladan's Canteen were opened under the drection of
the S,and T. atKalabagh

. . . .
. . . .

. .

Bannu
D. 1. Khan
Tank
Manzai
,
Jandola
Kotlrai
Piazha R.ag11z~ .

.

,

(Headqusrtors ~ v i t l one
l month'e
'reserve.)

. .
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

J

. . , . . . .
.

.

.

.

There was also a Canteen with the Derajat Colunli~at Ladha.

15. Masse.s

clnd

Clubs Libray.

1. Btanda.rd messes with folding funiit,ure, crockery and sc~vants
rconnpletewere established at places meiltiolled in Appendix F attac,hed
and contributed greatly to the comforts of 6. 0 8 . and B. 0. Rs.
A conve~iielltmlit was fouild to be :A iness for 12 B. 0s. (expandable to 18 3.0 s ) .
A lness for 20 B. 0.Rs.

8oldiers Clubs mere located a t B). I. Khan, Bannu and Tank.
2. A circulating Library for Indian Troops existed n t D. I. Iihan.

16. Dairies.
Dairies were located a t Kalabagh, Bannu, D. 1. Lihan, Tank allcl
.Janaola which sufEced for Sospita! requi~ements,tlie surl3lus (if any)
being pold to B. 0s. and B. 0.Rs, messes.

17. Labour.
The labour organization was not altogether satisfactory, as no labour
coi~troleither as a separate directorate, or as a branch of the 8. and
T. Control was established. The D. A. and Q. M. G. or t h e I. E. S.
had no one of technical knowledge or whole time officer, to study the
ecollomical use of labour. (Note.--The future labour organization now
specified provides for this and for the general principles of labour organization as a Q. M. G.'s Service.)
I

18. Miscellaneous Personnel.

1

I
I

The want of employment companies and followers' companies was
much felt, a unit is required by which the many miscellaneous requirements in personnel outside organised services, can be furnished. (Note.
-This is being organised.)

Held on. 1st March.

.

Piaza Raghza
Sorarogha
Icotkai

.

. .

.
.

10

,,
,,

10

,,

10

for its garrison and R.U
beyond.

.

30

,,
,,

Tank

30

,,

40

,,

Manzai

. .
. . .

. .
. . Dardoni . . .
Idak .
. .
/ Saidgi . . .
Bannu .
. .
D. I.Khan

Bwnu line

,

.

Kaur Bridge

1

30

30 ,,

30
30

40

,,
,,
,,

for its garrison and
certain minor oonstabulary posts and
10 days for its garriMon and all posts up
t o Ladha.

I

I

I

I

for its garrison and
10 days for all posts
beyond.

I

N.B.-Lately resemes have been increased to 60 dags across the Indus, the surplus
being kept a t Tank and Bannu end e t Dera Ismail Khan for that Post,

N

The following table shows the accommodation provided in Rest,

Reinforcement and Convalescent Camps at the various posts on the.
Line of Communication :-

Nature of Camps

Place.

Mari Indus

ICalabagh

.

.
.

13nnnu

.
.

Idak

.

Darcloni

. .

Bannu

Dnryn IChnn
n a r y 8 IC11i-m

D. I. Khan
D. I. Khan

.
.

Best

,

Rest

Rest

.

.

.

. . .
,
. .

.

.

.

. . .
Rest
. . .
, Rest
. . .
. ( Reinforoement . 1
. Rest . . .

.

.
.

.
.
. .

Reinforcement Convalescent.
Rest

Reinforcement

28

1

40

200

,..

...

,

400

D. I. IChnn

.

Tmk

,

.

Tank

Convalescent

. .
illanzl~i .
. .
kli~snz&i .
. .
ICaur Bridge

Ilhirgi

Rest and Reinforcement.

.

Jand~ls

.

Rest
nest

Convnlcscent
Rest

.

.
.

Rest

.
,

.

.

.

.
.

. .
. .. ,
.

Convalescent

Rest
Rest

. .

.
,

. . .
. . .

I

.....

.I

Reinforcement

Rest

'
I
12

...

11
1

40

I

...

48

...

140

,,.

190

20
..,
1G

I

'200

100
GOO
BOO

...

300

..,

388

16

18

300

16

26

200

14

30

200

...

APPENDIX L.
Main sub-divisions

o j Darwesh I<?~elW n z i ~ san,d Mahsz~ds.with fighting

st~engths.
UTRlANZAI

!

Tribe.

----

(TOCRI)
WAZIRS.

Sub-tribe.

i

Madda Khel (2,000)

Ibmhim Iihel (5,600)

"Wali IChel(5,OOO)

I

i'

-

.

.

Place of residence.*

IChaza Valley. Maizar and
- Shorann~.
a
and Mami
Manzar Khel (400)
. Between D ~ t t Khol
Rogha, head of IChaisora.
Tori IChzl (3,200)
,
Spinwarn on Icaitu, across
Tochi and ICha,isora Valleys
to niouth of Sliaktu.
Balrlta Khol (1,000)
, Majority in Baiulu District
ncar lnoaths of Tochi and
IChaisora. Some in Shalval
Plain (S, of Maizar).
Jani Khol (1,000)
, Bannu District near mouth of
Iihaisora wit11 grazing lands
near Shamal.
Kabul IChel (including Malik- I n winter on Kurrani between
shahi) (3,000).
Thal and Zarwam. Summer
in Birmal (Afghanistan).
IChel
(1,000)
.
,
Bora
Sheratala Plain and Palosin
plain in Kaitu. Summer
quarters-head of IChaisora
Wuzi Khcl (800)
Head of IClaisor~.
Khaddar IChcl (680)
, Toclii bctween Datta Xhel
and Sheranni.
Haasan Khol (400)
Xnitu Valley.
lfigrate to
Lmam Range on Khost
border in Summer.

.

.

I

,

P o h m i t Khel (2,880)

.

.

.

.. . ,

.

'1

* Tho great majority of both Tochi and Wana Wazirs are iionladic and migrate
+very year with their families t o their summer grazing grounds, which are in some
cases in British territory.,
AHMADZAI (WANA) WAZIRS.
Sub-tribe.

Tribe.

I

. .
Kolu Khel (8,500)
I Nasradin (7.200)*
.
..
HathiIChd (2,000)
.
Shin (Sani) Xhel \
Sirki IChel (800) .
(3,400).
Umarzai(6OO) .
..
Iaperka (1,300)

,

I

.
.

I1

,
,
,

Place of residence.

-

-

Bannu District.
Summer
quarters Shakai Plain and
head of Khaisora.
Wana Wazirs. Have settle.
ments N. of Bannu.
N. E. of Bannu. Possess
land in Wnna and Shakai.
Bannu and Wana.
Bannu Dist~iot.
Shaktu
Valley near Mandanwam.
Graze their flocks near Raz.
malr in Summer.

I
*Nasradin (main Sub-divisions):Shadi KhalKhojal Khel (170).
Bomi Khel (3,350)Zalli Khel (1,200).
Tojiya (or Taji) Khel (1,GOO).
( 186 )

Tribo.

Plaoe of roaidonoe

Sub-tribc.

---

-

----

d-ialrsuds.
Alizai (4,600)

.

Mhnzai (3,000)
Shabi IChol (1,600)

.
. ...
,
Chahar Ilhel (GOO)
Khal~luIChol (300)
.
CTdoshai (700) .
Badanzai (300) .
..

Nana ICho1 (1,500)*
Aimal IZ.11el (2,000)*
Shingi (1,000)
Band IChel (300)
Shaman Khel

.

. .
. .

* Nana ICliel (main sub-divisions):Abdur Rahman ICliel.
Nekaan IChol.
Haibnt IChol.
Jalal Khel.
ICikarai.
Gigar Khol.
Umer IChel.
Urmar Khel

,

.
..
,
,

.,

Mostly bctmoon the two branohm of the Tank Zam and
along Shaliur.

I

No sepemte settlementsscottorod ovor 3lahsud
oountry.

CALCUTTA
SUPEI1INTENDENT GOVERNMENT PltINTINO, mDIA

8, nbannas amnm

.

From [he Jibray of

Arthur Paul

1

